


United States Senate Committee On

HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

A stylized eagle with spread wings is centered in the background. Above the eagle's head are seven gold stars. The eagle is rendered in a dark blue color against a teal background.

**EXAMINATION OF U.S. SECRET
SERVICE PLANNING AND
SECURITY FAILURES RELATED TO
THE JULY 13, 2024
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT**

Interim Joint Report

HSGAC & Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Bipartisan Staff Report
September 2024

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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 13, 2024, Thomas Matthew Crooks bought 50 rounds of ammunition on his way to Butler, Pennsylvania, drove to former President Donald Trump’s campaign rally at the Butler Farm Show grounds, and climbed onto the roof of the American Glass Research (AGR) building less than 200 yards away from where the former President was speaking, where at 6:11 pm, he fired eight rounds from an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle, killing one person and injuring three others including the former president.¹ That day, he was able to fly a drone 200 yards from the site, use a rangefinder capable of gauging the distance to the former president less than an hour before he began speaking, and bring two explosive devices within proximity of the site of the rally.² The United States Secret Service’s (USSS’) planning, communications, intelligence sharing, and related security failures in advance of and during July 13 directly contributed to Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt and kill and injure people in Butler, PA that day.

On July 30, 2024, Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., the Acting Director of the USSS, testified in a joint hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) and Judiciary Committee that the attempted assassination “was a failure on multiple levels.”³ Acting Director Rowe testified before the Committees that he has since initiated several reforms to address clear deficiencies in how USSS provides security for its protectees.⁴ During the July 30 hearing, Acting Director Rowe acknowledged USSS responsibility for protecting former President Trump.⁵ In a series of transcribed interviews conducted by HSGAC and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, key USSS personnel responsible for planning, coordinating, communicating, and securing the Butler, PA rally on July 13, declined to acknowledge individual areas of responsibility for planning or security as having contributed to the failure to prevent the shooting that day, even when as an agency, the USSS has acknowledged ultimate responsibility for the failure to prevent the former president of the United States from being shot.⁶

¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (July 29, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt>).

² Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (July 29, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt>).

³ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁵ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁶ U.S. Secret Service, Transcribed Interviews with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (on file with Committee).

At the direction of U.S. Senators Gary Peters and Rand Paul, Chairman and Ranking Member of HSGAC and Senators Richard Blumenthal and Ron Johnson, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the Committee), Majority and Minority Committee staff are conducting a bipartisan investigation of planning and security failures that contributed to the attempted assassination on July 13, 2024.

This interim report details the information the Committee has learned to date, as well as the Committee's preliminary findings. The Committee finds that USSS failures in planning, communications, security, and allocation of resources for the July 13, 2024 Butler rally were foreseeable, preventable, and directly related to the events resulting in the assassination attempt that day. The Committee also finds that siloed communications and coordination problems between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials remain unaddressed and were a contributing factor to the failures at the July 13 Butler rally.

On September 15, 2024, a suspect was taken into custody in West Palm Beach, Florida after being identified by USSS hiding in a tree line with a semiautomatic rifle and a scope approximately 300 to 500 yards from where former President Trump was playing golf at Trump International Golf Club.⁷ On September 16, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USSS, and Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office held a press conference to provide an update on the investigation.⁸ On September 16, the suspect was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, among other charges.⁹ According to the complaint, the suspect's mobile phone was in the vicinity of the area along the tree line for approximately 12 hours prior to the incident.¹⁰ The FBI has said it is investigating the incident as an apparent assassination attempt.¹¹ The Committee has requested briefings from the USSS and the FBI. The Committee will be pursuing additional information from the USSS, FBI, and other relevant federal agencies as the Committee continues its investigation.

⁷ See News Conference on Apparent Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump in Florida with Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw (Sept. 15, 2024); United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D. Fla., Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).

⁸ U.S. Secret Service, *Media Advisory: Justice Department, FBI, U.S. Secret Service, and Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office to Provide Investigation Update* (Sept. 16, 2024) (<https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2024/09/media-advisory-justice-department-fbi-us-secret-service-and-palm-beach>).

⁹ United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D. Fla., Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).

¹⁰ United States of America vs. Ryan Wesley Routh, S.D. Fla., Criminal Complaint (Case No. 24-mj-8441-RMM) (Sept. 16, 2024).

¹¹ FBI Special Agent in Charge update to the West Palm Beach, Florida Assassination Attempt Investigation (Sept. 16, 2024).

Committee Actions to Date

On July 15, 2024, Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul announced their investigation into the assassination attempt on former President Trump and called for a briefing and public hearing within 15 days.¹² On July 24 and 25, 2024, Chairmen Peters and Blumenthal and Ranking Members Paul and Johnson sent ten letters requesting documents and information to the USSS, FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Beaver County District Attorney, Butler County District Attorney, Butler County Sheriff, Butler Township Police Department, Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), and Clairton Sportsmen’s Club as well as a letter requesting voluntary transcribed interviews with USSS individuals responsible for planning and security on July 13.¹³

On July 25, 2024, Acting USSS Director Rowe and FBI National Security Branch Executive Assistant Director Wells provided a closed-door unclassified briefing for HSGAC and Judiciary Committee Members.¹⁴ And on July 30, 2024, Acting Director Rowe and FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate testified at a joint public hearing before the Senate HSGAC and Judiciary Committees.¹⁵

On August 14, 2024, the Committee wrote DHS Secretary Mayorkas and FBI Director Wray seeking additional information about the July 12, 2024 arrest of Asif Merchant for

¹² Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

¹³ Letters from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 24, 2024), Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 24, 2024), Undersecretary Kenneth Wainstein, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security (July 24, 2024), District Attorney Nathan Bible, Beaver County District Attorney’s Office (July 24, 2024), District Attorney Richard Goldinger, Butler County District Attorney’s Office (July 24, 2024), Sheriff Michael Slupe, Butler County Sheriff’s Office (July 24, 2024), Acting Chief of Police Lt. Matthew Pearson, Butler Township Police Department (July 24, 2024), Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris, Pennsylvania State Police (July 24, 2024), Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 2024); Clairton Sportsmen’s Club (July 25, 2024); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (July 25, 2024).

¹⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, and Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 25, 2024).

¹⁵ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

allegedly orchestrating a plot to assassinate U.S. government officials and politicians, and any information related to security decisions made by the USSS in advance of July 13.¹⁶

As part of its bipartisan investigation, Committee staff traveled to Butler, PA on July 26 to conduct a site visit walk-through of the Butler Farm Show and AGR building and receive briefings from local law enforcement officials. Specifically, Committee staff spoke with law enforcement officials from Butler and Beaver Counties' Emergency Services Units (ESUs) that provided support to USSS on July 13, including the local snipers posted in the AGR building that day. During the visit, Committee staff examined the roof and interior of the AGR building with those officials. The Committee has also interviewed four local law enforcement officers who provided support on July 13 (three local snipers and one Quick Response Force operator), the President of the Clairton Sportsmen's Club, and two rally attendees.

The Committee has also examined state and local operational plans and other related information provided by PSP, Butler County ESU, and Beaver County ESU; reviewed local radio communications on July 13 provided by Butler County Emergency Services; and reviewed body worn camera footage provided by Butler Township Police Department. The Committee has also reviewed transcripts and audio recordings of several PSP interviews of state and local law enforcement officials who helped provide support on July 13.

On August 13, 2024, the Committee began a series of transcribed interviews with USSS personnel. To date, Committee staff have examined over 2,800 pages of documents provided by USSS and conducted 12 transcribed interviews with USSS personnel responsible for the planning and security in Butler, PA on July 13, 2024.

As discussed at the conclusion of this interim report, key requests to FBI, DHS, ATF and USSS remain outstanding. The majority of documents provided by the USSS and DHS are heavily redacted. This has unnecessarily hindered the Committee's ability to carry out its constitutional authority to investigate and acquire information necessary to identify needed reforms. These overly burdensome redactions, including of communications related to the same individuals who the Committee interviewed, only served to delay the Committee's ability to conduct these interviews and carry out its investigation efficiently and effectively. Despite these impediments, the Committee recognized the need to conduct transcribed interviews with USSS personnel as soon as possible before memories faded.

In addition, as detailed in the report below, several USSS individuals responsible for planning and security for the July 13 rally provided contradictory or incomplete information, some of which ran counter to responses from state and local law enforcement officials and even

¹⁶ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (Aug. 14, 2024).

other USSS personnel. This interim report highlights preliminary findings based on the Committee’s transcribed interviews and the limited document productions it has received to date. These preliminary failures and findings consider the actions of the USSS in the period leading up to the July 13 assassination attempt. They do not consider the extent to which other agencies or individuals may have contributed to these events, if at all. The Committee is choosing to present these preliminary findings while its investigation remains ongoing to ensure that the public has the most accurate and up-to-date information.

The Committee will continue to pursue all information it deems necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities and will, if necessary, take steps to ensure that it obtains the information it is seeking.

KEY FAILURES

1. USSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally.

- **USSS personnel responsible for planning in advance of the July 13 rally denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame.**
- **USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that planning and security decisions were made jointly, with no specific individual responsible for approval.¹⁷**

2. USSS failed to ensure the AGR Building was effectively covered.

- **USSS identified the AGR building as a concern due to the line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, but did not take steps to ensure sufficient security measures were in place.**
- **USSS knew that local snipers planned to set up inside the AGR building and USSS did not express objections or concerns about that placement.**
- **USSS personnel, including the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, did not enter the AGR building or go on the roof prior to the shooting.**
- **One USSS Counter Sniper team, whose responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats, had an obstructed view of the AGR roof.**

3. USSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement.

- **USSS did not give state or local partners specific instructions for covering the AGR building, including the positioning of local snipers.**

¹⁷ Prior to events requiring USSS Protection, USSS assigns personnel to serve as “Advance Agents” responsible for planning security, coordinating with state and local law entities, and requesting needed assets to secure the upcoming event, among other tasks. USSS assigned seven Advance Agents for the July 13 Rally in Butler, PA.

- **USSS did not adequately consider state and local law enforcement operational plans.**
 - **Communications at the July 13 rally were siloed and USSS did not ensure it could share information with local law enforcement partners in real time.**
- 4. USSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security.**
- **USSS denied specific requests for additional Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities and a Counter Assault Team liaison.**
 - **A USSS Counter Surveillance Unit – which could have helped patrol the outer perimeter that included the AGR building – was not requested by USSS Advance Agents.**
- 5. USSS failed to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel, and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump.**
- **At approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed.**
 - **Approximately two minutes before shots were fired, the USSS Security Room, located on the rally grounds, was told that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR building.**
 - **Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS Counter Sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn.**

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS

As detailed below and throughout this report, the Committee has identified several key findings as part of its ongoing investigation.

- 1. USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person with a rangefinder around the AGR building approximately 27 minutes before the shooting.** The report of a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building was relayed to the USSS Security Room at approximately 5:44 pm and to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader at 5:45 pm. Shortly after, USSS personnel, including a Counter Sniper Response agent, engaged in an on-the-ground effort to locate the individual. However, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart all told the Committee they did not receive this information and therefore did not know local law enforcement had identified a suspicious person with a rangefinder – and that those local officers later lost track of this individual – until after shots were fired.
- 2. USSS was notified about an individual on the AGR roof approximately two minutes before Crooks fired from the AGR roof.** Three minutes before shots were fired, a local law enforcement officer sent out a radio alert that there was an individual on the AGR roof. This information was passed to the USSS Security Room approximately two minutes before Crooks fired. Approximately 22 seconds before Crooks fired, a local officer sent out a radio alert that the individual on the AGR roof was armed, but that was not relayed to key USSS personnel that the Committee spoke with.
- 3. Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage.** The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn “elevated” the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage “did not cross [his] mind.”
- 4. USSS counter snipers – including the one who shot and killed Crooks – were sent to the rally in response to “credible intelligence” of a threat.** The July 13 rally was the first time a USSS counter sniper team was assigned to a protectee other than the President, Vice President, or a presidential candidate who had been formally nominated by his or her party. USSS provided the counter snipers in response to “credible intelligence” of a threat. However, FBI has said that Crooks “was not known to the FBI prior to” the assassination attempt. According to the USSS Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, a decision to assign counter snipers to former President Trump’s events occurred sometime in the first week of July. Of the USSS personnel interviewed by the Committee, nearly all – including the Intelligence Advance Agent and the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field Office – said they were unaware of any credible intelligence of a threat.

5. **USSS Advance Agents for the July 13 rally denied individual responsibility for planning or security failures, deflected blame, and could not identify who had final decision authority for the rally.** USSS planning and execution of security measures for the July 13 rally appears to have lacked a clear chain of command. USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that planning and security decisions were collaborative and could not agree on who at USSS was responsible for final approval or decisions. USSS Advance Agents interviewed by the Committee could not identify who was responsible for determining the security perimeter for the July 13 rally.
6. **Local law enforcement raised concern about the security coverage of the AGR building.** A member of Butler ESU told the Committee that he notified USSS Advance Agents during a walkthrough on Thursday, July 11 that local law enforcement did not have the “manpower” to lock down the AGR building. USSS Advance Agents interviewed by the Committee gave conflicting accounts and told the Committee that state and local law enforcement were responsible for covering the AGR building because it was in the outer perimeter. Prior to the July 13 rally, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Counter Sniper Team Leader, and Site Counterpart did not go into the AGR building. None of the USSS Advance Agents shared planning documents with state or local law enforcement, or requested state or local operational plans – and those plans reveal no post-standers or patrol assigned to cover the AGR building or roof.
7. **USSS advance personnel identified multiple line-of-sight concerns at the Butler Farm Show grounds, including the AGR building.** USSS advance personnel proposed positioning large trucks or heavy equipment in the area between the stage and nearby buildings to mitigate line-of-sight concerns. USSS told the Committee they relied on multiple measures, including USSS counter sniper teams and bleachers, to mitigate lines-of-sight. USSS ultimately did not use the trucks or heavy equipment to mitigate line-of-sight concerns from the AGR building. A USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position told the Committee he believed the mitigations were sufficient and the USSS Site Counterpart told the Committee she believed they had a “good security plan” for the July 13 rally.
8. **There were two separate communications centers at the July 13 rally – one run by USSS and one by local law enforcement.** The posts were anywhere from 120 to 300 yards apart from each other and the primary means of communication between the posts was by cell phone. Local law enforcement and USSS operated on separate radio channels. All of the local channels were recorded on July 13, but USSS radio transmissions were not.
9. **Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper’s sights for “mere seconds” before he fired at Crooks.** The USSS partner of the USSS counter sniper who shot Crooks told the Committee he observed that “mere seconds” after his partner identified Crooks in his sights, the USSS counter sniper fired at Crooks. USSS counter snipers confirmed to the Committee that they did not require permission before they fired.
10. **USSS Advance Agents requested additional resources that would have been helpful, but those assets were denied.** The USSS C-UAS operator told the Committee he requested additional C-UAS equipment and personnel in the days before the rally. However, these

requests were denied, at times without explanation. The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee former President Trump's USSS detail requested Counter Assault Team liaisons to help coordinate tactical assets in advance of the July 13 rally, but USSS denied this request. The USSS Site Agent and the Site Counterpart told the Committee that a Counter Surveillance Unit would have been helpful, but this asset is typically not provided for a former President and USSS Advance Agents did not request a Counter Surveillance Unit for the July 13 rally.

11. **USSS' C-UAS system experienced technical problems and was inoperable until 4:33 pm, after Crooks flew his drone near the rally site.** With no backup system, the USSS agent responsible for overseeing the C-UAS capabilities at the July 13 rally called a toll-free 888 tech support hotline "to start troubleshooting with the company," which took several hours. That agent had only three months of experience working with that equipment and lacked knowledge about it.
12. **Several USSS officials reported experiencing technical problems with their radios at the rally, and told the Committee such problems are common for USSS.** A USSS Hercules 1 counter sniper was offered a local radio on July 13 but said he did not have time to pick it up because he was occupied fixing technical problems with his USSS radio. In addition, at the Pittsburgh airport before the motorcade left for the rally, the USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office gave the Lead Advance Agent his radio because the Lead Advance Agent's radio was not working. As a result, the SAIC did not have a working radio on him during his entire time at the July 13 rally. While he did not "hold a post or a sector" and was "not part of any protective formation," he did claim that he was there to "act more in a liaison capacity." However, he did not have any means to communicate on the radio with his USSS counterparts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Planning and Coordination:** Congress should require USSS to identify defined roles and responsibilities for USSS personnel responsible for advance planning of any protective event.
 - For all protective events, USSS should improve coordination and specify roles and responsibilities between and among federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.
 - USSS policies and protocols should require advance planning leads to request and review state and local operational plans in advance of any protective event to ensure a shared understanding of security responsibilities and vulnerabilities as well as other critical planning and security components.
2. **Responsibility:** In advance of each protective event, USSS should designate a single individual responsible for approving all plans, including the responsibility for approving security perimeters.
3. **Communications:** DHS and USSS should ensure communications plans between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and first responders are properly executed and should ensure records retention capabilities.

