

No. _____, Original

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF TEXAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF
GEORGIA, STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND STATE OF
WISCONSIN,

Defendants.

**MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR STAY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STAY**

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**MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR STAY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STAY**

Pursuant to S.Ct. Rules 21, 23, and 17.2 and pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 65, the State of Texas (“Plaintiff State”) respectfully moves this Court to enter an administrative stay and temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin the States of Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively, the “Defendant States”) and all of their agents, officers, presidential electors, and others acting in concert from taking action to certify presidential electors or to have such electors take any official action—including without limitation participating in the electoral college or voting for a presidential candidate—until further order of this Court, and to preliminarily enjoin

and to stay such actions pending the final resolution of this action on the merits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lawful elections are the heart of our freedoms. “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). Trust in the integrity of that process is the glue that binds our citizenry and the States in this Union.

Elections face the competing goals of maximizing and counting *lawful* votes but minimizing and excluding *unlawful* ones. *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964); *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (“the votes eligible for inclusion in the certification are the votes meeting the properly established legal requirements”) (“*Bush II*”); compare 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1)-(2) (2018) *with id.* § 20501(b)(3)-(4). Moreover, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555. Reviewing election results requires not only counting lawful votes but also eliminating unlawful ones.

It is an understatement to say that 2020 was not a good year. In addition to a divided and partisan national mood, the country faced the COVID-19 pandemic. Certain officials in the Defendant States presented the pandemic as the justification for ignoring state laws regarding absentee and mail-in

voting. The Defendant States flooded their citizenry with tens of millions of ballot applications and ballots in derogation of statutory controls as to how they are lawfully received, evaluated, and counted. Whether well intentioned or not, these unconstitutional acts had the same *uniform effect*—they made the 2020 election less secure in the Defendant States. Those changes are inconsistent with relevant state laws and were made by non-legislative entities, without any consent by the state legislatures. The acts of these officials thus directly violated the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; *id.* art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

This case presents a question of law: Did the Defendant States violate the Electors Clause by taking non-legislative actions to change the election rules that would govern the appointment of presidential electors? These non-legislative changes to the Defendant States' election laws facilitated the casting and counting of ballots in violation of state law, which, in turn, violated the Electors Clause of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. By these unlawful acts, the Defendant States have not only tainted the integrity of their own citizens' vote, but their actions have also debased the votes of citizens in Plaintiff State and other States that remained loyal to the Constitution.

Elections for federal office must comport with federal constitutional standards, *see Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 103-05, and executive branch government officials cannot subvert these constitutional requirements, no matter their stated intent. For presidential elections, each State must appoint its Electors to the electoral college in a manner that complies with the

Constitution, specifically the Electors Clause requirement that only state *legislatures* may set the rules governing the appointment of electors and the elections upon which such appointment is based.¹

Constitutional Background

The Electors Clause requires that each State “shall appoint” its Presidential Electors “in such Manner as the *Legislature thereof* may direct.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added); *cf. id.* art. I, § 4 (similar for time, place, and manner of federal legislative elections). “[T]he state legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is *plenary*,” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added), and sufficiently *federal* for this Court’s review. *Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd.*, 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (“*Bush I*”). This textual feature of our Constitution was adopted to ensure the integrity of the presidential selection process: “Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.” FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). When a State conducts a popular election to appoint electors, the State must comply with all constitutional requirements. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. When a State fails to conduct a valid election—for any reason—the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such

¹ Subject to override by Congress, State legislatures have the exclusive power to regulate the time, place, and manner for electing Members of Congress, *see* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, which is distinct from legislatures’ exclusive and plenary authority on the appointment of presidential electors. When non-legislative actors purport to set State election law for presidential elections, they violate both the Elections Clause and the Electors Clause.

a manner *as the legislature of such State may direct.*”
3 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).

Defendant States’ Violations of Electors Clause

As set forth in the Complaint, executive and judicial officials made significant changes to the legislatively defined election laws in the Defendant States. *See* Compl. at ¶¶ 29-134. Taken together, these non-legislative changes did away with statutory ballot-security measures for absentee and mail-in ballots such as signature verification, witness requirements, and statutorily authorized secure ballot drop-off locations.

Citing the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant States gutted the safeguards for absentee ballots through non-legislative actions, despite knowledge that absentee ballots are “the largest source of potential voter fraud,” BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at 46 (Sept. 2005) (hereinafter, “CARTER-BAKER”), which is magnified when absentee balloting is shorn of ballot-integrity measures such as signature verification, witness requirements, or outer-envelope protections, or when absentee ballots are processed and tabulated without bipartisan observation by poll watchers.