- Congress should require that USSS record its radio transmissions at all protective events.
 - Congress should require DHS and USSS to evaluate the steps it needs to take to ensure communications plans with state and local partners are fully executed when conducting law enforcement and/or first response activities at a given location. Congress should require that DHS and USSS report to Congress any steps taken to remedy past failures to execute communications plans and to ensure compliance with those plans in the future.
4. **Intelligence:** USSS should consider sending additional assets, including counter snipers, to all future outdoor protective events as it evaluates intelligence and threats against protectees. USSS should also ensure that the appropriate agents working protective events are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against protectees.
5. **Resources:** Congress should evaluate USSS budget and resources. Security requirements should be determined depending on various threat levels, ranging from less severe threat environments to the highest level of security at National Special Security Events.
- Congress should require that USSS allocate assets and resources based on the threat level, not the position or title of the protectee.

III. USSS PLANNING AND SECURITY FAILURES FOR JULY 13, 2024, RALLY

On July 3, 2024, USSS began assigning key personnel responsible for planning and coordinating security for former President Trump’s travel to Pittsburgh and campaign rally on July 13 in Butler, PA.¹⁸ In interviews with the Committee, USSS agents responsible for leading and coordinating the advance planning for the July 13 rally provided contradictory, opaque, or nonresponsive information about who was responsible for key components of the planning and security.¹⁹ In response to questions by the Committee regarding responsibility for key planning decisions, the Senior Special Agent who served as the Lead Advance Agent for the July 13 rally stated:

I don’t approve anything. I clearly just take the information that they [the USSS Site Agent and USSS Site Counterpart] have recommended and put together with the other information that’s put together from the other advance entities, and those are all submitted to the field office and then submitted to the Trump detail, the candidate nominations operations, and then they go further to headquarters.²⁰

In response to questions by the Committee regarding responsibility for determining the site perimeter, USSS agents stated that these were joint decisions and no singular individual was responsible.²¹ In response to questions by the Committee regarding responsibility for security coverage of the AGR building, certain USSS advance agents pointed to state and local law enforcement, but could not say with any specificity how the AGR building would be covered.²²

¹⁸ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email Communication on July 5, 2024*, USSS_1033-USSS_1035 (received Aug. 23, 2024) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Timeline of Advance*, USSS_1367 (received Aug. 23, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁹ *See generally* Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office (Aug. 30, 2024).

²⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 23 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 141 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 37-38 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 18 (Aug. 23, 2024).

²² *See, e.g.* Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 35-38 (Aug. 26, 2024) (The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee, “[m]y understanding was that there would be police posts in the area and they would deter and enforce and mitigate anyone that tried to access the building or the area around it.” *Id.* at 37. However, there was a fence located between these PSP “police posts” and the AGR building. When the Committee asked if the Lead Advance Agent was aware of the fence at the time she stated, “I wasn’t aware – I didn’t recall the fence going all the way with no openings on that side.”). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 45-46, 48-50 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 31-33, 35 (Aug. 23, 2024).

The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the Committee that measures for securing the AGR building were briefed through the Donald Trump Detail (Trump Detail) and not through the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, and the Trump Detail and the USSS Office of Protective Operations (OPO) were responsible for reviewing the plans. According to the USSS Assistant Director of OPO, the preliminary survey, which “encapsulates the security plan,” “should get reviewed and approved by the local field office management” in addition to the Trump Detail’s operations section.²³

As discussed throughout this section, multiple foreseeable and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS contributed to Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt of former President Trump on July 13. These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable C-UAS systems, among many others.

A. Overview of USSS Planning and Security Assignments for the July 13 Rally

Prior to any event requiring USSS protection, USSS assigns an “advance team” to plan security and obtain needed assets to secure the event.²⁴ USSS’ advance team for the Butler Rally consisted of a Lead Advance Agent, a Site Agent, a Site Counterpart, an Intelligence Advance Agent, and in some cases, a C-UAS Advance Agent, among other potential asset advance agents, depending on a variety of factors, including threat assessments.²⁵ USSS “advance agents” conduct a series of assessments and prepare documents as part of their planning and security.²⁶ These documents, collectively known as a “site security plan” include a preliminary survey, Technical Security Division (TSD) outdoor site survey, site security diagrams, hospital surveys, transportation documents, and counter sniper documents (if such assets are applicable).²⁷ USSS assigned the following roles to lead the advance planning for the July 13 rally.

²³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 49 (Sept. 13, 2024).

²⁴ Congressional Research Service, Legislative Evolution of U.S. Secret Service, at 3 (R48138) (July 25, 2024); U.S. Secret Service, Our Protective Mission (<https://www.secretservice.gov/protection>) (last accessed Sept. 2024).

²⁵ See Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Preliminary Survey* (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²⁶ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 15-16, 24-26 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 16-18, 21 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 21, 114-115 (Aug. 21, 2024).

²⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 21-22 (Aug. 26, 2024).

USSS Advance Agents Assigned to the July 13 Rally

<i>Title</i>	<i>Associated Office</i>
Lead Advance Agent	Pittsburgh Field Office
Site Agent	Donald Trump Detail
Site Counterpart	Pittsburgh Field Office
Intelligence Advance Agent	Pittsburgh Field Office
Technical Security Investigator	Technical Security Division
Counter Sniper Team Leader	Special Operations Division
C-UAS Advance Agent	Donald Trump Detail

According to the USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, USSS received preapproval for 18 posts, which were broken down into “jump teams.”²⁸ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office explained that for campaigns, a “jump team” includes USSS and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents, per a USSS memorandum of understanding.²⁹ ATF told the Committee that there was an ATF agent present in his personal capacity at the Butler rally on July 13 but that ATF as an agency had no official presence at the rally and did not provide any security assistance before shots were fired.³⁰ The committee has yet to speak with the ATF agent who was at the rally. Due to the size of the Butler venue, the USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office requested and received additional USSS agents to staff the site.³¹ The USSS Site Diagram depicted below provides an aerial overview of the planning and security posts for the July 13 rally, which are discussed throughout this section.

²⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).

³⁰ Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Sept. 5, 2024).

³¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 44 (Aug. 30, 2024).

*USSS Site Diagram for the July 13 Rally*³²



B. Planning Failures

Throughout the week of July 8, USSS advance personnel spoke or met with federal, state and local law enforcement on multiple occasions to identify available assets, plan security for the July 13 rally, and conduct site visits to identify areas of concern, needed mitigation, fence lines, and post positions.³³ Most of the interactions between USSS, federal, state, and local law enforcement were informal, and there appeared to be only two “official” or planned meetings, which included an initial police briefing for state and local law enforcement on Monday, July 8, and site walk-through with state and local law enforcement on Thursday, July 11.

³² Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Site Diagram*, at 2 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³³ See generally Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 11 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), Briefing with Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (July 26, 2024) (hereinafter “Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024)”); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024).

The USSS Advance Agents did not document responsibility for securing the outer perimeter – the area outside the fence lines where individuals would be screened by magnetometers, which included the AGR building.³⁴ They also did not share planning documents with state or local law enforcement, or request state or local operational plans.³⁵ According to state and local law enforcement officials, USSS received more resources than USSS Advance Agents requested from state and local law enforcement for the July 13 rally.³⁶ Multiple USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that they received fewer assets than they had requested from other USSS components.³⁷ The Committee also found that USSS agents involved in the planning process did not have a clear understanding of who was responsible for approving certain documents and requests.

USSS Advance Personnel Roles and Responsibilities Were Unclear and Lacked Accountability.

USSS planning leads identified three security perimeters for the July 13 rally: the inner perimeter (which included the stage and “wherever [the protectee] is moving”³⁸), the middle perimeter (which included a double fence line and magnetometers), and the outer perimeter (which included anything outside of the fence line and was not secured or off-limits to spectators).³⁹ The Lead Advance Agent explained, “[w]hen we consider a perimeter for Secret Service, the perimeter that we secure is what we are able to secure with (sic) our laws and regulations that we operate under. The perimeter on the outside, although it could be secured in other ways, it’s not necessarily as hard and as fast as having complete access shut off.”⁴⁰

³⁴ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024).

³⁵ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart (Aug. 21, 2024).

³⁶ See generally Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

³⁷ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024) (stating the Trump Detail requested but did not receive Counter Assault Team liaison assets); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 35-36 (Aug. 21, 2024) (stating the Lead Advance Agent requested 13 magnetometers, but only received 10); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 55 (Aug. 23, 2024) (stating the Lead Advance Agent requested 13 magnetometers, but only received 10).

³⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 31-33 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³⁹ See generally Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 24-33; 62-64 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 36-46 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 26-31 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁴⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 64 (Aug. 26, 2024).

The USSS Lead Advance planning agents could not answer questions about who – specifically – was responsible for determining the perimeter and who approved the designation of the perimeter. For example, when asked who was in charge of determining the perimeter for the Butler Farm Show site, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart each individually explained that it was a joint effort based on available assets.⁴¹ The USSS Site Agent explained to the Committee it was a “consensus decision,” noting “we work together as a team, and we submit [the required information] to the [USSS Lead Advance Agent],” who then sends to OPO and Headquarters.⁴² The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee the advance agents put together a draft that is then “raised to the [the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office] and then to the Trump detail CNOS operations, and then come back down.”⁴³

The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the Committee he was not responsible for reviewing or approving perimeter decisions, as he was not present (or expected to be present) for the walk-through of the site on the day prior to the rally.⁴⁴ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the Committee that the reporting, operational planning, and overall approval goes through the Trump Detail and OPO, not the SAIC of the local field office.⁴⁵ However, the USSS Assistant Director of OPO told the Committee that, in addition to the Trump Detail, the Pittsburgh Field Office supervisor and the Lead Advance Agent “are responsible for the security plan on the ground.”⁴⁶ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office also told the Committee that if issues were brought to his attention, he would be there to address them, but otherwise it is the detail supervisors who are responsible.⁴⁷

USSS Failed to Sufficiently Coordinate With State and Local Law Enforcement.

On July 5, USSS informed PSP and Butler County local law enforcement of former President Trump’s planned visit to the Butler County Farm Show.⁴⁸ USSS did not share materials outlining their expectations and according to state and local law enforcement, planning

⁴¹ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 36-40 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 20; 22-23 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁴² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 20-21 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁴³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁴⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 24-25 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 24 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 55-56, 144 (Aug. 30, 2024).

⁴⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 15, 55 (Aug. 30, 2024).

⁴⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 49-50 (Sept. 13, 2024).

⁴⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 26 (Aug. 30, 2024).

⁴⁸ Pennsylvania State Police, *Email from PSP Lieutenant (Officer in Charge) to PSP Law Enforcement Officials (July 5, 2024)*, at PSP_0002 (received Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).

meetings were disorganized and lacked direction.⁴⁹ A PSP Lieutenant involved in the July 8 planning meeting noted USSS did not have answers to certain questions from PSP (e.g. where the stage would be).⁵⁰ A Butler ESU Commander involved in the advance planning described the July 11 site walk-through as “incredibly disorganized” with “no coordination . . . really just people milling about . . . I felt like there was no plan.”⁵¹ Some USSS leads participated in briefings by telephone or not at all.⁵² While some key USSS personnel did not request state and local operational plans in advance of the July 13 rally, the USSS Site Agent was provided a copy of the PSP operational plan.⁵³ The SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office did not receive the operational plan. Both the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office and the USSS Site Agent told the Committee that state and local partners do not always send operational plans prior to an event.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office said he was not aware of any USSS policy or procedure to request any state or local operational plans.⁵⁵

On Monday, July 8, USSS held a “police meeting,” led by the Lead Advance Agent.⁵⁶ Attendees included USSS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement.⁵⁷ During that meeting, USSS explained “what [assets/resources] they wanted each agency to provide.”⁵⁸ According to local law enforcement, USSS also did not discuss the site perimeter at this meeting.⁵⁹ The Butler

⁴⁹ See, e.g. Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler ESU Assistant Commander 1 on July 23, 2024 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁵⁰ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁵¹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁵² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 20-25, 30 106, 115 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance Agent, at 21-22, 65 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19-20, 27, 36 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁵³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 113 (Aug. 21, 2024).

⁵⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 54 (Aug. 30, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 113 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁵⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 54 (Aug. 30, 2024).

⁵⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁵⁷ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024). In correspondence to the Committee, the FBI stated that it attended the July 8 briefing. Letter from Assistant Director Patrick N. Findlay, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, to Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Sept. 13, 2024).

⁵⁸ Pennsylvania State Police, *Email from PSP Official to PSP Law Enforcement Officials (July 19, 2024)*, at PSP_0037-PSP_0038 (received Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁵⁹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

County ESU Commander told the Committee that after the Police Brief, a Butler ESU Deputy Commander contacted the Beaver County Emergency Service Unit to request additional assistance for the Trump rally “knowing the [event] was going to be manpower intensive.”⁶⁰

On Tuesday, July 9, agents from USSS, PSP, and Butler County conducted separate site visits at the Butler Farm Show and following their visits, joined together at the “Butler Barracks,” a local PSP office, to review the site on Google Earth.⁶¹ A PSP Lieutenant explained, “we ... started just pre planning the map. . . We were able to draw like, the fence line and then show like, around like, areas that would be of any concern and where we needed to make some. Set some posts up, which we discussed at a later date.”⁶² Below is the initial map created during that meeting. A PSP Lieutenant sent this map out to “the group,” including the USSS Lead Advance Agent and USSS Site Agent.⁶³

⁶⁰ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁶¹ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁶² Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁶³ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Email correspondence to Committee staff from PSP (Sept. 22, 2024) (on file with Committee).

Initial Map from July 9 Meeting⁶⁴



USSS Did Not Adequately Cover the AGR Building.

USSS’ Protective Operations policy documents provide guidance on how to conduct advance planning and secure protective events for former President Trump.⁶⁵ Specifically, USSS’ Protective Operations Manual states, “[a]ll large events should be closely scrutinized by both the Site Agent and the Lead Advance Agent. Attention should be paid to how attendees may

⁶⁴ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁶⁵ U.S. Secret Service Directives Systems, Protective Operations Manual, Donald Trump Protective Division General Information (USSS_000226- 000249).

gain access to the protectee(s).”⁶⁶ Despite this guidance, in interviews with the Committee, USSS agents in charge of the advance planning could not say with any specificity how the AGR building would be covered and who was ultimately responsible for ensuring the AGR building was sufficiently covered.⁶⁷ For example, the USSS Site Agent told the Committee that other than the local snipers inside the building, she did not know how the AGR building would be covered, but understood Butler ESU “would have coverage of [the] building.”⁶⁸ Butler ESU told the Committee that they informed USSS they did not have the manpower to lock down the AGR building, but USSS Advance Agents told the Committee Butler local law enforcement never raised these concerns.⁶⁹

A Butler ESU police officer told the Committee that during a July 11 police walk through of the Butler rally site on July 11 led by USSS, he introduced himself to the USSS Site Agent and USSS Site Counterpart:

[I] explained where our teams were going to be . . . I told them that the area along the AGR fence line was a concern... the closeness to the stage . . . it wasn’t a good vantage point for anybody to see even from the venue inside... I explained to them there would be cars parking alongside the road because it was close and people walking up.⁷⁰

The Butler ESU officer stated that they “did not have the manpower to lock down this area and the area [referring to the AGR building] needed to be locked down.”⁷¹ The Butler ESU officer told the Committee that in response to these concerns, USSS – specifically the Site Agent, Site Counterpart, and Counter Sniper Team Leader – said they “copied” and “they would take care of it.”⁷²

When the Committee interviewed the USSS Site Agent and asked about this interaction, she stated “it was brought up to our attention that the local Pennsylvania State Police won’t have the manpower to secure the building” and “at that point our response was the Butler County ESU

⁶⁶ U.S. Secret Service Directives Systems, Protective Operations Manual, Donald Trump Protective Division General Information (USSS_000240).

⁶⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 35-38 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 48, 50, 122-124 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 39 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁶⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 49 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁶⁹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 39 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 123 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 148 (Aug. 23, 2024) (noting PSP raised concerns they did not have the “manpower to secure” the AGR building, but Butler ESU did not raise these concerns).

⁷⁰ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁷¹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁷² Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

would have coverage of the AGR building.”⁷³ Specifically, the Site Agent told the Committee Butler ESU did not inform her they did not have the manpower to lockdown the building. When the Committee asked what steps USSS took to ensure the AGR building was covered – knowing PSP could not secure the building – the Site Agent told the Committee, “since it was on the outer perimeter, we did not discuss or plan for having a post-stander or having any other asset other than the local counter sniper, once they decided to have a local counter sniper inside the building for the day.”⁷⁴ When the Committee asked the USSS Site Counterpart about local law enforcement raising concerns, she stated, “that was not a conversation I took part in.”⁷⁵ The Lead Advance Agent also told the Committee she was not aware of local law enforcement raising these concerns.⁷⁶ When asked how the AGR building would be covered, the Lead Advance Agent stated, “my understanding was that there would be police posts in the area and they would deter and enforce and mitigate anyone that tried to access the building or the area around it.”⁷⁷

Prior to the July 13 rally, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Counter Sniper Team Leader, and Site Counterpart did not go into the AGR building as part of their advance planning.⁷⁸ On the day of the rally, USSS did not sweep the AGR building prior to the rally.⁷⁹ When asked by the Committee “who ultimately was responsible” for ensuring there was no unauthorized access of the AGR roof, the Lead Advance Agent stated:

There’s no specific. There were several different plans in place, different pieces of the puzzle from the advance that all had their own stake in making sure that that building was not accessible.⁸⁰

The Site Agent told the Committee, “[t]he AGR building was not part of our site. The AGR building was not considered part of our perimeter . . . that building was not part of our perimeter, our secure perimeter. When we say, when we identify buildings and surroundings that [are outside] of perimeter, that’s more local law enforcement responsibilities.”⁸¹ When the Committee asked what specific steps USSS took to ensure the AGR building was covered, the Site Agent stated, “[s]ince it was on the outer perimeter, we did not discuss or plan for having a

⁷³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 40 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁷⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 37 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁷⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 123 (Aug. 21, 2024).

⁷⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 39-40 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁷⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 36 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁷⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 98 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 167 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 59-60 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁷⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 90, 110-111 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 115 (Aug. 23, 2024).

⁸⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 38 (Aug. 26, 2024).

⁸¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 147 (Aug. 23, 2024).

post-stander or having any other asset other than the local counter sniper[s]...”⁸² However, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that part of the USSS counter snipers’ responsibility included scanning for threats regardless of the location, including beyond the perimeter.⁸³ The Committee has interviewed two USSS counter snipers and has requested interviews for the other two USSS counter snipers that were assigned to the July 13 Butler rally.

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader Identified the AGR Roof as a Vulnerability, but Did Not Ensure Local Snipers Could Mitigate It.

The four USSS counter snipers positioned on two barn roofs behind the stage played a key role in scanning for threats, including on and around the AGR building. In interviews with the Committee, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader stated that part of his job in the advance planning for the event was to identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities or threats and that he identified the AGR building, with its line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, as one such vulnerability.⁸⁴ He further stated in his interview that a key component of his plan to mitigate the AGR building vulnerability was himself and his partner in the Hercules 1 position on the southern barn.⁸⁵

The image below shows the positions of the USSS counter sniper Hercules 1 and Hercules 2 positions during the rally, the local snipers in the AGR building, and the likely route Crooks took across the roofs to get into position and ultimately shoot.⁸⁶

⁸² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 37 (Aug. 23, 2024).


⁸³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 27-28, 46-47 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁸⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 29 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁸⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 30-31 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁸⁶ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

USSS and Local Sniper Positions at July 13 rally⁸⁷



Source: Google Maps. Markings added by the Committee.

H1: USSS counter sniper Hercules 1.

H2: USSS counter sniper Hercules 2.

S: stage.

LS: local snipers in the AGR building.

AC: air conditioning unit where Crooks climbed up on the roof.

Red Arrow: likely route Crooks took across the roofs to get into position.

C: position from which Crooks fired.

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader created a planning document as part of his advance work for the Butler event that he and the other USSS counter snipers would use for

⁸⁷ The likely route Crooks took across the roofs is based on the following information received by the Committee as part of its investigation: the position of the air conditioning unit where Crooks climbed up on the roof, dash cam footage and PSP interview with a Butler Township Police Officer, and Committee staff examination of the AGR roof on July 26, 2024 (Butler Investigation Evidence Photos, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 28, 2024, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/butler-investigation-photos>; Dashboard Camera Footage, Butler Township Police Department, Unit 5-1, July 13, 2024, at 18:08:34-18:08:46 (footage appears to show Thomas Crooks traversing the roof of the AGR building); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee).

planning purposes as well as for communicating about specific locations during the event.⁸⁸ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that when he went to the Butler Farm Show site on July 10 before the event, he identified where the USSS counter snipers would be posted and took pictures of the approximate views the sniper teams would have from their postings.⁸⁹ These pictures were incorporated in planning documents, like the image below, to be used by the USSS counter sniper teams during the event and included potential areas of vulnerabilities such as the AGR building.⁹⁰

This image below does not show the exact view that Hercules 2 had of the AGR building because it was not taken from the same part of the barn roof where Hercules 2 was positioned. The Counter Sniper Team Leader explained to the Committee that he took this picture while standing on the roof of the barn that was in the middle of the Hercules 1 and Hercules 2 positions.⁹¹ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that when he went to the roof of the barn where Hercules 1 and 2 would be positioned and took the photograph contained in the image below, “I actually wasn’t looking independently at all the threat areas. It was more to make sure that the roof was secure for us to stand on. . . . Up there it was really just officer safety.”⁹²

This image below does show the trees that partially blocked the line-of-sight from the Hercules 2 position on the northern barn (to the right of the photographer’s position) to the right side of the AGR roof from which Crooks fired.

⁸⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 16-19, 75-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).


⁸⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 75-76 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁹⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 16-19, 75-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁹¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 75-76 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁹² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 76 (Aug. 28, 2024).

*USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader Planning Document*⁹³



The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that when he initially went on the barn roof to take the photograph contained in the above image, “I looked over at the AGR building, but I didn’t really make a mental note of, hey, this is actually being blocked. It wasn’t until later that I was actually doing the grids and doing a 360 that I went, I don’t know if you can see that [the AGR building] from Hercules 2, so I made note of that at the time. But Hercules 1, you had a clear line-of-sight, so I was okay with it.”⁹⁴

When the Committee asked the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader if he ever notified the Hercules 2 counter snipers about the tree line obstruction of the AGR building, he said, “I did not mention [to] them that hey, part of the [AGR] building is going to be obscured from you.”⁹⁵ When the Committee asked why the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader did not mention the obstruction to the Hercules 2 team, he responded:

⁹³ USSS Counter Sniper Team, *Site 2: Butler Farm Outdoor Rally*, at 4 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁹⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 76-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁹⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).

Honestly, I just didn't think about it. This is one of the many threat areas that looked it [sic]. I wouldn't have mentioned that hey, we can actually see the buildings on the left side, the private residences and the wood line, and you guys can't see that. It's kind of, between each posting, when we're working together we have full coverage, but there are certain things a certain post would see better than another post.⁹⁶

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that if another USSS counter sniper had an issue with their post, "they could reach out if they had any concerns. But I believe they would understand I did the advance work, this is this line of we can't see a certain threat area, I assume that the advance did his job diligently, which I did, and Hercules 1 could see the threat area."⁹⁷ After noticing the obstruction of the trees in front of the AGR building, one of the USSS counter snipers on Hercules 2 told the Committee that he and his partner did not notify the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader "because it was assumed that he took the post during his advance procedures and chose that one, regardless of a line of sight issue with the trees, because the AGR building was to be secured by locals."⁹⁸

Local snipers explained to the Committee they understood their primary areas of responsibility to be the rally crowd.⁹⁹ The local snipers also explained that they were positioned behind windows and behind their weapons, which were approximately 6-7 feet away from the windows.¹⁰⁰ The image below, created by local law enforcement, identifies seven sectors of coverage responsibility.

⁹⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 77-78 (Aug. 28, 2024).


⁹⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 78 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁹⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 80 (Aug. 16, 2024).

⁹⁹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁰⁰ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

Sector Map of Butler Rally Site¹⁰¹



According to one of the local snipers the Committee interviewed, the snipers in the AGR building were responsible for covering part of Sector 2 (identified by the dark green box in the above map); Sector 1 (the yellow box in the in the above map); and the upper portion of Sector 5 (the purple box in the above map).¹⁰² These sectors cover the approximate locations of the rally crowd.

No USSS personnel involved with planning who the Committee interviewed questioned the local snipers' decisions regarding these positions nor their understanding of their areas of responsibility.¹⁰³ As discussed above, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Counter Sniper Team Leader, and Site Counterpart did not go into the AGR building as part of their advance

¹⁰¹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024) (Sector map taken from Butler County ESU briefing documents presented at Rally on July 13, 2024).

¹⁰² Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁰³ See e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 36-38 (Aug. 28, 2024).

planning.¹⁰⁴

Committee staff visited the Butler Farm Show rally site, toured the AGR building, and examined the rooms and views where each local sniper was posted.¹⁰⁵ During the tour, Committee staff took photographs from the approximate position of the local snipers in the AGR building on July 13, 2024.¹⁰⁶ As shown in the photographs below, the local snipers had a limited view of the AGR roof based on their positions on July 13.¹⁰⁷

View from local sniper post in AGR building¹⁰⁸



The photograph above shows the approximate field of view from one of the positions occupied by local snipers positioned in AGR building on July 13, 2024.¹⁰⁹ As can be seen in the photograph, from this position the local sniper would not have been able to see Crooks either during his transit of the roof or when he took his final firing position.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 98 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 167 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 59-60 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁰⁵ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁰⁶ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁰⁷ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁰⁸ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on July 26, 2024.

¹⁰⁹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹⁰ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

Although local snipers would not have been able to see Crooks from their positions, they had access to a break room on the same floor of the AGR building.¹¹¹ This breakroom contained a south-facing window, and was closest to the location from which Crooks fired.¹¹² The photograph below, taken by Committee staff, shows the southward view from that AGR window looking out toward the rally site.

View from AGR building breakroom¹¹³



The roof visible in the foreground of the above photograph is the AGR roof from which Crooks fired. However, this view does not show the actual spot from which Crooks fired, which was on the eastern side of that roof (i.e., to the left from the perspective of this photograph).¹¹⁴ In addition, as the above photograph shows, a local sniper positioned in this location would not

¹¹¹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹² Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹³ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on July 26, 2024.

¹¹⁴ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

have been able to provide coverage of the rally crowd, which was their primary area of responsibility.¹¹⁵

Based on staff's tour of the AGR building, it was possible for a local sniper in the breakroom to position themselves so as to be able to see Crooks' location on the roof while remaining concealed inside the building. In order to obtain a visual of that spot, a sniper would have had to go to the breakroom, press up against the window, and look eastward (i.e., to the left). The photograph below was taken by Committee staff and shows that view of Crooks' approximate position (indicated with the black arrow) from that window.

View looking left from AGR building breakroom¹¹⁶



¹¹⁵ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹⁶ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on July 26, 2024.

As can be seen in the above photograph, a sniper who assumed this position would have obstructed their view of what was understood to be their primary area of responsibility—the rally crowd.¹¹⁷

Additionally, local snipers told the Committee that their understanding was their role was to act as “snipers,” concealed within the AGR building and looking into the crowd within the rally site for threats – as opposed to “counter snipers” primarily responsible for looking outside the site for threats from snipers on structures such as the AGR building.¹¹⁸

As discussed in the Timeline (Section IV) below, a local sniper in the AGR building was the first to spot the suspicious person with a rangefinder, which was relayed to USSS. According to the Beaver County ESU Commander, “if [the Beaver County sniper in the AGR building] doesn’t give that first warning, however long it was, nobody would be looking for that guy” – and the two officers who fired at Crooks (the Butler ESU officer and the USSS counter sniper) may not have been able to determine where the shots were coming from and to shoot at Crooks as quickly as they did, thereby preventing him from inflicting further harm on former President Trump and rally attendees.¹¹⁹

During the Committee’s July 30, 2024 hearing, Acting Director Rowe presented the below photograph taken from the AGR building to show local snipers could have seen Crooks on the roof from their positions.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹⁸ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹¹⁹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹²⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).



In regard to this image, Acting Director Rowe stated:

This is from the second floor of the AGR building. This point of view is the point of view where the counter-sniper team locally was posted. The gold arrow indicates where the shooter fired from. Looking left, why was the assailant not seen? When we were told that building was going to be covered, that there had been a face to face that afternoon, that our team leads met. This was the view.¹²²

Local law enforcement snipers stationed in the AGR building who spoke with the Committee said that the Acting Director's assessment did not align with their point of view.¹²³ When asked about the picture presented by Acting Director Rowe, one local law enforcement sniper stationed in the AGR building told the Committee "I'm not exactly

¹²¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

¹²² Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

¹²³ Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with Committee); Interview with Local Law Enforcement Sniper positioned in AGR Building (Aug. 6, 2024).

sure where they took those pictures from, but like if they were taken from where I was, they would have been, they would have literally had to been hanging out the window.”¹²⁴

Multiple Law Enforcement Line-of-Sight Concerns Were Not Sufficiently Mitigated in Advance of July 13.

The USSS site agent told the Committee that the Butler County Farm Show site had “many vulnerabilities,” which included an airport hangar, multiple buildings, a residential area, rooftops, and empty buildings near the airport, noting “so everything pretty much surrounding the venue, the site, was pretty much considered a line-of-sight [concern] or a vulnerability.”¹²⁵ USSS and PSP discussed placing farm equipment, bleachers, and other large trucks in certain areas.¹²⁶ In an interview with Committee staff, the USSS Site Counterpart said that by Wednesday, July 10, there were still line-of-sight concerns that needed to be mitigated.¹²⁷ The USSS Site Counterpart “tried to put [trucks] in those positions that I wanted to block, you know, those AGR building.”¹²⁸ A PSP Lieutenant involved in coordinating the planning and security for the rally stated:

But in the end, like, to me, I thought from the way it sounded, like there was going to be a lot more [tractors/vehicles] than was actually there. I mean, I think there was only a handful of tractors on this side and one combine right here.¹²⁹

The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee she discussed AGR line-of-sight concerns throughout the week, including the day before the rally.¹³⁰ The USSS Lead Advance Agent noted that the rally site “had still not been built out as of the time I left on Friday” and the second supervisors from the Trump Detail “were continuing to walk through the site and discussed line-of-sight and other issues.”¹³¹ The USSS Site Agent told the Committee she was not prevented or overruled in using heavy equipment or trucks to mitigate ground line-of-sight

¹²⁴ Interview with AGR Sniper 1, Beaver County ESU (Aug. 5, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹²⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 51-52 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹²⁶ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 33 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 55 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 174 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 87 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹²⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹²⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹²⁹ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 33 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹³⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 117 (Aug. 26, 2024). The USSS Lead Advance Agent left the Butler Farm Show grounds at approximately 3:00 pm on July 12. *Id.*, at 137.

¹³¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 117 (Aug. 26, 2024).

issues.¹³² Ultimately, however, large trucks were not used.¹³³ The USSS Lead Advance Agent said, “the Penske trucks were in the area at the time, helping with the buildout. Those trucks were not used. They continued to speak about some farm equipment that they had. The counter sniper teams that we had in place, the police posting we had in place, the screens that were going to be in place, and the bleachers that would be in place, that would all mitigate being able to obstruct line-of-sight from that area.”¹³⁴ A USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position told the Committee he believed the mitigations were sufficient and the USSS Site Counterpart told the Committee she believed they had a “good security plan” for the July 13 rally.¹³⁵

Resource Requests for Additional Assets Were Denied and Others Were Not Made.

PSP initially told USSS they would be able to provide 10-15 troopers but ultimately provided a total of 30 troopers, including 22 troopers on site.¹³⁶ The Butler County ESU sent three sniper teams and approximately 20-25 officers.¹³⁷

The USSS Trump Detail requested specific assets for the July 13 rally that were not approved.¹³⁸ These included C-UAS and UAS resources, which are discussed below, and a Counter Assault Team liaison.¹³⁹ President Trump’s USSS detail requested Counter Assault Team liaisons to help coordinate tactical assets in advance of the July 13 rally, but other USSS components denied this request.¹⁴⁰ The Lead Advance Agent also told the Committee she requested 13 magnetometers from USSS, but only received 10.¹⁴¹ In addition, the USSS Site Counterpart told the Committee that having a Counter Surveillance Unit (CSU) would have been helpful and she was “surprised” USSS did not have a CSU for an outdoor event.¹⁴² A CSU team

¹³² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 53 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹³³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 56 (Aug. 26, 2024). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 175 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹³⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 56 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹³⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 163 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 61 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹³⁶ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Lieutenant, Officer in Charge on July 22, 2024, at 20 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹³⁷ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹³⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 26 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 159 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 28 (Aug. 21, 2024) (stating “I don’t know who makes the final decision on whether a request gets granted or not.”).