Factual Background

Without Defendant States’ combined 72 electoral votes, President Trump presumably has 232 electoral votes, and former Vice President Biden presumably has 234. Thus, Defendant States’ electors will determine the outcome of the election. Alternatively, if Defendant States are unable to certify 37 or more electors, neither candidate will have a majority in the

Electoral College, in which case the election would devolve to the U.S. House of Representatives under the Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Original actions follow the motions practice of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. S.Ct. 17.2. Plaintiffs can obtain preliminary injunctions in original actions. *See California v. Texas*, 459 U.S. 1067 (1982) (“[m]otion of plaintiff for issuance of a preliminary injunction granted”); *United States v. Louisiana*, 351 U.S. 978 (1956) (enjoining named state officers “and others acting with them ... from prosecuting any other case or cases involving the controversy before this Court until further order of the Court”). Similarly, a moving party can seek a stay pending appeal under this Court’s Rule 23.²

Plaintiffs who seek interim relief under Federal Rule 65 must establish that they likely will succeed on the merits and likely will suffer irreparable harm without interim relief, that the balance of equities between their harm in the absence of interim relief and the defendants’ harm from interim relief favors the movants, and that the public interest favors interim relief. *Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). To obtain a stay pending appeal under this Court’s Rule 23, the applicant must meet a similar test:

² *See, e.g., Frank v. Walker*, 135 S.Ct. 7 (2014); *Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP*, 135 S.Ct. 42 (2014); *North Carolina v. League of Women Voters*, 135 S.Ct. 6 (2014); *Arizona Sect’y of State’s Office v. Feldman*, 137 S.Ct. 446 (2016); *North Carolina v. Covington*, 138 S.Ct. 974 (2018); *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 140 S.Ct. 1205 (2020).

(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. In close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent.

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010).

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO HEAR THIS CASE.

Although Plaintiff State disputes that this Court has discretion to decide not to hear this case instituted by a sovereign State, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (this Court's jurisdiction is exclusive for actions between States); *Nebraska v. Colorado*, 136 S.Ct. 1034, 1035 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.); *accord New Mexico v. Colorado*, 137 S.Ct. 2319 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting), this Court is nonetheless likely to exercise its discretion to hear this case for two reasons, which is analogous to the first *Hollingsworth* factor for a stay.

First, in the analogous case of *Republican Party v. Boockvar*, No. 20A54, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5181 (Oct. 19, 2020), four justices voted to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that worked an example of the type of non-legislative revision to State election law that the Plaintiff State challenges here. In addition, since then, a new Associate Justice joined the Court, and the Chief Justice indicated a rationale

for voting against a stay in *Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legis.*, No. 20A66, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5187, at *1 (Oct. 26, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) that either does not apply to original actions or that was wrong for the reasons set forth in Section II.A.2, *supra* (non-legislative amendment of State election statutes poses a question that arises under the federal Constitution, see *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).

Second, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the “uniquely important national interest” in elections for president and the rules for them. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 112 (interior quotations omitted); *see also Oregon v. Mitchell*, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (original jurisdiction in voting-rights cases). Few cases on this Court’s docket will be as important to our future as this case.

Third, no other remedy or forum exists for a State to challenge multiple States’ maladministration of a presidential election, *see* Section II.A.8, *infra*, and *some* court must have jurisdiction for these fundamental issues about the viability of our democracy: “if there is no other mode of trial, that alone will give the King’s courts a jurisdiction.” *Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774) (Lord Mansfield).

II. THE PLAINTIFF STATE IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL.

Under the *Winter-Hollingsworth* test, the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing is the primary factor to assess the need for interim relief. Here, the Plaintiff State will prevail because this Court has jurisdiction and the Plaintiff State’s merit case is likely to prevail.

A. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff State's claims

In order to grant leave to file, this Court first must assure itself of its jurisdiction, *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't.*, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); *cf. Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (courts deny leave to file amended pleadings that would be futile). That standard is met here. The Plaintiff State's fundamental rights and interests are at stake. This Court is the *only* venue that can protect the Plaintiff State's Electoral College votes from being cancelled by the unlawful and constitutionally tainted votes cast by Electors appointed by the Defendant States.

1. The claims fall within this Court's constitutional and statutory subject-matter jurisdiction.

The federal judicial power extends to "Controversies between two or more States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and Congress has placed the jurisdiction for such suits exclusively with the Supreme Court: "The Supreme Court shall have original *and exclusive* jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States." 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added). This Court not only is a permissible court for hearing this action; it is the only court that can hear this action quickly enough to render relief sufficient to avoid constitutionally tainted votes in the Electoral College and to place the appointment and certification of the Defendant States' presidential electors before their legislatures pursuant to 3 U.S.C. §§ 2, 5, and 7 in time for a vote in the House of Representatives on January 6, 2021. *See* 3 U.S.C. § 15. With that relief in place, the House can resolve the

election on January 6, 2021, in time for the President to be selected by the constitutionally set date of January 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.

2. The claims arise under the Constitution.

When States violate their own election laws, they may argue that these violations are insufficiently federal to allow review in this Court. *Cf. Foster v. Chatman*, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1745-46 (2016) (this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state-court decisions that “rest[] on an adequate and independent state law ground”). That attempted evasion would fail for two reasons.

First, in the election context, a state-court remedy or a state executive’s administrative action purporting to alter state election statutes implicates the Electors Clause. *See Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105. Even a plausible federal-law defense to state action arises under federal law within the meaning of Article III. *Mesa v. California*, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (holding that “it is the raising of a federal question in the officer’s removal petition that constitutes the federal law under which the action against the federal officer arises for Art. III purposes”). Constitutional arising-under jurisdiction exceeds statutory federal-question jurisdiction of federal district courts,³ and—indeed—we did not even have federal-question jurisdiction until 1875. *Merrell Dow Pharm.*, 478 U.S. at 807. The

³ The statute for federal-officer removal at issue in *Mesa* omits the well-pleaded complaint rule, *id.*, which is a *statutory* restriction on federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. *See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson*, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).

Plaintiff State's Electoral Clause claims arise under the Constitution and so are *federal*, even if the only claim is that the Defendant States violated their own state election statutes. Moreover, as is explained below, the Defendant States' actions injure the interests of Plaintiff State in the appointment and certification of presidential electors to the Electoral College.

Given this federal-law basis against these state actions, the state actions are not "independent" of the federal constitutional requirements that provide this Court jurisdiction. *Fox Film Corp. v. Muller*, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935); *cf. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons*, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (noting that "even though state law creates a party's causes of action, its case might still 'arise under' the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law" and collecting cases) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Plaintiff State's claims therefore fall within this Court's arising-under jurisdiction.

Second, state election law is not purely a matter of state law because it applies "not only to elections to state offices, but also to the election of Presidential electors," meaning that state law operates, in part, "by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution." *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76. Logically, "any state authority to regulate election to [federal] offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution," meaning that any "such power had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States." *Cook v. Gralike*, 531 U.S.

510, 522 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). “It is no original prerogative of State power to appoint a representative, a senator, or President for the Union.” J. Story, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858). For these reasons, any “significant departure from the legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal constitutional question.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

Under these circumstances, this Court has the power both to review and to remedy a violation of the Constitution. Significantly, parties do not need winning hands to establish jurisdiction. Instead, jurisdiction exists when “the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction,” even if the right “will be defeated if they are given another.” *Bell v. Hood*, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). At least as to *jurisdiction*, a plaintiff need survive only the low threshold that “the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes [not] ... be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” *Id.* at 682. The Bill of Complaint meets that test.

3. The claims raise a “case or controversy” between the States.

Like any other action, an original action must meet the Article III criteria for a case or controversy: “it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of

judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.” *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff State has standing under those rules.⁴

With voting, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 555). In presidential elections, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983). Thus, votes in the Defendant States affect the votes in the Plaintiff State, as set forth in more detail below.

a. Plaintiff State suffers an injury in fact.

The citizens of Plaintiff State have the right to demand that all other States abide by the constitutionally set rules in appointing Presidential Electors to the Electoral College. “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,

⁴ At its constitutional minimum, standing doctrine measures the necessary effect on plaintiffs under a tripartite test: cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, causation by the challenged conduct, and redressable by a court. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992). The rules for standing in state-versus-state actions is the same as the rules in other actions under Article III. See *Maryland v. Louisiana*, 451 U.S. 725, 736 (1981).

even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10; *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“the political franchise of voting” is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”). “Every voter in a federal ... election, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted.” *Anderson v. United States*, 417 U.S. 211, 227 (1974); *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). Put differently, “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction,” *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), and—unlike the residency durations required in *Dunn*—the “jurisdiction” here is the entire United States. In short, the rights at issue are cognizable under Article III.