¹³⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁴⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁴¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 26-27 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁴² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 30 (Aug. 21, 2024).

is used to “identify and observe outer perimeter areas from which significant threats could originate.”¹⁴³ The USSS Assistant Director of OPO also told the Committee that “a large outdoor venue would lend itself for requesting a CSU-type asset,” and that a CSU may have helped because “an area of focus for CSU is to look for that pre-attack behavior.”¹⁴⁴ The USSS Site Agent also told the Committee having a CSU asset would have been helpful for the July 13 rally.¹⁴⁵

While former President Trump did not have a CSU for the outdoor rally that was expected to have 15,000 attendees on July 13, the First Lady did have a CSU assigned for her indoor event in the same area had 410 expected attendees.¹⁴⁶ According to the USSS Site Counterpart, the First Lady regularly receives CSU.¹⁴⁷ The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee she was not aware of any discussions to request a CSU for the July 13 rally, noting “it’s not a typical asset for an advance for a former President that I had worked at that time.”¹⁴⁸

The Site Counterpart for the July 13 rally noted that Advance Agents often already know what assets will be provided before putting in a request: “a lot of times I think it is like . . . you can make the request, but you know what you’re going to get,” explaining, “we have limited, you know, manpower, limited resources. Especially during a campaign, is [sic] it’s always an issue: resources and manpower.”¹⁴⁹ The fact that USSS was responsible for providing security for two protectees in the Pittsburgh area on July 13 – former President Trump’s event in Butler and the First Lady’s event in the city of Pittsburgh – resulted in shared USSS assets at the Pittsburgh airport.¹⁵⁰ Although the Site Counterpart for the Butler rally acknowledged that resources could be strained by asset sharing between protectees, she told the Committee that she was confident that there was not going to be any resource issues during this specific arrangement because she had previously worked with the local law enforcement entity providing the shared coverage.¹⁵¹

¹⁴³ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, USSS Manpower Briefing, at 3 (USSS_000155-158) (received Aug. 2, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁴⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 122-123 (Sept. 13, 2024).

¹⁴⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 30 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹⁴⁶ Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler event at 5, U.S. Secret Service (on file with Committee); Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 FLOTUS event, U.S. Secret Service (on file with Committee).

¹⁴⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 67-68 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹⁴⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 26 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁴⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 31 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹⁵⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 171 (Aug. 21, 2024); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, USSS Manpower Briefing, at 3 (USSS_000155-158) (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁵¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 173 (Aug. 21, 2024).

She said that if any issues did arise, “I think it would’ve been an easy and quick adjustment if needed.”¹⁵²

When asked if protective glass had been discussed for the July 13 event, the Site Agent told the Committee that on protective events she had worked, former presidents typically did not have this asset. The Agent added that, in her opinion, “definitely would be beneficial to have protective glass.”¹⁵³

Errors in Security Planning Documents.

At least two documents that USSS officials created detailing security specifications and asset postings for the July 13 rally contained errors regarding the positions of the local counter snipers at the event.

One document, the Preliminary Survey, which contains information about the positions of assets, radio frequencies, and many other items, contained inaccurate information regarding the positions of the local counter snipers at the July 13 rally.¹⁵⁴ In an interview with the Committee, the USSS Site Agent for the July 13 rally who contributed to the Preliminary Survey acknowledged that the accuracy of the document is important.¹⁵⁵ In the document, it stated “Local CS [Counter Sniper] Team (elevated 4 o’clock & 8 o’clock) Barn Roof.”¹⁵⁶ When asked about the accuracy of that information, the Site Agent acknowledged that this was not the actual position of the local counter sniper teams.¹⁵⁷ The agent continued:

[O]nce the paperwork is submitted, we normally brief during the post-stander briefing to make sure that everybody is aware of tactical assets or special tacticals from local law enforcement. And that was briefed as part of -- if there’s any corrections or anything that needs to be addressed prior to the visit, or even during the post-stander briefing, which is what we did once we noticed that there was some misinformation, or not, something that was not correct, we make sure that we brief that during the day of the visit to ensure that everybody is aware of tactical elements or positioning of local assets.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 173 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹⁵³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 121-122 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁵⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 92 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁵⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 93 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁵⁶ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler event at 5, (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁵⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 98 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁵⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 98 (Aug. 23, 2024).

Another document, the Site Diagram, which contains overhead images of site venues and lists assets for those venues, also contained similar, inaccurate information listing “Local CS [Counter Sniper] Team (elevated 4 o’clock & 8 o’clock) Barn Roof.”¹⁵⁹ The Site Agent, who also contributed to this document, confirmed that the location of the local counter sniper teams presented in this Site Diagram was also not accurate.¹⁶⁰ The Site Agent submitted this paperwork with the errors to the Lead Advance Agent for the July 13 rally.¹⁶¹ The Lead Advance Agent’s supervisor did not review the preliminary survey until “after it had already been approved and submitted.”¹⁶² The Lead Advance Agent did not catch the error before she submitted the document to the Trump detail.¹⁶³ The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee, however, “I put those [papers] together with the best of my ability, I observed them, and those errors that were found were addressed when they were found.”¹⁶⁴ The Lead Advance Agent stated, “I did review. There was information that I missed on the page, and that was corrected in a briefing that happened later that evening,” and that “[t]he counter sniper advance sent an email with his documents, that had in the body of the email the correct locations of the counter sniper teams and the [local] sniper teams, and that was what was briefed[.]”¹⁶⁵

C. Communications Failures

Multiple USSS officials, including Acting Director Rowe, have acknowledged communications failures on July 13.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁹ The USSS Site Diagram for the July 13, 2024 rally contained a diagram for the Pittsburgh airport, the Butler Farm Show site, and the stage and bleacher set-up. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, USSS Site Diagram, at 2 (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁶⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 103 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁶¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 104 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁶² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, at 188 (Aug. 30, 2024).

¹⁶³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 171-172 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁶⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 174 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁶⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 171, 173 (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹⁶⁶ *See, e.g.*, Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 163 (Aug. 26, 2024) (“I think we can agree that communication failed.”); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 137 (Aug. 21, 2024) (“I think there was also like a big communication breakdown. It appears that, you know, the word wasn’t getting out to the right entities.”); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 90 (Sept. 13, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

Several USSS personnel at the rally have told the Committee that they were not notified about the suspicious person with a rangefinder – and that if they had been, there may have been time to take action prior to shots being fired.¹⁶⁷ The Site Counterpart explained:

There’s a lot of things that could have been done, but it has to be relayed. It has to be communicated in order for those to be put in place. . . . I didn’t know anything was going on. I can’t put out fires that I don’t know exist[.].¹⁶⁸

The USSS Site Agent told the Committee that if she had known law enforcement was trying to locate a suspicious person, she would have passed that information along to the supervisors of former President Trump’s detail, who could make the decision whether to remove him from the stage.¹⁶⁹ The USSS Lead Advance agents the Committee has interviewed stated that they were not aware of any discussions that day about potentially removing former President Trump from the stage.¹⁷⁰

In an interview with the Committee, the Assistant Director of the USSS OPO said, “clearly, there were communication gaps that day that led to this failure. And if those communication gaps had been mitigated, information could have been passed in a more timely fashion that would’ve avoided that failure.”¹⁷¹ When asked by the Committee to provide additional detail on what specific communication gaps he was referring to, the Assistant Director stated:

Well, I did not conduct the advance. I don’t have firsthand knowledge, but based on information I’ve learned after the fact and even one could almost observe from a third-party perspective. The communications plan was, in my opinion, siloed. We had a security room with a Secret Service supervisor, a member of the Pennsylvania State Police, and then approximately 120 yards to 300 yards away. You had a mobile command post with the various law enforcement agencies represented.

So, I will speak in generalities to answer your question. In law enforcement, one of the most basic tenants is one has to be able to communicate. What frustrates me, and maybe I’m dating myself, but I keep hearing about technology, and this, and that, and the other

¹⁶⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 92-94 (Aug. 26, 2024). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 112-114 (Aug. 14, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 134 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁶⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 145 (Aug. 21, 2024).

¹⁶⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 134-135 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁷⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 93-94 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 132-135 (Aug. 23, 2024).

¹⁷¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 90 (Sept. 13, 2024).

thing, and/or some panacea radio-type system where, again, if you just had a well-staffed, unified command post with law enforcement appropriately co-located for command and control, and the ability to contemporaneously communicate and pass information, we wouldn't have had -- or I'll say, I don't have all the facts to the investigation, but you won't have stovepipe communications that can cause failures that we saw up at Butler as a result of communication being delayed. This individual was walking around for an hour, but somehow information seemed to be getting stove piped. Sometimes in law enforcement, there isn't a script for every play or every scenario you may encounter, but just by sitting in that unified command post, "Oh, what did you hear? There's a guy, so and so." And oftentimes that's how information in reality is going to get passed.

Even if you had one radio communication frequency and everyone could speak on, it would be worthless because everyone would be stepping on each other. And oftentimes in exigent situations, you can take their, you can't even talk on the radio, but it's that lead up prior to something becoming kinetic, which is essential in that command and control.

So, if the information is correct, which I don't have firsthand knowledge of, but there was a Secret Service security room with only a Secret Service supervisor and a member of the Pennsylvania State Police. Why would you not embed them in that unified mobile command post to have that command and control? If there was an incident or something percolating, establish that jurisdictional deconfliction and address the issue.

I mean, if I was to use an analogy; if there's any football fans, if we have the coach calling in the plays to the quarterback, and we have the defensive coordinator on the same radio frequency, it's not going to work. So, I don't really put much stock in the whole -- there's been this whole notion of radios and radio. You establish a unified command so people can communicate and collaborate and reach out to their respective entities.¹⁷²

¹⁷² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 91-92 (Sept. 13, 2024).

Key USSS personnel were never informed that local law enforcement was searching for a suspicious person with a rangefinder prior to shots being fired.

After a local sniper first observed Crooks with a rangefinder at 5:32 pm, local and state law enforcement officials acted promptly to notify others, including USSS.¹⁷³ As detailed below, by 5:52 pm at least eight USSS personnel had been notified of the suspicious person. The PSP Sergeant in the USSS Security Room notified the USSS Security Room Agent verbally at approximately 5:44 pm, and shared photos of Crooks with the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent at approximately 5:48 pm.¹⁷⁴ The C-UAS Advance Agent passed the photos and description of Crooks along to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Team agent by text message at 5:52 pm.¹⁷⁵ The Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader notified the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader at 5:45 pm via text message – and that USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee he found the report of a rangefinder “extremely suspicious” – who then notified the other three USSS Counter Snipers by email at 5:52 pm.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, a USSS Protective Intelligence Agent at the rally site was also looking into the suspicious person report around this time.¹⁷⁷

The C-UAS and Intelligence Advance Agents told the Committee that after learning of the suspicious person, the USSS Counter Sniper Response Team Agent and USSS Protective Intelligence Agent engaged in the on-the-ground effort to locate the individual. Several USSS personnel told the Committee they were not aware that these agents had been deployed in a search of any kind.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, the Site Agent and Counter Sniper Team Leader stated that they would typically be made aware if the Counter Sniper Response Team is deployed in a search, and that they should have been told on July 13.¹⁷⁹

Despite the fact that multiple USSS personnel were aware that local law enforcement identified a suspicious person with a rangefinder – and some USSS personnel were actively engaged in the search – others including the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, Site

¹⁷³ See Section IV below.

¹⁷⁴ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁷⁵ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Messages from C-UAS Advance Agent to Counter Sniper Response Team Agent*, USSS_1919, USSS_1922 (received Aug. 30, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁷⁶ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm*, at USSS_001412-001415 (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email between USSS counter snipers on July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm*, at USSS_001417-001419 (on file with Committee).

¹⁷⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024).

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent at 107-108 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 107-109 (Aug. 29, 2024).

¹⁷⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 207 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 182 (Aug. 23, 2024).

Counterpart, and Counter Assault Team Leader, did not receive this information until after shots were fired.¹⁸⁰

USSS officials expected the USSS Security Room would relay relevant information from all law enforcement agencies.

Several of the USSS personnel who did not learn of the suspicious person with a rangefinder until after the shooting told the Committee that they expected the USSS Security Room would relay relevant information from all law enforcement agencies working at the rally site.¹⁸¹ According to the PSP Sergeant who was stationed in the USSS Security Room, he initially told the Security Room Agent about the suspicious person with a rangefinder approximately 27 minutes prior to the shooting, and that the suspicious individual was on the AGR building roof approximately 2 minutes before the shooting.¹⁸² The PSP Sergeant stated that he was not aware of what, if anything, the Security Room Agent did with the information.¹⁸³ The Committee has not yet interviewed the Security Room Agent to determine what he did with that information. Additionally, the Committee was not able to review radio communications made from the USSS Security Room because, as Acting USSS Director Rowe stated in his testimony to the Committee on July 30, the USSS did not record its radio transmissions on July 13.¹⁸⁴ USSS officials told the Committee that radio communications are often recorded at protective events, but that the recording capability was not available at the rally.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 92 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 47-48 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 53 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 127 (Aug. 16, 2024).

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 92-93, 96-97 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 181 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 69 (Aug. 14, 2024).

¹⁸² See, e.g. Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁸³ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee)

¹⁸⁴ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

¹⁸⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 143 (Aug. 20, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 91-92 (Aug. 14, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

Siloed communications hindered information sharing at the July 13 rally.

USSS, state, and local law enforcement operated on multiple, separate radio channels.

At the July 13 rally, the USSS operated at least three radio channels, each designated for different categories of personnel.¹⁸⁶ PSP operated on two radio channels – a primary channel that all PSP officers were instructed to monitor, and a secondary channel.¹⁸⁷ Local law enforcement operated on three radio channels on July 13 – a tactical channel for local snipers and members of the quick response force and counter assault teams, a patrol channel for local post-standers and patrol officers, and a third channel for members of the Butler County Sheriff’s Department.¹⁸⁸

USSS uses encrypted radio frequencies, which are not accessible without a USSS-issued radio.¹⁸⁹ According to Butler County ESU police officers, no local law enforcement officials were given a USSS radio on July 13, and no one from USSS had a Butler County-issued radio.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, all of the USSS personnel the Committee interviewed stated that they did not personally have a local radio or access to local radio channels.¹⁹¹ Based on its interviews with USSS personnel and local law enforcement, the Committee could not confirm anyone in USSS had a local radio nor any local law enforcement had a USSS radio.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ See USSS Site Post Instructions for July 13, 2024, USSS_000219 (listing two radio frequencies: one for “shift and motorcade” and another for “post standers, TSD, UD.” A third channel was also used for tactical personnel. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 105 (Aug. 16, 2024). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 34 (Aug. 14, 2024).

¹⁸⁷ Pennsylvania State Police, *Former President Donald J. Trump Visit to the Butler County on July 13, 2024*, at 3 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

¹⁸⁸ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024). In addition to the local law enforcement channels, there was a separate radio channel used for medical/emergency personnel. *Id.*

¹⁸⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 108 (Aug. 30, 2024).

¹⁹⁰ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁹¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 134, 136 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 105-106 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 176 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 173 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 35 (Aug. 14, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 196 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 118 (Aug. 30, 2024).

¹⁹² The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that she believed she saw the USSS Counter Assault Team Advance exchange a radio with a Butler ESU officer. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 105-106 (Aug. 26, 2024). However, the Counter Assault Team Advance told the Committee that he did not exchange radios with any local Butler ESU personnel. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 37 (Aug. 20, 2024). He said he did exchange radios with someone from Pennsylvania State Police. *Id.*, at 27. Similarly, Butler ESU told the Committee none of their personnel exchanged radios with USSS personnel on July 13. Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

Several USSS personnel told the Committee that it is a common practice to exchange radios with local partners to facilitate communications during protective events.¹⁹³ However, they noted that it is not a required practice, and it is more common when tactical officers conduct on-site advance work for several days prior to a protective event, which was not the case for the July 13 rally.¹⁹⁴

One USSS officer – the Counter Sniper Team Leader – was offered a local radio on July 13, but he did not pick it up.¹⁹⁵ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that when he met with local snipers at the rally they offered him a local radio.¹⁹⁶ According to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader and Butler County ESU officials, he did not pick up a local radio that day.¹⁹⁷ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that he intended to pick up a local radio, but did not have time due to technical issues with his USSS radio he needed to resolve first.¹⁹⁸ He explained that by the time those problems were addressed, he needed to get into his assigned position on the barn roof.¹⁹⁹

In addition to radio exchanges, USSS officials noted that another common practice for facilitating communications is for USSS and local law enforcement to co-locate, or embed, tactical personnel.²⁰⁰ On July 13 a Butler ESU tactical officer was embedded with the USSS Counter Assault team, meaning he was stationed in close proximity to them throughout the day.²⁰¹ Both USSS Counter Assault team members told the Committee that a primary purpose of having the local officer embedded with them was to ensure they had a direct line of communication with local tactical assets.²⁰²

¹⁹³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 39 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 151-153 (Aug. 14, 2024).