Significantly, Plaintiff State presses its own form of voting-rights injury *as a State*. As with the one-person, one-vote principle for congressional redistricting in *Wesberry*, the equality of the States arises from the structure of the Constitution, not from the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. See *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 7-8; *id.* n.10 (expressly not reaching claims under Fourteenth Amendment). Whereas the House represents the People proportionally, the Senate represents the States. See U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 3 (“no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate”). While Americans likely care more about who is elected President, the States have a distinct interest in who is elected *Vice President* and thus who can cast the tie-

breaking vote in the Senate. Through that interest, Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election. This injury is particularly acute in 2020, where a Senate majority often will hang on the Vice President’s tie-breaking vote because of the nearly equal—and, depending on the outcome of Georgia run-off elections in January, possibly *equal*—balance between political parties. Quite simply, it is vitally important to the States who becomes Vice President.

Because individual citizens may arguably suffer only a generalized grievance from Electors Clause violations, Plaintiff State has standing where its citizen voters would not, *Lance v. Coffman*, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (distinguishing citizen plaintiffs from citizen relators who sued in the name of a state). In *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency*, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), this Court held that states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.” *Id.* at 520. While *Massachusetts* arose in a different context—the same principles of federalism apply equally here to require special deference to the sovereign states on standing questions.

In addition to standing for their own injuries, States can assert *parens patriae* standing for their citizens who are Presidential Electors.⁵ Like

⁵ “The ‘*parens patriae*’ doctrine ... is a recognition of the principle that the state, when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, ‘must be deemed to represent all its citizens.’” *New Jersey v. New York*, 345 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1953) (quoting *Kentucky v. Indiana*, 281 U.S. 163, 173 (1930)).

legislators, Presidential Electors assert “legislative injury” whenever allegedly improper actions deny them a working majority. *Coleman v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 433, 435 (1939). The Electoral College is a zero-sum game. If the Defendant States’ unconstitutionally appointed Electors vote for a presidential candidate opposed by the Plaintiff State’s presidential electors, that operates to defeat the Plaintiff State’s interests.⁶ Indeed, even without an electoral college majority, presidential electors suffer the same voting-debasement injury as voters generally: “It must be remembered that ‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting *Reynold*, 377 U.S. at 555). Those injuries to electors serve as an Article III basis for a *parens patriae* action by their States.

b. The Defendant States caused the injuries.

Non-legislative officials in the Defendant States either directly caused the challenged violations of the Electors Clause or, in the case of Georgia, acquiesced to them in settling a federal lawsuit. The Defendants thus caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.

⁶ Because Plaintiff State appointed its presidential electors fully consistent with the Constitution, it suffers injury if its presidential electors are defeated by the Defendant States’ unconstitutionally appointed presidential electors. This injury is all the more acute because Plaintiff State has taken steps to prevent fraud. Unlike the Defendant States, the Plaintiff State neither weakened nor allowed the weakening of its ballot-integrity statutes by non-legislative means.

c. **The requested relief would redress the injuries.**

This Court has authority to redress the Plaintiff State's injuries, and the requested relief will do so.

First, while the Defendant States are responsible for their elections, this Court has authority to enjoin reliance on *unconstitutional* elections:

When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.

Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104; *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary”). The Plaintiff State does not ask this Court to decide who won the election; they only ask that the Court enjoin the clear violations of the Electors Clause of the Constitution.

Second, the relief that the Plaintiff State requests—namely, remand to the State legislatures to allocate presidential electors in a manner consistent with the Constitution—does not violate the Defendant States' rights or exceed this Court's power. The power to select presidential electors is a plenary power of the legislatures, and this remains so, without regard to state law:

This power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their State constitutions....

Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (internal quotations omitted); *accord Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76-77; *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104.

Third, uncertainty of how the Defendant States' legislatures will allocate their electors is irrelevant to the question of redressability:

If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency's action and remand the case – even though the agency ... might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998). The Defendant States' legislatures would remain free to exercise their plenary authority under the Electors Clause in any *constitutional* manner they wish. For example, they may review the presidential election results in their State and determine that winner would be the same, notwithstanding the violations of state law in the conduct of the election. Or they may appoint the Electors themselves, either appointing all for one presidential candidate or dividing the State's Electors and appointing some for one candidate and some for another candidate. Or they may take any number of actions that would be consistent with the Constitution. Under *Akins*, the simple act of

reconsideration under lawful means is redress enough.