¹⁹⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 39 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 153-154 (Aug. 14, 2024).

¹⁹⁵ Butler ESU briefing; Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024).

¹⁹⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152 (Aug. 28, 2024).

¹⁹⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

¹⁹⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-53 (Aug. 28, 2024).

¹⁹⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁰⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 34-35, 38 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁰¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 34 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁰² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 64 (Aug. 14, 2024).

USSS and local law enforcement operated separate communications centers.


Several USSS personnel the Committee spoke to explained that a command post or “security room,” is used at protectee events to facilitate communications among USSS as well as between the USSS and its state and local partners.²⁰³ USSS operated a Security Room at the July 13 rally, and Butler County law enforcement ran a separate Command Post for local law enforcement agencies. The posts were at least 120 to 300 yards distance from each other.²⁰⁴ The USSS Security Room and the local Command Post’s primary means of communication with each other was by cell phone, not radio.²⁰⁵ The graphic below depicts the multi-step process for information to travel from local law enforcement to the USSS Security Room, as described by Butler ESU.

²⁰³ According to a USSS policy manual, “A security room is the Secret Service communications center at a site, when the command post is located elsewhere.” U.S. Secret Service Directives System, Protective Operations Manual, OPO-06, at 5 (on file with Committee). USSS officials explained that a command post is generally used for an entire visit, while a Security Room is used for a specific location. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 132 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance, at 40 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 56 (Aug. 23, 2024). However, the terms are often used interchangeably to refer to the USSS communications hub for an event. Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 132 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 117 (Aug. 13, 2024). USSS instructions to post-standers on July 13 also describe the security room as “the command post for the overall visit.” Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Site Post Instructions for Site #2, Candidate Donald J. Trump – Rally, Butler, PA, at USSS_000220 (received August 9, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²⁰⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 91 (Sept. 13, 2024).

²⁰⁵ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 13 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

Local Command Post and USSS Security Room Communications²⁰⁶



The Butler ESU Commander maintained radio contact with the local law enforcement officers working the rally.²⁰⁷ If he wanted to relay information he heard from local radio channels to USSS, the Butler ESU Commander would use his cell phone to call the PSP Sergeant in the USSS Security Room.²⁰⁸ The PSP Sergeant stated that he would then relay information verbally to the USSS Security Room Agent, who had the ability to contact USSS agents in the field over the USSS radio.²⁰⁹ The Committee has not yet interviewed the USSS Security Room Agent.

Law enforcement officers routinely communicated by cell phone.

Several law enforcement personnel at the July 13 rally also used cell phones to communicate. All of the local snipers at the rally were on a group text chain, in addition to being

²⁰⁶ Graphic created by the Committee.

²⁰⁷ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).


²⁰⁸ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

²⁰⁹ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

on the same radio channel.²¹⁰ USSS and local law enforcement officials told the Committee that one reason text messages or email will be used is to send images or photographs.²¹¹

In some instances, such as between the PSP Sergeant in the USSS Security Room and the Butler ESU Commander in the Local Command Post, cell phones were the primary or only direct method of communication between certain entities.²¹² As depicted in the graphic below, cell phones were also the primary method of communication between the local snipers, via the Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader, and USSS counter snipers during the July 13 rally.²¹³

Text and Email Communication between Local Snipers and USSS Counter Snipers²¹⁴



As described in more detail in the Timeline in Section IV below, the local sniper in the AGR building who first observed Crooks with a rangefinder sent a text message on the local sniper chain with pictures and a description of Crooks.²¹⁵ The Butler ESU Sniper Team Leader, who was on the text chain, passed that information along to the USSS Counter Sniper Team

²¹⁰ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

²¹¹ See generally Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent (Aug. 20, 2024).

²¹² Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 6-7 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²¹³ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 184 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²¹⁴ Graphic created by the Committee.

²¹⁵ See *Timeline, Section IV*.

Leader by text message, who then emailed the information and photos to the other USSS Counter Snipers.²¹⁶

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that relying on cell phones was “not great but better than nothing.”²¹⁷ He also explained: “Radios are preferred. They’re instantaneous. But they didn’t have our radios. We didn’t have their radios.”²¹⁸ However, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader also noted that, “if radios are being difficult and/or there’s just a lot of traffic, the cellphone is always an option too.”²¹⁹

Radio problems added to communications challenges at the July 13 rally.

The Committee has been made aware of multiple instances of USSS dealing with faulty radio equipment on the day of the July 13 rally. USSS personnel told the Committee that it is standard practice at protective events to scan multiple USSS radio channels to maintain awareness of relevant USSS communications.²²⁰ However, the Committee has asked for and not been provided all unredacted standard operating procedures related to communications. On July 13, the Site Counterpart’s regular USSS-issued radio was unable to scan, and it could only connect to one channel at a time.²²¹ On the day of the rally, the USSS Site Counterpart sent a text message to the Site Agent and Lead Advance Agent: “So I think my radio is screwed up of course. I’ve had problems ever since I got the new radio. Been on the phone with the radio folks and they think there is a problem as well.”²²²

In another USSS text message on July 13 at 5:13 pm, a USSS employee—whose name is redacted—wrote: “I’m not getting good comms on either my phone or radio I’ll try to stay on[.]”²²³ On the day of the rally, USSS changed the post-standers’ radio frequency due to bleed

²¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm*, at USSS_001412-001415 (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email correspondence between USSS Counter Snipers on July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm*, at USSS_001417-001419 (on file with Committee).

²¹⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 118 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²¹⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 153 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²¹⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 131 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²²⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 111-112 (Aug. 21, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 80 (Aug. 14, 2024).

²²¹ USSS Texts (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 124 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 112 (Aug. 21, 2024).

²²² Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Message from USSS Site Counter Part to USSS Site Agent and USSS Lead Advance Agent at 9:34 am*, at USSS_000822 (received Aug. 23, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²²³ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Message on July 13, 2024 at 5:13 am*, at USSS_000912 (on file with Committee).

over from other radio traffic – meaning that USSS radios at the Butler rally site were picking up transmissions they believed to be coming from the First Lady’s USSS detail nearby.²²⁴ USSS personnel told the Committee that this type of issue is common when multiple protectee details are in the same area.²²⁵

The two USSS counter snipers that have been interviewed by the Committee both reported experiencing issues with their radios at the rally. One said that the orientation of his USSS-issued radio antenna can affect the signal and it “can become spotty” if angled towards the ground.²²⁶ He also recalled problems caused by his radio being in close proximity to his partner’s radio while they were in position on the barn roof, saying the radio frequencies will “sometimes cancel out” and one of them will receive a transmission but the other will not.²²⁷ The Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that he experienced interference on his radio channels and had to spend time troubleshooting, resulting in him being unable to pick up a local radio on July 13.²²⁸

The USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office did not have a working radio on his person during his entire time at the July 13 rally.

The Lead Advance Agent said that while at the Pittsburgh airport waiting for former President Trump to arrive, her radio “dropped code,” meaning she “could hear some radio traffic” but “wouldn’t be able to communicate back.”²²⁹ Since the Lead Advance Agent would be travelling to the rally in the motorcade and giving vehicle directions along the way, her supervisor, the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, made the decision to give her his own radio. The SAIC told the Committee “[i]t was more important for [the Lead Advance Agent] to have communications with everybody than for myself at that point.”²³⁰ The SAIC also told the Committee that upon arriving at the Butler Farm Show grounds, he intended to code the Lead Advance Agent’s radio in the Security Room, but learned at the Security Room that the coder was back at the motorcade.²³¹ The SAIC was walking back from the Security Room to the motorcade in order to obtain the coder, when shots were fired.²³²

²²⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 125-126 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 123 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²²⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 123-124 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²²⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 13, 50 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²²⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 50 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²²⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 152-153 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²²⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 125 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²³⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, 108-109 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²³¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²³² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 110-112 (Aug. 30, 2024).

The SAIC told the Committee that, while he was in the Trump motorcade heading to the rally, he was riding with another USSS official who had a working radio and that “on the day of the visit and during the visit, I act more in a liaison capacity. I don’t hold a post or a sector. I’m not part of any protective formation.”²³³ Instead, the SAIC said, “I’m there just if something comes up and somebody needs help or if there’s something with our local or state partners or something else comes up, I’m there to help assist with that.”²³⁴ Having given the Lead Advance Agent his working radio and unable to code the Lead Advance Agent’s radio, the SAIC did not have direct access to any radio communications with other USSS agents while he was at the rally.²³⁵

Responsibilities for the USSS Security Room were not well defined or clearly understood.

In addition to a lack of clarity regarding how information should be shared between the USSS and its state and local partners, some of the protocols and expectations for communications within USSS were also unclear. While USSS personnel the Committee spoke to agreed that the Security Room was a critical component of the overall communications plan for the July 13 rally, they did not agree about who was responsible for ensuring the Security Room was functioning as intended.²³⁶

According to USSS policy, the “Site Agent is responsible for coordinating [the security room’s] physical setup and staffing.”²³⁷ However, the site agent for the July 13 rally told the Committee that she was not the primary person responsible for the security room’s physical setup and staffing.²³⁸ She said that she was involved in the setup “working in coordination with [the Site Counterpart],” but that the Site Counterpart coordinated equipment and ensured the security room was adequately staffed.²³⁹ In her view, Security Room equipment and staffing is a responsibility of the local field office, in this case, Pittsburgh.²⁴⁰ When asked about responsibility for the Security Room set up and staffing, the Site Counterpart told the Committee

²³³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²³⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 109 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²³⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 108-110, 113 (Aug. 30, 2024).

²³⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 176-174 (Aug. 23, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 132-136 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²³⁷ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Donald Trump Protective Division Functions*, at USSS_000243 (received Aug. 9, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²³⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 172-173 (Aug. 23, 2024).

²³⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 172 (Aug. 23, 2024).

²⁴⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 173 (Aug. 23, 2024).

that “the Site Agent’s really responsible for making sure that the security room’s set up and that there’s communications.”²⁴¹

The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that both the Site Agent and Site Counterpart were “responsible for making sure that the site has adequate resources and everything that was part of the plan is in place.”²⁴² She explained that during the July 8 Police Meeting she had invited all state and local agencies participating in rally security to have someone present in the USSS Security Room.²⁴³ However, she stated that there was no specific follow up regarding which state and local entities would actually be present in the Security Room.²⁴⁴

Some USSS officials told the Committee they expected that local law enforcement entities working at the rally would have a representative in the USSS Security Room, but many were not certain about which local agencies, if any, were present in the Security Room on July 13.²⁴⁵ When asked how the USSS was supposed to communicate with local law enforcement at the July 13 rally, the Site Agent told the Committee: “that’s the reason why there should be a local counterpart from each department inside the Security Room, to ensure that everyone has some communications and everyone is clear, on the same page.”²⁴⁶

D. “I got him” – USSS Counter Snipers and Local Snipers Describe Line-of-Sight and Communication Limitations

Radio logs obtained by the Committee show that the local snipers positioned in the AGR building did not receive any notification on their ESU radio channel about an individual on the roof before Crooks fired, and the Beaver County sniper that was posted in the AGR building told the Committee that neither he nor his partner in the AGR building were aware of anyone on the roof before shots were fired.²⁴⁷ The Committee learned that a Butler Township Police Officer responded to the AGR building to look for the suspicious person and saw a person with a book bag “running” on the roof of the AGR building, from the north end “south across the building

²⁴¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 112 (Aug. 21, 2024).

²⁴² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 103 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁴³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 101-102; 129-130 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁴⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 129-130 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁴⁵ See Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 101-102 (Aug. 26, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Operator, at 70 (Aug. 14, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 156 (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 118-119 (Aug. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 49-50, 124-125 (Aug. 23, 2024).


²⁴⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 176 (Aug. 23, 2024).

²⁴⁷ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4 (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Interview with AGR 1 Sniper (Beaver County ESU) (Aug. 5, 2024).

towards the stage” – but he did not send out a radio alert about the individual on the roof at that point.²⁴⁸

On July 13, the four USSS counter snipers assigned to the Butler rally were split into two 2-man teams identified by USSS as “Hercules 1” and “Hercules 2.” The image below depicts the positions of law enforcement at the Butler rally with two arrows pointing at the locations of the USSS counter sniper “Hercules” teams:

Butler County ESU Site Map²⁴⁹



As depicted in the above image, Hercules 1 was positioned on the rooftop of the southern barn and Hercules 2 was positioned on the rooftop of the northern barn. The Hercules 2 counter sniper team’s responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats (though their view of the AGR building was partially obstructed by trees).²⁵⁰ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, along with his partner, were co-located at the Hercules 1 post.²⁵¹ Although

²⁴⁸ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 6-12 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee).

²⁴⁹ Butler County ESU, Site Map for July 13, 2024 Rally (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee) (two red arrows added by Committee).

²⁵⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 12, 55 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁵¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 22, 25, 69, 77 (Aug. 28, 2024).

Hercules 1 did have a “clear line-of-sight” of the AGR building, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that the majority of his time he was facing “basically the same direction as the stage.”²⁵²

At approximately 5:45 pm, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader received text messages from a local sniper regarding an individual near the AGR building with a rangefinder looking toward the stage.²⁵³ The text messages included two pictures of Crooks.²⁵⁴ Within a minute, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader responded, “Roger. I’ll notify teams on AGR side.”²⁵⁵ Then, at 5:52 pm, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader emailed the USSS counter snipers the information he received from the local sniper, regarding an individual with a rangefinder near the AGR building:²⁵⁶

²⁵² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 28, 76-77 (Aug. 28, 2024).


²⁵³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 127-128 (Aug. 28, 2024); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm*, at USSS_001412-001415 (on file with Committee).

²⁵⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm*, at USSS_001412-001415 (on file with Committee).

²⁵⁵ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text between U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader and Local Officer Sniper, July 13, 2024 at 5:45 pm*, at USSS_001416 (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 128 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁵⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 114-116, 128-130. In the July 25 Member briefing, USSS Acting Director Rowe told senators that former President Trump’s protective detail probably should have held the former President off-stage until law enforcement tracked down and resolved the suspicious person with the rangefinder. USSS and FBI Briefing with the Committee (July 25, 2024).

*Image of 5:52 pm USSS email notifying counter snipers of individual near AGR building
(white redactions applied by USSS)²⁵⁷*



The 5:52 pm email above included two images of Crooks (although his identity was unknown at the time):



In reference to this email, one of the Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper team members told the Committee that this “BOLO” or “be on the lookout” email was “worded vaguely.”²⁵⁸ But, he and his partner, “continued to search and observe the site.”²⁵⁹ The Hercules 2 counter sniper

²⁵⁷ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email between USSS counter snipers on July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm*, at USSS_001417-001419 (on file with Committee).

²⁵⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁵⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 12 (Aug. 16, 2024).

testified:

After we were searching for several minutes I saw two white vehicles pull into the AGR parking lot, but they were obscured by that tree line that I previously mentioned. And from those two vehicles I saw one individual emerge from the tree line, identified him as a police officer, and I couldn't tell why he was moving urgently, but I went over the radio with the following transmission: "Security Room from Hercules, locals are working something at the three o'clock, approximately 200 yards out."²⁶⁰

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but did not radio the Trump Detail to remove Trump from the stage.

According to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, as soon as he and his partner (both at the Hercules 1 post) heard this radio transmission, they repositioned themselves to face the AGR building. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee:

[W]e repositioned ourselves so that our tripod was on the center of the [roof], the peak, and then we were standing on the, I guess, the farthest edge that away from the AGR building. So we were facing the AGR building.²⁶¹

* * * *

[W]e had all focus on that building, around that building, trying to figure out what was happening.²⁶²

* * * *

[W]e placed our rifles in the tripods and started searching through the rifle scopes themselves.²⁶³

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader could not recall the exact time that he and his partner repositioned themselves to face toward the AGR building.²⁶⁴ He estimated that it was "close to minutes" between the time he received the Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper's radio

²⁶⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 12-13 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁶¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 109 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁶² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁶³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 182 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁶⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181 (Aug. 28, 2024).

transmission and when shots were fired.²⁶⁵ The Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper told the Committee that it could have been “a minute or two” between his radio transmission and the first shots.²⁶⁶

However, in that short amount of time, the Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee what he witnessed unfolding in front of the AGR building when he and his partner turned to face the AGR building:

[W]hen we looked, just plain eyes, no optics or anything, you could see police running towards the building with their hands on their pistols. I think one actually had a pistol facing towards the ground, out of a holster. That’s a pretty big deal for us, so immediately we turned and faced our guns towards the threat area. We didn’t know what was happening, but it seemed pretty serious, especially with the locals’ response.²⁶⁷

* * * *

There were police running, guns out, and there were a couple of people just running away from the AGR building, that looks like citizens, I guess you would say, just normal people. So something was wrong. We didn’t know what. But there was a lot going on in that moment. The police were the main identifier that something bad was happening.²⁶⁸

Despite this, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader did not relay this information to anyone on the radio. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader explained this decision to the Committee below:

Question: So why not, in that moment, send a signal or a radio call, saying, “Do not let the protectee on the stage,” or if the protectee was already on the stage, take him off?