Fourth, the requested relief is consistent with federal election law: “Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.” 3 U.S.C. § 2. Regardless of the statutory deadlines for the Electoral College to vote, this Court could enjoin reliance on the results from the constitutionally tainted November 3 election, remand the appointment of Electors to the Defendant States, and order the Defendant States’ legislatures to certify their Electors in a manner consistent with the Constitution, which could be accomplished well in advance of the statutory deadline of January 6 for the House to count the presidential electors’ votes. 3 U.S.C. § 15.

4. Plaintiff State has prudential standing.

Beyond the constitutional baseline, standing doctrine also poses prudential limits like the zone-of-interests test, *Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970), and the need for those seeking to assert absent third parties’ rights to have their own Article III standing and a close relationship with the absent third parties, whom a sufficient “hindrance” keeps from asserting their rights. *Kowalski v. Tesmer*, 543 U.S. 125, 128-30 (2004). Prudential doctrines pose no barrier here.

First, the injuries asserted here are “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or

regulated by the ... constitutional guarantee in question.” *Camp*, 397 U.S. at 153. The Court has relied on the structure of the Constitution to provide the one-person, one-vote standard, *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 7-8 & n.10, and this case is no different. The structure of the Electoral College provides that each State is allocated a certain number of presidential electors depending upon that State’s representation in Congress and that each State must abide by constitutional requirements in the appointment of its Electors. When the elections in one State violate those requirements in a presidential election, the interests of the citizens in other States are harmed.

Second, even if *parens patriae* standing were not available, States have their own injury, a close relationship with their citizens, and citizens may arguable lack standing to assert injuries under the Electors Clause. *See, e.g., Bognet v. Sec’y Pa.*, No. 20-3214, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35639, at *18-26 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2020). States, by contrast, have standing to assert such injuries. *Lance*, 549 U.S. at 442 (distinguishing citizen plaintiffs who suffer a generalized grievance from citizen relators who sued in the name of a state); *cf. Massachusetts*, 549 U.S. at 520 (federal courts owe “special solicitude in standing analysis”). Moreover, anything beyond Article III is merely prudential. *Caplin & Drysdale v. United States*, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989). Thus, States also have third-party standing to assert their citizens’ injuries.

5. This action is not moot and will not become moot.

None of the looming election deadlines are constitutional, and they all are within this Court's power to enjoin. Indeed, if this Court vacated a State's appointment or certification of presidential electors, those Electors could not vote on December 14, 2020; if the Court vacated their vote after the fact, the House of Representatives could not count those votes on January 6, 2021. There would be ample time for the Defendant States' legislatures to appoint new presidential electors in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Any remedial action can be complete well before January 6, 2020. Indeed, even the swearing in of the next President on January 20, 2021, will not moot this case because review could outlast even the selection of the next President under "the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine," which applies "in the context of election cases ... when there are 'as applied' challenges as well as in the more typical case involving only facial attacks." *FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.*, 551 U.S. 449, 463 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); *accord Norman v. Reed*, 502 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1992). Mootness is not, and will not become, an issue here.

6. This matter is ripe for review.

The Plaintiff State's claims are clearly ripe now, but they were not ripe before the election: "A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." *Texas v. United States*, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).⁷ Prior to the election, there was no reason to know who would win the vote in any given State.

Ripeness also raises the question of laches, which Justice Blackmun called “precisely the opposite argument” from ripeness. *Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n*, 497 U.S. 871, 915 n.16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Laches is an equitable defense against unreasonable delay in commencing suit. *Petrella v. MGM*, 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014). This action was neither unreasonably delayed nor is prejudicial to the Defendant States.

Before the election, the Plaintiff State had no ripe claim against a Defendant State:

“One cannot be guilty of laches until his right ripens into one entitled to protection. For only then can his torpor be deemed inexcusable.”

What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 449-50 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31: 19 (4th ed. 2003); *Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp.*, 60 F.3d 770, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same); *Profitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Profit Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy P.C.*, 314 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). The Plaintiff State could not have brought this action before the election results. Nor did the full extent of the county-level deviations from election statutes in the Defendant

⁷ It is less clear whether this matter became ripe on or soon after election night when the networks “called” the election for Mr. Biden or significantly later when enough States certified their vote totals to give him 270-plus anticipated votes in the electoral college.

States become evident until days after the election. Moreover, a State may reasonably assess the status of litigation commenced by candidates to the presidential election prior to commencing its own litigation. Neither ripeness nor laches presents a timing problem here.