Answer: At that time we didn’t know what we were working with. Obviously, police are running towards a situation. That could be anything from a medical situation to potentially a man with a gun or some sort of violent situation. We didn’t know what we were having, and I didn’t have enough to go over the radio with the

²⁶⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 135 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁶⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 109 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁶⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 138 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁶⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 139 (Aug. 28, 2024).

same exact communication of “the police are working a situation at the three o’clock.” We know they’re working. What are they working on? We don’t know. We’re trying not to clog the radio.

Question: Understood. You mentioned you saw someone with their gun drawn.

Answer: Mm-hmm.

Question: That seems like an extremely serious situation, more than just looking for a suspicious person.

Answer: Yes.

Question: It seems like a major elevation of a threat level. Correct?

Answer: That’s why we placed our rifles in the tripods and started searching through the rifle scopes themselves.

Question: But beyond that, is that not enough to say we have something imminent happening here, if their guns are drawn and we need to ensure the safety of the protectee?

Answer: Potentially. It definitely is elevated. We’re trying to figure out what’s happening. It’s happening very quickly. It’s a very dynamic situation. But –

Question: Did the thought even cross your mind that you should inform someone to keep the protectee from going on stage, or, if he was already on stage, take him back? Did that thought even cross your mind?

Answer: The thought did not cross my mind. It was more find out what’s happening, figure out what’s happening. Can we help? Can we take action?²⁶⁹

The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that if he did go on the radio to notify USSS to remove the protectee from a potentially dangerous situation, “there will be no

²⁶⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 181-183 (Aug. 28, 2024).

questions asked and that'll happen."²⁷⁰

Based on the estimated likely route Crooks took across the roofs of the AGR buildings starting at 6:05 pm on July 13, the USSS counter snipers in the Hercules 1 position could have had a direct line-of-sight to him for at least part of his movements across the roofs.²⁷¹ The photograph below was taken by Committee staff from an AGR roof looking southward toward the USSS Hercules 1 position on the southern barn behind the stage (i.e., the red barn on the right in this photograph below). The AGR property is a complex of buildings with a series of connected roofs.²⁷² Crooks fired from the AGR roof peak closest to the stage, and there are two additional roof peaks beyond (i.e., to the north of) that roof, all of which are connected and able to be traversed on foot.²⁷³ The photograph below was taken from the third (i.e., northernmost) of those three roofs, looking back past Crooks' shooting position and on to the Hercules 1 position. As the photograph below shows, the Hercules 1 position had a direct line-of-sight to portions of these three roofs.

²⁷⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 137-138 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁷¹ The likely route Crooks took across the roofs is based on the position of the air conditioning unit where Crooks climbed up on the roof, dash cam footage and PSP interview with a Butler Township Police Officer, and Committee staff examination of the AGR roof on July 26, 2024 (Butler Investigation Evidence Photos, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 28, 2024, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/butler-investigation-photos>; Dashboard Camera Footage, Butler Township Police Department, Unit 5-1, July 13, 2024, at 18:08:34-18:08:46 (footage appears to show Thomas Crooks traversing the roof of the AGR building); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee). Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 43-45 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁷² Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

²⁷³ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

View from AGR Building Roof²⁷⁴



When shown the photograph above of these three roof peaks during the Committee’s interview, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader who was in the Hercules 1 position (i.e., on the roof of the red barn on the right in the photograph above) acknowledged that with the view he had of the AGR building, if someone were standing on those three roofs or walking across them, he could have been able to see them: “From our position you should have line-of-sight, yes.”²⁷⁵ However, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader and the Hercules 2 USSS counter sniper said they never saw Crooks on the roof prior to shots being fired.²⁷⁶

Although FBI “confirmed the subject’s movement across multiple AGR building roofs between 6:05 and 6:08 p.m.,” the Committee cannot know for certain that the Hercules 1 USSS counter snipers would have spotted him if they were facing that direction at that time.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ Committee Visit to AGR Building, Staff Photograph taken on July 26, 2024 (arrow added by Committee).

²⁷⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 43-45 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁷⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 190 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 43 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁷⁷ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper’s sights for “mere seconds” before he fired at Crooks.

The two USSS counter snipers interviewed by the Committee both confirmed that the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader’s partner on Hercules 1 fired his weapon at Crooks.²⁷⁸ The Committee has requested to interview the USSS counter sniper who shot Crooks, but has not yet interviewed him. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that prior to his team member firing his weapon, he “distinctly heard three shots.”²⁷⁹ He then heard his USSS counter sniper partner tell him, “I got him.”²⁸⁰ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader stated, “I immediately gave him a wind call— when you’re doing a shooter/spotter, a wind call is basically any adjustments you’d have to make to the wind. ...But at 200 yards it’s minimal.”²⁸¹ The Counter Sniper Team Leader continued, “[f]rom there I heard his round go off... I still couldn’t find what he was shooting at, so I got off my gun and looked to see what angle he was looking at. I figure out he was looking at the roof, got on, and then I saw the target that he had shot at.”²⁸²

The Committee asked the Counter Sniper Team Leader how long his partner on Hercules 1 had Crooks in his sights before firing, and he responded, “mere seconds.”²⁸³ The Counter Sniper Team Leader confirmed to the Committee that, to his knowledge, USSS counter snipers fired only one shot at Crooks.²⁸⁴ Further, the USSS counter snipers the Committee spoke with confirmed that USSS counter snipers do not need permission to fire at a shooter. They also said that no permission was requested or required during the July 13 rally.²⁸⁵

One of the counter snipers on the Hercules 2 team told the Committee that after hearing shots fired, he “thought that [his] partner was hit, due to the proximity of these whip-like cracks[.]”²⁸⁶ The USSS Counter Sniper added that after the shooting he told the Committee that he “asked my partner how close he thought the rounds were to our left, and he looked at me and said, ‘I heard them on my right.’ And the[re] were approximately six feet between him and I

²⁷⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper at 57, 59 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁷⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 144 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82, 144 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 81-82 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178-179 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178 (Aug. 28, 2024).

²⁸⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 178 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 114 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁸⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).

when we were on the rooftop at the main site.”²⁸⁷ The Committee cannot confirm whether any bullets passed by any of the USSS counter snipers. The Committee has not yet spoken to the other USSS Counter Sniper on the Hercules 2 team about these statements.

E. Intelligence Concerns

The July 13 rally was the first time USSS sent counter snipers for a protectee other than the President, Vice President, or a presidential candidate who had been formally nominated by his or her party.²⁸⁸ According to the USSS Assistant Director of OPO, prior to July 5, the then-Deputy Assistant Director and the SAIC of the Special Operations Division agreed that USSS headquarters would send USSS counter snipers to all outdoor events for former President Trump going forward.²⁸⁹ In his interview with the Committee, the USSS Assistant Director of OPO said this decision was based on several factors including the size and scale of the former President’s outdoor events, his being on the cusp of becoming the nominee, and threat information, at least some of which is classified.²⁹⁰ To date, the Committee has not been provided any additional detail related to the USSS’ decision in early July to send counter snipers to outdoor events going forward, aside from Assistant Director of OPO’s testimony provided during his transcribed interview. It appears that the addition of the USSS counter snipers to the security detail at the rally was a direct result of “credible intelligence.”²⁹¹ However, only two of the USSS personnel the Committee has interviewed were made aware that there was a credible threat related to former President Trump prior to July 13, only one of whom was made aware of the classified information underlying the threat.²⁹²

A USSS official was made aware that “credible intelligence” existed of a threat, but still wrote in a security planning document that there was “no adverse intelligence” concerning the visit to Butler, PA.

The USSS Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that on July 9, 2024, she received a call from the second supervisor of the Trump detail, telling her that USSS counter snipers would be assigned to the rally.²⁹³ The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that the second

²⁸⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 14-15 (Aug. 16, 2024).

²⁸⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19 (Aug. 28, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 74-75 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁸⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 44, 54-55, 81-82 (Sept. 13, 2024).

²⁹⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 31, 34, 62, 63, 67 (Sept. 13, 2024).

²⁹¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations, at 67-68 (Sept. 13, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44-45 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).

supervisor of the Trump detail informed her that the reason USSS was assigning counter snipers was because of “credible intel” that he could not discuss further with her.²⁹⁴ The Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that she instructed the second supervisor to call her supervisor, the SAIC of the USSS Pittsburgh Field Office, to discuss the “credible intel,” and stated:²⁹⁵

Lead Advance Agent: He said that there was credible intelligence that he could not speak about, and that we were going to get Secret Service counter sniper advance for that reason.

Question: And did he say why he couldn’t speak about it?

Lead Advance Agent: Because it was information that he wasn’t able to pass.

Question: Did he say it was classified?

Lead Advance Agent: He did not use the word “classified” on the phone, but from my general knowledge when you say that you cannot pass something on the phone, the understanding is that it’s classified and he can’t speak about it on the phone.²⁹⁶

When the Lead Advance Agent told the Pittsburgh SAIC that USSS counter snipers were being assigned to the rally “because the second supervisor expressed that there was credible intelligence,” she said the SAIC did not have any awareness of this information prior to their discussion.²⁹⁷ The Pittsburgh SAIC, however, told the Committee that the Lead Advance Agent did not relay this information to him.²⁹⁸ He said that he first became aware that USSS counter snipers were coming to the event through an e-mail requesting housing for them.²⁹⁹ In an interview with the Committee, the Pittsburgh SAIC said:

Question: Do you know why -- so I guess stepping back, was that the first time you had heard about even a request for counter snipers?

Pittsburgh SAIC: I did not even know a request was made.

Question: Okay. Do you know why they were sent?

Pittsburgh SAIC: I don’t.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 72-73 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 166 (Aug. 26, 2024).

²⁹⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 86-87 (Aug. 30, 2024).


²⁹⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 84 (Aug. 30, 2024).

³⁰⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 85 (Aug. 30, 2024).

The SAIC said if he had been made aware of intelligence regarding a potential threat, he would have requested more specific information about the threat and might have pushed for the event to be moved indoors if it was deemed too risky for an outdoor venue.³⁰¹ Additionally, the SAIC told the Committee that he would have requested more assets if he had received this information.³⁰²

Despite learning on July 9 that based on “credible intelligence” of a threat, USSS counter sniper assets would be provided for the July 13 rally, the Lead Advance Agent wrote in the intelligence section of the Preliminary survey document that, “[a]t this time, no adverse intelligence has been developed concerning this visit. Any adverse intelligence that may arise will be passed on to all working supervisors.”³⁰³

*Snapshot from Preliminary Survey, Intelligence Section*³⁰⁴



In response to questions from the Committee regarding why she specifically wrote that “no adverse intelligence has been developed concerning this visit” despite the information provided on July 9, the Lead Advance Agent said:

At the time I filled out this document my understanding was that there was no adverse intelligence to pass on to the group as a whole. This is not all-encompassing as to intelligence, whether or not it can be passed. If it’s something classified, such as something that was not passed to me to begin with, then that would not be put in writing, as well. It would’ve been passed to those that needed to know in this situation.³⁰⁵

It is unclear who else involved in the planning for the July 13 rally, besides the Lead Advance Agent, had knowledge of the “credible intelligence.” The Pittsburgh SAIC told the

³⁰¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 103 (Aug. 30, 2024).

³⁰² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 103-105 (Aug. 30, 2024).

³⁰³ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler Event, at 10 (on file with Committee); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 168 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³⁰⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Preliminary Survey for July 13, 2024 Butler Event, at 10 (on file with Committee).

³⁰⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 168 (Aug. 26, 2024).

Committee that it would be his expectation that any credible threat or intelligence would appear in the “intelligence” section in the Preliminary Survey.³⁰⁶

Other USSS officials involved in the planning of the rally told the Committee they had no knowledge of any threats and the FBI did not respond to USSS’ intelligence request.

The FBI has stated that Crooks “was not known to the FBI prior to” the assassination attempt.³⁰⁷ The FBI also communicated to the Committee, and publicly stated, that the arrest on July 12, 2024, of Asif Merchant, “a Pakistan national with ties to Iran, [for] plotting to commit murder-for-hire” of U.S. government officials, was not connected to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.³⁰⁸ The Committee has requested additional documents and information about this matter and has yet to receive a response.³⁰⁹ In public updates on August 28, 2024 regarding its ongoing investigation, FBI Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells also stated:

[T]he FBI has not identified a motive nor any co-conspirators or associates of Crooks with advance knowledge of the attack. And I want to be clear: we have not seen any indication to suggest Crooks was directed by a foreign entity to conduct the attack.³¹⁰

Additionally, the FBI Deputy Director testified on July 30, 2024, to the Committee that there is:

[a]n integrated relationship between FBI and Secret Service and every other federal, state, local agency you can imagine. We have constructs like the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Violent Crime Task Forces where we’re cross embedded with each other. And when it comes to this event and others like it, we’re always talking in advance. In fact, with respect to this event, we did have a meeting

³⁰⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 183 (Aug. 30, 2024).

³⁰⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Update on the FBI Investigation of the Attempted Assassination of Former President Donald Trump* (Jul. 14, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/update-on-the-fbi-investigation-of-the-attempted-assassination-of-former-president-donald-trump>).

³⁰⁸ Email communication from Federal Bureau of Investigation to Committee staff (received Aug. 6, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³⁰⁹ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (Aug. 14, 2024).

³¹⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Opening Statement to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt Investigation* (Aug. 28, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/opening-statement-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt-investigation-08282024>).

between US Secret Service and FBI in the days leading up to the event to determine, assess whether there was any information or intelligence pertaining to a threat against the rally or to former President Trump or anyone else there. There was an absence of that in the lead up specifically. And again, none of us had any information in our holdings with regard to the -- to the ultimate shooter.³¹¹

Nonetheless, the decision to send counter snipers to the July 13 rally, which was based on credible intelligence of a threat, potentially saved lives.³¹² The July 13 rally was the first time USSS sent counter snipers for a protectee other than the President, Vice President, or a presidential candidate who had been formally nominated by his or her party.³¹³ On July 9, the Lead USSS Agent received a phone call from a supervisor in the Trump Detail who stated, “there was credible intelligence that he could not speak about, and that we were going to get Secret Service counter sniper advance [for the July 13 rally].”³¹⁴ The Lead Advance Agent asked that this information be relayed to the SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, but it never was.³¹⁵ USSS has not provided the Committee with any information confirming that this information was ever shared with any other USSS personnel responsible for planning the July 13 rally, including the USSS Site Agent, USSS Counter Assault Team, Site Counterpart, Intelligence Advance Agent, Technical Security Division (TSD) Advance, or the C-UAS Advance Agent, or any state or local law enforcement officials.

In response to questions regarding whether advance planning leads would have expected to be made aware of any credible intelligence or threats, USSS agents told the Committee that information is something they “absolutely” should have been aware of prior to the July 13 rally.³¹⁶ The Site Agent told the Committee:

As a Site Agent or Lead [Advance] Agent assigned, you should have any intelligence or any information pertaining to an active threat to a particular protectee, absolutely, in case that we need to take, you know, take additional measures, or maybe plan for additional assets or additional resources for that particular matter.

³¹¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³¹² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 44 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³¹³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 19 (Aug. 28, 2024).

³¹⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 71-73 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³¹⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office, at 86-87 (Aug. 30, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 169 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³¹⁶ *See, e.g.* Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 69, 71 (Aug. 23, 2024).