7. This action does not raise a non-justiciable political question.

The “political questions doctrine” does not apply here. Under that doctrine, federal courts will decline to review issues that the Constitution delegates to one of the other branches—the “political branches”—of government. While appointing presidential electors involves political rights, this Court has ruled in a line of cases beginning with *Baker* that constitutional claims related to voting (other than claims brought under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, §4) are justiciable in the federal courts. As the Court held in *Baker*, litigation over political rights is not the same as a political question:

We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable “political question.” The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection “is little more than a play upon words.”

Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. This is no political question; it is a constitutional one that this Court should answer.

8. No adequate alternate remedy or forum exists.

In determining whether to hear a case under this Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court has considered

whether a plaintiff State “has another adequate forum in which to settle [its] claim.” *United States v. Nevada*, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973). This equitable limit does not apply here because Plaintiff State cannot sue Defendant States in any other forum.

To the extent that Defendant States wish to avail themselves of 3 U.S.C. § 5’s safe harbor, *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 77-78, this action will not meaningfully stand in their way:

The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors. ...

There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated[.]

Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104 (citations and internal quotations omitted).⁸ The Defendant States’ legislature will remain free under the Constitution to appoint electors or vote in any *constitutional* manner they wish. The only thing that they cannot do—and should not wish to do—is to rely on an allocation conducted in violation of the Constitution to determine the appointment of presidential electors.

Moreover, if this Court agrees with the Plaintiff State that the Defendant States’ appointment of presidential electors under the recently conducted elections would be unconstitutional, then the statutorily created safe harbor cannot be used as a

⁸ Indeed, the Constitution also includes another backstop: “if no person have such majority [of electoral votes], then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

justification for a violation of the Constitution. The safe-harbor framework created by statute would have to yield in order to ensure that the Constitution was not violated.

It is of no moment that Defendants' *state laws* may purport to tether state legislatures to popular votes. Those state limits on a state legislature's exercising federal constitutional functions cannot block action because the U.S. Constitution "transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State" under this Court's precedents. *Leser v. Garnett*, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); *see also Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 77; *United States Term Limits v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) ("the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution"). As this Court recognized in *McPherson v. Blacker*, the authority to choose presidential electors:

is conferred upon the legislatures of the states by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their state constitutions. ... *Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away or abdicated.*

146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The Defendant States would suffer no cognizable injury from this Court's enjoining their reliance on an unconstitutional vote.

B. The Plaintiff State is likely to prevail on the merits.

For interim relief, the most important factor is the likelihood of movants' prevailing. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20. The Defendant States' administration of the 2020 election violated the Electors Clause, which renders invalid any appointment of presidential electors based upon those election results. For example, even without fraud or nefarious intent, a mail-in vote not subjected to the State legislature's ballot-integrity measures cannot be counted. It does not matter that a judicial or executive officer sought to bypass that screening in response to the COVID pandemic: the choice was not theirs to make. "Government is not free to disregard the [the Constitution] in times of crisis." *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo*, 592 U.S. ___ (Nov. 25, 2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). With all unlawful votes discounted, the election result is an open question that this Court must address. Under 3 U.S.C. § 2, the State legislatures may answer the question, but the question must be asked here.

1. Defendant States violated the Electors Clause by modifying their legislatures' election laws through non-legislative action.

The Electors Clause grants authority to *State Legislatures* under both horizontal and vertical separation of powers. It provides authority to each State—not to federal actors—the authority to dictate the manner of selecting presidential electors. And within each State, it explicitly allocates that authority to a single branch of State government: to the

“Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. State legislatures’ primacy *vis-à-vis* non-legislative actors—whether State or federal—is even more significant than congressional primacy *vis-à-vis* State legislatures.

The State legislatures’ authority is plenary. *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. It “cannot be taken from them or modified” even through “their state constitutions.” *McPherson*, 146 U.S. at 35; *Bush I*, 531 U.S. at 76-77; *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 104. The Framers allocated election authority to State legislatures as the branch closest—and most accountable—to the People. *See, e.g.*, Robert G. Natelson, *The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections*, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 31 (2010) (collecting Founding-era documents); *cf.* THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (C. Rossiter, ed. 2003) (Madison, J.) (“House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in its members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people”). Thus, only the State legislatures are permitted to create or modify the respective State’s rules for the appointment of presidential electors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

Regulating election procedures is necessary both to avoid chaos and to ensure fairness:

Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (interior quotations omitted). Thus, for example, deadlines are necessary to avoid chaos, even if some votes sent via absentee ballot do not arrive timely. *Rosario v. Rockefeller*, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973). Even more importantly in this pandemic year with expanded mail-in voting, ballot-integrity measures—*e.g.*, witness requirements, signature verification, and the like—are an essential component of any legislative expansion of mail-in voting. See CARTER-BAKER, at 46 (absentee ballots are “the largest source of potential voter fraud”). Though it may be tempting to permit a breakdown of the constitutional order in the face of a global pandemic, the rule of law demands otherwise.

Specifically, because the Electors Clause makes clear that state legislative authority is exclusive, non-legislative actors lack authority to *amend* statutes. *Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar*, No. 20-542, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5188, at *4 (Oct. 28, 2020) (“there is a strong likelihood that the State Supreme Court decision violates the Federal Constitution”) (Alito, J., concurring); *Wisconsin State Legis.*, No. 20A66, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5187, at *11-14 (Oct. 26, 2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); *cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“it is not within our power to construe and narrow state laws”); *Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.*, 561 U.S. 477, 509-10 (2010) (“editorial freedom ... [to “blue-pencil” statutes] belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary”). That said, courts can enjoin elections or even enforcement of *unconstitutional* election laws, but they cannot rewrite the law in federal presidential elections.

For example, if a state court enjoins or modifies ballot-integrity measures adopted to allow absentee or mail-in voting, that invalidates ballots cast under the relaxed standard unless the legislature has—prior to the election—ratified the new procedure. Without pre-election legislative ratification, results based on the treatment and tabulation of votes done in violation of state law cannot be used to appoint presidential electors.

Elections must be lawful contests, but they should not be mere *litigation contests* where the side with the most lawyers wins. As with the explosion of nationwide injunctions, the explosion of challenges to State election law for partisan advantage in the lead-up to the 2020 election “is not normal.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay). Nor is it healthy. Under the “*Purcell* principle,” federal courts generally avoid enjoining state election laws in the period close to an election. *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4-5 (citing “voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls”). *Purcell* raises valid concerns about confusion in the run-up to elections, but judicial election-related injunctions also raise *post-election* concerns. For example, if a state court enjoins ballot-integrity measures adopted to secure absentee or mail-in voting, that invalidates ballots cast under the relaxed standard unless the State legislature has had time to ratify the new procedure. Without either pre-election legislative ratification or a severability clause in the legislation that created the rules for absentee voting by mail, the state court’s actions operate to violate the Electors Clause.

2. **State and local administrator’s systemic failure to follow State election law qualifies as an unlawful amendment of State law.**

When non-legislative state and local executive actors engage in systemic or intentional failure to comply with their State’s duly enacted election laws, they adopt by executive fiat a *de facto* equivalent of an impermissible amendment of State election law by an executive or judicial officer. See Section II.B.1, *supra*. This Court recognizes an executive’s “consciously and expressly adopt[ing] a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” as another form of reviewable final action, even if the policy is not a written policy. *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (interior quotations omitted); *accord id.* at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). Without a *bona fide* amendment to State election law *by the legislature*, executive officers must follow state law. Cf. *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); *Service v. Dulles*, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957). The wrinkle here is that the non-legislative actors lack the authority under the federal Constitution to enact a *bona fide* amendment, regardless of whatever COVID-related emergency power they may have.⁹

⁹ To advance the principles enunciated in *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (concerning state police power to enforce compulsory vaccination laws), as authority for non-legislative state actors re-writing state election statutes—in direct conflict with the Electors Clause—is a nonstarter. Clearly, “the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a ... power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause.”

This form of executive nullification of State law by statewide, county, or city officers is a variant of impermissible amendment by a non-legislative actor. See Section II.B.1, *supra*. Such nullification is always unconstitutional, but it is especially egregious when it eliminates legislative safeguards for election integrity (*e.g.*, signature and witness requirements for absentee ballots, poll watchers¹⁰). Systemic failure by statewide, county, or city election officials to follow State election law is no more permissible than formal amendments by an executive or judicial actor.

III. THE OTHER *WINTER-HOLLINGSWORTH* FACTORS WARRANT INTERIM RELIEF.

Although Plaintiff State’s likelihood of prevailing would alone justify granting interim relief, relief is also warranted by the other *Winter-Hollingsworth* factors.

Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916). In other words, the States’ reserved police power does not abrogate the Constitution’s express Electors Clause. See also *Cook v. Gralike*, 531 U.S. at 522 (election authority is delegated to States, not reserved by them); accord Story, 1 COMMENTARIES § 627.

¹⁰ Poll watchers are “prophylactic measures designed to prevent election fraud,” *Harris v. Conradi*, 675 F.2d 1212, 1216 n.10 (11th Cir. 1982), and “to insure against tampering with the voting process.” *Baer v. Meyer*, 728 F.2d 471, 476 (10th Cir. 1984). For example, poll monitors reported that 199 Chicago voters cast 300 party-line Democratic votes, as well as three party-line Republican votes in one election. *Barr v. Chatman*, 397 F.2d 515, 515-16 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1968).

A. Plaintiff State will suffer irreparable harm if the Defendant States' unconstitutional presidential electors vote in the Electoral College.

Allowing the unconstitutional election results in Defendant States to proceed would irreparably harm Plaintiff State and the Republic both by denying representation in the presidency and in the Senate in the near term and by permanently sowing distrust in federal elections. This Court has found such threats to constitute irreparable harm on numerous occasions. *See* note 2, *supra* (collecting cases). The stakes in this case are too high to ignore.

B. The balance of equities tips to the Plaintiff State.

All State parties represent citizens who voted in the 2020 presidential election. Because of their unconstitutional actions, Defendant States represent some citizens who cast ballots not in compliance with the Electors Clause. It does not disenfranchise anyone to require the State legislatures to attempt to resolve this matter as 3 U.S.C. § 2, the Electors Clause, and even the Twelfth Amendment provide. By contrast, it would irreparably harm Plaintiff State if the Court denied interim relief.

In addition to ensuring that the 2020 presidential election is resolved in a manner consistent with the Constitution, this Court must review the violations that occurred in the Defendant States to enable Congress and State legislatures to avoid future chaos and constitutional violations. Unless this Court acts to review this presidential election, these

unconstitutional and unilateral violations of state election laws will continue in the future.

C. The public interest favors interim relief.

The last *Winter* factor is the public interest. When parties dispute the lawfulness of government action, the public interest collapses into the merits. *ACLU v. Ashcroft*, 322 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2003); *Washington v. Reno*, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994); *League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby*, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). If the Court agrees with Plaintiff State that non-legislative actors lack authority to amend state statutes for selecting presidential electors, the public interest requires interim relief. Withholding relief would leave a taint over the election, disenfranchise voters, and lead to still more electoral legerdemain in future elections.

Electoral integrity ensures the legitimacy of not just our governmental institutions, but the Republic itself. *See Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10. “Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.” *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4. Against that backdrop, few cases could warrant this Court’s review more than this extraordinary case arising from a presidential election. In addition, the constitutionality of the process for selecting the President is of extreme national importance. If the Defendant States are permitted to violate the requirements of the Constitution in the appointment of their presidential electors, the resulting vote of the Electoral College not only lacks constitutional legitimacy, but the Constitution itself will be forever sullied.

The nation needs this Court's clarity: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). While isolated irregularities could be "garden-variety" election irregularities that do not raise a federal question,¹¹ the unconstitutional setting-aside of state election statutes by non-legislative actors calls both the result and the process into question, requiring this Court's "unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront." *Bush II*, 531 U.S. at 111. The public interest requires this Court's action.

IV. ALTERNATIVELY, THIS CASE WARRANTS SUMMARY DISPOSITION.

In lieu of granting interim relief, this Court could simply reach the merits summarily. *Cf.* FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); S.Ct. Rule 17.5. Two things are clear from the evidence presented at this initial phase: (1) non-legislative actors modified the Defendant States' election statutes; and (2) the resulting uncertainty casts doubt on the lawful winner. Those two facts are enough to decide the merits of the Electors Clause claim. The Court should thus vacate the Defendant States' appointment and impending certifications of presidential electors and remand to their State legislatures to allocate presidential electors via any constitutional means that does not rely on 2020

¹¹ "To be sure, 'garden variety election irregularities' may not present facts sufficient to offend the Constitution's guarantee of due process[.]" *Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections*, 635 F.3d 219, 232 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Griffin v. Burns*, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978)).

election results that includes votes cast in violation of State election statutes in place on Election Day.

CONCLUSION

This Court should first administratively stay or temporarily restrain the Defendant States from voting in the electoral college until further order of this Court and then issue a preliminary injunction or stay against their doing so until the conclusion of this case on the merits. Alternatively, the Court should reach the merits, vacate the Defendant States' elector certifications from the unconstitutional 2020 election results, and remand to the Defendant States' legislatures pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 2 to appoint electors.

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