* * * *

So it shocked me, like just being out there. They're planning to have a protectee with 15-, 20,000 people, in an outdoor event, when there's an active threat for the drone attack. That was definitely one thing that obviously raised my concerns, and I know everyone's concerns.³¹⁷

The Site Agent also clarified that the information about a possible drone attack threat was relayed to her in 2023.³¹⁸

The USSS Intelligence Advance Agent also did not receive information about a threat in advance of the July 13 rally. The USSS Intelligence Advance Agent told the Committee he did not know why counter snipers were being sent and he did not receive any intelligence on threats related to the July 13 rally, nor about the arrest of Mr. Merchant on July 12, the day before the rally.³¹⁹ On July 10, 2024, the Intelligence Advance Agent sent a letter to FBI, requesting any intelligence related to former President Trump and the July 13 rally in Butler, PA.³²⁰ The FBI did not respond to this intelligence request.³²¹ A document from the USSS Protective Intelligence & Assessment Division dated July 8 described "Open Source Findings for Candidate Donald Trump's Visit to Pittsburgh Pennsylvania."³²²

According to interviews the Committee conducted with the USSS Intelligence Advance Agent for the Butler rally, having received no intelligence from headquarters, the Intelligence Advance Agent called the USSS Protective Intelligence Division, asked if there were any updates, and was told there were not.³²³ The Site Agent explained to the Committee, "normally, we receive a bulletin with any information or any advisory information in regards to a specific visit, but not for this one [referring to the July 13 rally]," noting "it came back with negative results, as no threats or no other issues or concerns prior to the visit."³²⁴ The Site Agent Counterpart explained that she was never made aware there was any type of threat to former

³¹⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 69-71 (Aug. 23, 2024).

³¹⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 68 (Aug. 23, 2024).

³¹⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 30-31, 158 (Aug. 29, 2024).

³²⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 18-19, 66-68 (Aug. 29, 2024); Email communication from U.S. Secret Service to Committee staff (received Sept. 23, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³²¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 18-19, 66-68 (Aug. 29, 2024).


³²² Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Protective Intelligence & Assessment Division, *Open source findings for Candidate Donald Trump's visit to Pittsburgh, PA* (July 8, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³²³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Advance Agent, at 30 (Aug. 29, 2024).

³²⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 63 (Aug. 23, 2024).

President Trump in advance of the rally.³²⁵ Without being briefed on any specific intelligence threats, the Site Counterpart assumed USSS sent counter snipers because of the size of the rally and venue.³²⁶ In notes taken after the assassination attempt, the Site Counterpart wrote, “why am I hearing that there were threats to the site on TV. How can the SAIC of our [field office] not know about any threats and why did they feel that only one part of [Special Operations Divisions] was sufficient to cover it instead of the entire package.”³²⁷ The USSS Site Counterpart explained that by “entire package” she meant, not sending Counter Assault Team liaisons, CSU, and other assets.³²⁸

Excerpt of Site Agent Counterpart Notes Taken After the July 13 Rally³²⁹



Threets - why am I hearing that there were threats to the site on TV
How can the SAIC of our FO not know about any threats and why did they feel that only one part of SOD was sufficient to cover it instead of the entire package

F. Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Failures

At 3:51 pm on July 13, 2024, Crooks flew a drone near the site of the Butler rally for about 11 minutes.³³⁰ USSS Acting Director Ronald Rowe testified at a Senate hearing that on July 13, the USSS counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) “had technical difficulties and did not go operational until after 5:00” and that had it been working properly, “[w]e could have

³²⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 51-52 (Aug. 21, 2024).

³²⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 150 (Aug. 21, 2024).

³²⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 51 (Aug. 21, 2024); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Site Counterpart Hand Written Notes*, at USSS_000791 (received Aug. 21, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³²⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Counterpart, at 115 (Aug. 21, 2024).

³²⁹ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Site Counterpart Hand Written Notes*, at USSS_000791 (received Aug. 21, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³³⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

maybe stopped him [Crooks].”³³¹ The Committee learned that in addition to the C-UAS “technical difficulties,” requests for additional C-UAS equipment and longer drone flight restrictions were denied.³³² Further, the USSS agent tasked with C-UAS responsibilities at the rally had very little experience with the equipment he was operating.³³³

Requests for additional counter drone equipment and drone flight restrictions were denied.

USSS TSD’s Outdoor Site Survey of threats and vulnerabilities flagged that the “open farm area” rally site “is vulnerable to possible drone attacks with the limited amount [of] C-UAS equipment on site” as well as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices, both of which are items the shooter brought near the rally site undetected.³³⁴ The Site Agent told the Committee that she was briefed on possible drone attacks in June 2023, but did not receive any briefings prior to the July 13 rally.³³⁵

USSS used C-UAS equipment intended to counter the unauthorized use of drones the day of the rally.³³⁶ USSS has several forms of drone mitigation equipment available.³³⁷ An additional mitigation tool for protective events is a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR), issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which bans all unauthorized aircrafts, including drones, from operating in a certain area for a limited period of time.³³⁸

USSS assigned the C-UAS Advance Agent to operate the C-UAS unit the day of the Butler Farm Show rally.³³⁹ USSS also assigned other equipment that can assist in mitigation efforts.³⁴⁰ On July 10, during a phone call with the USSS Lead Technician for the event as part

³³¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³³² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 34-38 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³³³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent at 11 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³³⁴ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *TSD Outdoor Site Survey*, USSS_000310-000316 (received Aug. 12, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³³⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Site Agent, at 67-73 (Aug. 23, 2024).

³³⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service TSD Advance, at 49-52 (Aug. 13, 2024).

³³⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 25-26, 140 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³³⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024). Federal Aviation Administration, *Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs)* (last accessed Sept. 22, 2024) (https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/temporary_flight_restrictions).

³³⁹ *See generally* Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 25-26 (Aug. 20, 2024). The C-UAS Advance Agent stated that the Trump detail has operated drones at other events for overwatch, search warrants, etc., and the Pennsylvania State Police offered USSS the use of drones on July 13 for similar purposes. The C-UAS

of pre-planning for the security of the rally, the C-UAS Advance Agent requested an additional mitigation capability as well as a more advanced mitigation system with a technician to operate it as a backup to the C-UAS system.³⁴¹ Both requests were denied.³⁴²

On July 12, the day before the rally, the C-UAS Advance Agent visited the Butler Farm Show to determine the best location to place the C-UAS unit.³⁴³ He initially placed it a few hundred yards from the stage.³⁴⁴ During this site visit, the C-UAS Advance Agent spoke to another USSS agent in person to request extending the time for the TFR for the event.³⁴⁵ Specifically, the C-UAS Advance Agent was concerned that former President Trump sometimes operates outside of the expected timeframe for his events, and a longer TFR would provide more certainty that the TFR would cover the entire time former President Trump was on the stage.³⁴⁶ The request for extending the TFR was denied without explanation.³⁴⁷ FAA approved the TFR at the Butler Farm Show rally site from 4:20 pm to 6:15 pm on July 13.³⁴⁸

The USSS official responsible for overseeing C-UAS at the July 13 rally lacked experience and knowledge about the equipment.

In an interview with the Committee, the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent said that, following a 10:00 am post-stander briefing at the rally site on July 13, he tried to activate the C-UAS equipment that can detect drones and immediately began having issues with it.³⁴⁹ Because the equipment was located near satellite trucks, he decided to change locations for the C-UAS to avoid potential interference.³⁵⁰ However, even after he moved the equipment to a different location and “reconnected everything,” it was still inactive.³⁵¹ The C-UAS Advance Agent determined that the equipment was not active, and at approximately 11:30 am, he began to call others within the USSS asking for help.³⁵² He contacted a member of his detail and also spoke to

Advance Agent told the Committee that such use cases were beyond his job description, and he did not want to second guess the security plan that had been approved. *See* Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 99-100 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 34, 38 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 34 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 15 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 15-16 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 95-97 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 35-36 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 23 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁴⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 17, 37 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 117-118 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 19 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 18 (Aug. 20, 2024).

the USSS official he believed was in charge of the C-UAS program.³⁵³ In his interview with the Committee, the C-UAS Advance Agent said this official gave him the number for tech support at the company that produces the C-UAS equipment.³⁵⁴ The C-UAS Advance Agent was unable to reach someone immediately when he called the 888 tech support hotline.³⁵⁵ He also undertook basic steps to troubleshoot the problem, such as reconnecting wires and moving the location of the equipment.³⁵⁶ When the C-UAS unit's Tech Support called the C-UAS Advance Agent back, he worked with them for several hours over several phone calls, where they took steps to fix the problem such as restarting the system remotely and pushing software updates to the system, to no avail.³⁵⁷

Shortly after 4:00 pm, the C-UAS Advance Agent received a call from the C-UAS unit's tech support, who told him that the components of the system were not communicating with each other.³⁵⁸ They recommended he replace an ethernet cable between two components of the equipment.³⁵⁹ He did not see an ethernet cable in the Security Room so he approached the audio-visual personnel for the Trump campaign and used one of their ethernet cables.³⁶⁰ Shortly afterwards, the system became operational, and at 4:33 pm, he called the Second Supervisor for the Trump Detail to let him know the system was active.³⁶¹ Once the system was operational, the only drones the C-UAS Advance Agent detected were drones operated by local police.³⁶²

With no backup C-UAS system while the C-UAS unit was down, USSS did not have any drone detection capabilities.³⁶³ When the Committee asked the C-UAS Advance Agent if he had received specialized training in the use of the C-UAS unit, which consists of two boxes and four antenna nodes, he replied that another USSS employee walked him through the C-UAS unit's

³⁵³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 121 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 16, 18 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 20 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 20-21 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁵⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024). The Committee notes that this recounting of events contrasts with Acting Director Rowe's testimony before the Committee that the inoperability of the C-UAS system came from cellular connectivity issue. *See* Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁶⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024). The C-UAS Advance Agent noted that it is not common to use equipment that is not USSS property, but given the delay in troubleshooting the device, he stated "I just wanted to get the system up."

³⁶¹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁶² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 33, 42-43 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁶³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 27 (Aug. 20, 2024).

operation, stating his total training consisted of this hands-on training and “wasn’t very long, less than an hour.”³⁶⁴ In describing the steps he took to troubleshoot the C-UAS unit while he was waiting for tech support to return his call, the C-UAS Advance Agent told the Committee:

I continued to troubleshoot it myself, just to the best of my abilities, turning it on and off, reconnecting stuff. At some time after 4 p.m., I get a call back from Tech Support and says that another person from [the C-UAS unit’s] Tech Support had looked at it, had looked at my system that was connected, and it looked like two boxes -- please don’t ask me what these boxes are; it’s beyond me -- but two boxes were not talking to each other, and to try to change out an ethernet cable between those two boxes, that connected the two of them.³⁶⁵

In setting up the security plan for the rally, the Lead Advance Agent told the Committee that her role was to coordinate the various entities involved and “make sure that they have the equipment and knowledge and personnel that they need.”³⁶⁶ The C-UAS Advance Agent’s unfamiliarity with C-UAS equipment was evident in his testimony to the Committee. As described above, he struggled to describe the functions of certain pieces of technical equipment that were not working properly.³⁶⁷ In another instance, the C-UAS Advance Agent seemed unsure whether C-UAS connects to a cellular network:

Question: What is your understanding of how the C-UAS system interacts with the mobile cell networks?

Answer: I don’t know how it interacts with it. I believe that it does. The technical aspect of how it communicates to it I don’t know.

Question: Okay. But is it your understanding that the equipment has to be connected to a mobile network in order for it to be functioning?

Answer: To like a – I think it needs cell signal, cellular signal, to my knowledge. So if that’s what you mean by mobile network, yes.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 115 (Aug. 20, 2024). In total, the C-UAS Advance Agent for July 13 had approximately three months of experience working with that equipment. *See* Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 11 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁶⁵ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 20-21 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁶⁶ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Lead Advance Agent, at 15 (Aug. 26, 2024).

³⁶⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁶⁸ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent at 118-119 (Aug. 20, 2024).

The C-UAS Advance Agent also admitted that he did not follow standard USSS protocol when he replaced the Ethernet cable with another Ethernet cable he found with the Trump campaign equipment.

Question: The cable that you replaced to connect the systems again, was that cable Secret Service property?

Answer: No. It was a Trump campaign radio and video, audio and video personnel.

Question: Is that standard protocol to use a cable that isn't Secret Service property in this case?

Answer: No. I just wanted to get the system up.³⁶⁹

The C-UAS system was inoperable until 4:33 pm on July 13.³⁷⁰ It was during that time that Crooks flew his drone in the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show at approximately 3:51 pm for 11 minutes while streaming footage to his controller.³⁷¹ Even though this was not within the window of the TFR, had the C-UAS system been active and detected Mr. Crooks' drone, the C-UAS Advance Agent stated he would have sent USSS personnel to conduct a voluntary interview with Mr. Crooks to determine the purpose of his flight.³⁷²

Acting Director Rowe testified before the joint HSGAC and Judiciary Committee hearing on July 30, 2024, that the outage of the C-UAS system had cost him "a lot of sleep because of the eventual outcome of the assailant."³⁷³ Acting Director Rowe testified that perhaps had the C-UAS system been operational at 3:51 pm, USSS agents would have spoken with Crooks and he could have decided not to go through with his assassination attempt.³⁷⁴

³⁶⁹ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 156 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁷⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁷¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁷² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service C-UAS Advance Agent, at 98 (Aug. 20, 2024).

³⁷³ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁷⁴ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

IV. TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS AT THE JULY 13, 2024, RALLY

Known Actions of the Assailant Prior to the July 13 Rally

At the Committee’s July 30th hearing, FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate testified about what the Bureau had learned to date as part of its investigation of the attempted assassination. According to the FBI, Thomas Crooks registered for the Butler rally on July 6, 2024, three days after it had been announced.³⁷⁵ The next day, he visited the site for “advanced planning and reconnaissance.”³⁷⁶ FBI said that on July 8, Crooks searched “AGR International.”³⁷⁷ On July 12, the day before the rally, Crooks signed in at 2:45 pm to shoot at the rifle range at the Clairton Sportsmen’s Club.³⁷⁸

According to PSP, on July 13, Crooks’ cell phone data showed he was at the Butler Farm Show grounds between 10:58 am and 11:50 am.³⁷⁹ He returned with a weapon and ammunition.³⁸⁰ At approximately 3:51 pm, he flew a drone approximately 200 yards from the Farm Show grounds for about 11 minutes and was able to view the footage from the drone live on his controller.³⁸¹

³⁷⁵ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁷⁶ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁷⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge's Remarks to Media on Updates to the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt Investigation (August 28, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fbi-pittsburgh-special-agent-in-charge-s-remarks-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt-investigation>).

³⁷⁸ Clairton Sportsmen’s Club, *Range Off Hours Sign in Log, July 12, 2024* (received Aug. 2, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³⁷⁹ Pennsylvania State Police, *Thomas Crooks Timeline*, at PSP_0054 (received Aug. 14, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³⁸⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁸¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

As detailed further below, at 5:32 pm, local law enforcement observed Crooks using a rangefinder, a device used to determine the distance of objects, frequently used at golf courses and gun ranges.³⁸² At 6:05 pm, he climbed to the roof of the AGR building, where he remained for approximately 6 minutes, before firing eight shots at the former president at 6:11 pm.³⁸³

Within hours of the assassination attempt, the FBI assumed the lead role as the federal law enforcement agency investigating the incident.³⁸⁴ The FBI identified the weapon used by Crooks as an AR style rifle, and announced that his phone as well as explosive devices found in his car had been shipped to Quantico for forensic analysis.³⁸⁵ The FBI also reported that Crooks' social media history going back to 2019 espoused political violence.³⁸⁶ Crooks also prepared for July 13, searching online for details on how to build an explosive and researching how the rally would be set up.³⁸⁷ As of the publication of this interim report, the FBI's investigation is ongoing.³⁸⁸

³⁸² Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/SWAT*, at 18 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁸³ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

³⁸⁴ FBI National Press Office: FBI Statement on Incident in Butler, Pennsylvania (July 14, 2024).

³⁸⁵ Assistant Director Cath Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Attorney General Merrick Garland, Department of Justice, Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for the Media (July 14, 2024).

³⁸⁶ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁸⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (July 29, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt>); Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (July 29, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt>).

³⁸⁸ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

Prior to the Butler rally, Crooks had researched multiple political targets including President Biden, former President Trump, the DNC Convention, and the RNC Convention.³⁸⁹ On July 6, the same day Crooks registered for the Butler rally, he searched online with the following entry: “how far away was Oswald from Kennedy.”³⁹⁰

The following is a detailed timeline of events between the first confirmed sighting of Crooks by law enforcement and when Crooks was killed.

Identification and Search for the Suspicious Individual on July 13, 2024

4:26 pm

An AGR Sniper from Beaver County who had been positioned inside the AGR building earlier that day exited the building at the end of his shift and noticed a suspicious person sitting near the AGR building.³⁹¹ The sniper texted the other two local snipers remaining in the AGR building: “Someone followed our lead and snuck in and parked by our cars just so you know. I’m just letting you know because you see me go out with my rifle and put it in my car so he knows you guys are up there he’s sitting to the direct right on a picnic table about 50 yards from the exit.”³⁹²

FBI initially testified that “The first reported sighting of the shooter by local law enforcement was at approximately 4:26 p.m.”³⁹³ However, FBI later stated that while witness interviews indicated that Crooks was in the AGR area at 4:26 pm, “Subsequent digital evidence review shows the subject was in fact near the farm show air strip, walking past a row of vendors outside the secure perimeter approximately a half mile away from the AGR grounds at 4:26 p.m.”³⁹⁴

5:10 pm

³⁸⁹ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

³⁹⁰ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

³⁹¹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *Text Messages between AGR Snipers* (IMG_0549), at 49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³⁹² Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *Text Messages between AGR Snipers* (IMG_0549), at 49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

³⁹³ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁹⁴ Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery (Aug. 28, 2024).

AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) posted in a window inside the AGR building observed an individual outside walk by the window, who the sniper later determined was Crooks.³⁹⁵ This was the first confirmed sighting of Crooks by law enforcement, 1 hour and 1 minute before the shooting.

5:14 pm

AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) took a photograph of Crooks using his cell phone.³⁹⁶ That sniper later told the Committee that he was not sure at the time why he took the photograph, but that something seemed off about the individual.³⁹⁷

5:32 pm

AGR Sniper 1 (Beaver County) observed Crooks “looking at [his] phone, news feeds, and rangefinder confirmed through monoculars.”³⁹⁸

5:38 pm

AGR Sniper 1 texted all local snipers (AGR Building and Grandstands): “Kid learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking toward stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.” The text included two photographs of Crooks.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁵ The local Beaver County sniper referred to here, who was stationed on the second floor of the AGR building on July 13, is identified by the Committee as AGR Sniper 1. *See* Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *Text Messages Between AGR Snipers* (IMG_0534 and IMG_0535), Slideshow, at 47-49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).


³⁹⁶ Beaver County ESU, *Text Messages Between AGR Snipers* (IMG_0534 and IMG_0535), Slideshow, at 47-49 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁹⁷ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

³⁹⁸ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/SWAT*, at 18 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee); *see* Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

³⁹⁹ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/SWAT*, at 47-48 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

Text Message from AGR Sniper 1 to All Local Snipers⁴⁰⁰



Shortly after 5:38 pm

An AGR Sniper went downstairs to the exit of the AGR building in attempt to keep track of Crooks.⁴⁰¹

5:42 pm

AGR Sniper 1 radioed on the local ESU channel, “Just an FYI, we had a younger white male long hair lurking around the AGR building. He was viewed with a rangefinder sighting the stage. He was up against the building; believe he was looking up at us and he walked around the side of the building. We lost sight of him. Also there’s a bike with a large backpack sitting beside it, it’s parked in the rear of the building that wasn’t there earlier.”⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ Beaver County ESU, *FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/SWAT, at 47-48* (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰¹ Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴⁰² Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 4* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

5:43 pm

The Butler ESU Commander responded to the 5:42 radio call, “Copy. We will send somebody to check it.”⁴⁰³

5:44 pm

The Butler ESU Commander called a PSP Sergeant, stationed in the USSS Security Room, who was his primary point-of-contact and liaison to USSS. In a subsequent interview, the PSP Sergeant stated he received information about a suspicious person near the AGR building, specifically, “a young white male, long hair, with a rangefinder, like, had been seen by the counter snipers. . . . And then he also said a bike and a backpack had appeared that they weren’t sure was related, but wasn’t there, obviously, at the start of the rally.”⁴⁰⁴ This was the first confirmed communication to USSS about Crooks, approximately 27 minutes before the shooting.⁴⁰⁵

Around that same time, the PSP Sergeant called a PSP Trooper (who was assigned as the intelligence officer working with the USSS Protective Intelligence agent) and a PSP Corporal (who was assigned as a site roving supervisor) and informed them about the suspicious person and was told they would start to look for him.⁴⁰⁶ Also at 5:44 pm, the Butler ESU Commander told a Butler County Sheriff’s Deputy about the suspicious person.⁴⁰⁷

5:45 pm

The Butler ESU Commander radioed on the local ESU channel, “PSP and Sheriffs should be en route. If you [get] a visual let me know.”⁴⁰⁸ The Butler County Sheriff’s Deputy then radioed on the Sheriff’s Office radio channel, “[b]e on the lookout for a white male, young white male, blonde hair with a backpack, might be on the AGR side fence line.”⁴⁰⁹

Also at 5:45 pm, the Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead texted the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader in the Hercules 1 position on top of the southern barn behind the stage: “At

⁴⁰³ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 4* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁴ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁵ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁶ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024, at 9 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁷ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log Timeline with CI Phone Calls* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁸ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 4* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁰⁹ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for Sheriff’s Channel* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

AGR...Sending a uniformed office[r] to check him out. Kid learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking toward stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.”⁴¹⁰ The text included the same two photographs of Crooks.⁴¹¹ The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader responded, “Roger. I’ll notify teams on AGR side.”⁴¹² The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader later told the Committee that he meant he would notify the two USSS counter snipers in the Hercules 2 position on top of the northern barn behind the stage.⁴¹³

This was the first communication to the USSS counter snipers about Crooks, approximately 26 minutes before the shooting. The USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader told the Committee that immediately after receiving the text, a USSS Protective Intelligence agent called him and told him she was looking into the suspicious person report.⁴¹⁴

5:47 pm

The PSP Trooper who had been told about the suspicious person around 5:44 pm then called two undercover PSP Troopers stationed at the Sheetz gas station and gave them a description of the suspicious person and told them to go to the AGR building to look for him.⁴¹⁵

Approx. 5:48 pm

The Butler ESU Commander texted the PSP Sergeant stationed in the USSS Security Room, and again provided a description of the suspicious individual and attached the

⁴¹⁰ Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1* (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1*, USSS_1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹¹ Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1* (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1*, USSS_1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹² Butler County Emergency Services Unit (ESU), *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1* (received July 26, 2024) (on file with Committee); Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Message from Butler ESU Local Sniper Team Lead to Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1*, USSS_1411-1415 (received Aug. 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 128 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴¹⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1, at 116 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴¹⁵ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on July 23, 2024, at 11 (received August 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

photographs of Crooks.⁴¹⁶ The PSP Sergeant shared this information with the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent who was co-located with him in the USSS Security Room.⁴¹⁷

5:52 pm

After receiving the photographs of Crooks from the PSP Sergeant, the USSS C-UAS Advance Agent sent the photographs to the USSS Counter Sniper Response Team agent.⁴¹⁸ At that same time, the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader who had received the description and photographs of Crooks at 5:45 then sent a “be on the lookout” or “BOLO” email to all three other USSS counter snipers positioned on the two barn roofs behind the stage. The BOLO included a description of Crooks and the photographs, and stated: “From local police near the AGR Glass Building. If spotted please notify [USSS Protective Intelligence] at [redacted] or go direct with [USSS Security Room]. ‘Kid learning [sic] around building we are in. AGR I believe it is. I did see him with a rangefinder looking towards stage. FYI. If you wanna notify SS snipers to look out. I lost sight of him. Also a bike with backpack sitting next to it in rear of building that was not seen earlier.’”⁴¹⁹

5:54 – 5:55 pm

The Butler ESU Commander sent a radio transmission on the local officers’ radio channel (including Butler Township PD) with a description of Crooks and noted that he “was near the AGR building on foot, with believed to be a rangefinder, headed towards the stage. Our [local sniper] units lost visual of him. I believe you guys are outside of that fence if you come upon him.” At 5:55 a local officer replied, “Copy there is a PSP unit by the water tower, and I sent [a local officer] over there and he didn’t [...] see him.”⁴²⁰

Approx. 6:00 pm

Former President Trump took the stage at the rally.⁴²¹

6:02 pm

⁴¹⁶ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹⁷ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹⁸ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Text Messages from C-UAS Advance Agent to Counter Sniper Response Team Agent*, at USSS_1919, USSS_1922 (received Aug. 30, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴¹⁹ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, *Email between USSS counter snipers, July 13, 2024 at 5:52 pm*, at USSS_001417-001419 (on file with Committee).

⁴²⁰ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

The Beaver County ESU sniper who took the photograph of Crooks radioed on the local ESU channel, “Alright subject is in between the AGR buildings. He’s got a backpack now. He just went towards Sheetz.”⁴²²

Approx. 6:03 – 6:04 pm

The Butler ESU Commander relayed this information via phone call to the PSP Sergeant.⁴²³ In a subsequent interview, the PSP Sergeant stated that he was unable to radio the PSP Trooper at Post 5 so he called the PSP Trooper, relayed the information, and told him, “[t]hat guy’s back. He’s walking between buildings. He’s headed towards the Sheetz.”⁴²⁴

6:04 pm

The PSP Trooper (who had previously directed the two undercover Troopers to look for the suspicious person at 5:47 pm) then sent the two undercover Troopers the photograph of Crooks.⁴²⁵ The Butler County Sheriff’s Deputy then radioed on the Sheriff’s Office radio channel that the suspicious person “is headed towards Sheetz.”⁴²⁶

6:05 – 6:08 pm

According to FBI, at approximately 6:05 pm, Crooks climbed up an air conditioning unit onto a roof on the north end of the AGR complex.⁴²⁷ He then moved southward across the connected AGR buildings’ roofs with the backpack.⁴²⁸ FBI later stated that “video obtained from a local business showed the subject climbed to the roof of the AGR complex at approximately 6:05 p.m. Video from local business, police dash cam, and police body cameras confirmed the subject’s movement across multiple AGR building roofs between 6:05 p.m. and 6:08 p.m. [...]

⁴²² Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 4* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Department, *Audio File for PD Ops 4* (received Aug. 19, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²³ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²⁴ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²⁵ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on July 23, 2024 (received August 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²⁶ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for Sheriff’s Channel* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴²⁷ Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee* (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with Committee); Press Conference with Assistant Director Cathy Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴²⁸ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

Our overall assessment is the subject was only on the roof for approximately 6-minutes prior to the shooting between 6:05 p.m. and 6:11 p.m.”⁴²⁹

Approx. 6:06 – 6:10 pm

The Beaver County ESU sniper positioned in the AGR building who took the photograph of Crooks went downstairs to the AGR exit to meet the law enforcement officers responding to the suspicious person “to let them know suspect is around building on side of fairgrounds. One marked vehicle and one unmarked vehicle pull[ed] in together.”⁴³⁰ PSP testimony later confirmed that a Butler Township PD car and a PSP car came into the parking lot on the east side of AGR, and officers were seen surrounding the building.⁴³¹

Around the same time, a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position (on top of the northern barn behind the stage) “saw two white vehicles pull into the AGR parking lot” and saw a police officer emerge from one of the vehicles and begin “moving urgently.”⁴³² The USSS counter sniper then radioed on a USSS channel, “locals are working something at the three o’clock, approximately 200 yards out,” which indicated the area of the AGR building.⁴³³

6:08:32 pm

⁴²⁹ See Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee* (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with Committee); Press Conference with Assistant Director Cathy Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024). A video taken by James Copenhaver (who would later sustain gunshot wounds at the rally) appears to show Crooks moving across the roof of the AGR building. Audrey Conklin, *Video from Trump assassination attempt victim’s POV shows figure moving on roof moments before gunfire*, Fox News (July 31, 2024) (<https://www.foxnews.com/us/video-from-trump-assassination-attempt-victims-pov-shows-figure-moving-roof-moments-before-gunfire>); Alex Oliveira, *Chilling new video shows Thomas Crooks moving across roof before Trump assassination attempt*, N.Y. Post (July 31, 2024) (<https://nypost.com/2024/07/31/us-news/chilling-new-video-shows-thomas-crooks-moving-across-roof-before-trump-assassination-attempt/>).

⁴³⁰ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *FPOTUS After Action Beaver County ESU/SWAT*, Timeline at 6 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴³¹ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴³² Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 12-13 (Aug. 16, 2024).

⁴³³ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper, at 13 (Aug. 16, 2024).

A Butler Township PD officer radioed on the local officers' radio channel, "[s]omeone's on the roof. [...] I have someone on the roof with white shorts."⁴³⁴ The Butler ESU Commander replied on the radio and confirmed the individual on the roof was not local law enforcement.⁴³⁵

6:09 pm

The same Butler Township PD officer then radioed, "[w]e got him, we don't have him in custody yet, but he's right straight in front of me by the pine tree standing upwards. He has a backpack."⁴³⁶ That officer then radioed that they "Lost sight of him. [PSP] Trooper was chasing him, trying to follow him around the building."⁴³⁷

The Butler ESU Commander called the PSP Sergeant to notify him that the suspicious person they had been looking for was on the AGR roof.⁴³⁸ The PSP Sergeant later stated that he then relayed that information to USSS.⁴³⁹

6:10 pm

Between 6:10:08 and 6:10:17, body camera footage from Butler Township Police show USSS counter snipers positioned on the roof of the southern barn behind the stage reposition themselves to face toward the direction of the AGR building.⁴⁴⁰ Around the same time, a Butler

⁴³⁴ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Department, *Audio File for PD Ops 3* (received Aug. 19, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴³⁵ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee). Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴³⁶ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Department, *Audio File for PD Ops 3* (received Aug. 19, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴³⁷ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴³⁸ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴³⁹ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Sergeant and Site Liaison on July 20, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁴⁰ Butler Township, Body Camera Footage from July 13, 2024 at 6:10:08 pm – 6:10:17 pm (on file with Committee).

County Sheriff's Deputy radioed on the Sheriff's Office radio channel, "State Police and [Butler Township PD] units have AGR surrounded. They are looking for him."⁴⁴¹

6:11:03 – 6:11:25 pm

At approximately 6:11 pm, a Butler Township PD officer was lifted up to the roof by another officer, and he stated that he saw Crooks approximately 5 to 6 feet away with "his gun pointed directly at me."⁴⁴² The officer further stated, "I thought I was fucked because all he had to do was pull the trigger. [...] So, my hands came off and I went back down onto the concrete."⁴⁴³

At 6:11:03 pm, that officer then radioed on the local officers' radio channel, "[h]e's armed! I saw him, he's laying down! [...] He's got a long gun!"⁴⁴⁴ A Sheriff's Deputy confirmed the individual is armed and relayed on the Sheriff's radio channel that other law enforcement had indicated he "has a long gun."⁴⁴⁵

Around this time, according to USSS Acting Director Rowe's testimony before the Committee, "[a] member of former President Trump's [USSS] protective detail contacted their Pittsburgh Field Office counterpart to inquire about the radio update that there was an issue local law enforcement was looking into near the perimeter."⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴¹ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for Sheriff's Channel* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁴² Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 14-16 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴⁴³ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of Butler Township Police Detective on July 16, 2024, at 14-16 (received Sept. 4, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁴⁴ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁴⁵ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Department, *Audio File for PD Ops 3* (received Aug. 19, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁴⁶ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Paul Abbate, Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

Uniformed officers were seen running with their hands on their weapons, and rally attendees were seen running away from the AGR building.⁴⁴⁷

6:11:25 – 6:11:40 pm

At approximately 6:11:25, Crooks fired an initial volley of three shots, one of which struck former President Trump in the ear.⁴⁴⁸ At 6:11:33, a local law enforcement officer reported over the radio that shots had been fired from the AGR building roof.⁴⁴⁹ The USSS Acting Director testified before the Committee that “[w]ithin three seconds, the former President’s detail rushed the stage and covered former President Trump, shielding him with their bodies.”⁴⁵⁰ Crooks fired an additional five shots over the next several seconds, for a total of eight shots.⁴⁵¹

Local Law Enforcement Fired at Crooks

In a briefing with Butler County ESU, the Committee learned that after Crooks fired, a Butler ESU officer between the stands and the AGR building looked in the direction of the shots that had been fired, and saw Crooks’ head and part of his shoulders.⁴⁵² That Butler ESU officer relayed to the Committee that as he shouldered his weapon, he saw Crooks fire his eighth round

⁴⁴⁷ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024); Beaver County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴⁴⁸ Butler ESU, Butler Township PD, and the Butler County Sheriff’s Office all radioed alerts about shots being fired between 6:11:25 and 6:11:34 (Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 3 (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for PD Ops 4 (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee); Butler County Emergency Services Unit, Radio Log for Sheriff’s Channel (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee)); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Investigative Updates on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (July 29, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt>).

⁴⁴⁹ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 3* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁵⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴⁵¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Opening Statement of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Email from Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Committee* (Aug. 28, 2024) (on file with Committee); Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Remarks to Media on the Butler, Pennsylvania, Assassination Attempt* (Aug. 28, 2024) (<https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/remarks-to-media-on-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt-08282024>).

⁴⁵² Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

and “saw the gas come from the muzzle, I heard the snap, and then immediately I returned fire” and shot at Crooks.⁴⁵³

Other law enforcement officers who were in the vicinity also confirmed that they saw or heard an officer fire from the area where the Butler ESU officer stated he fired from, including a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 2 position on top of the northern barn behind the stage, a USSS counter assault officer, and a PSP Trooper who stated that he “saw [the Butler ESU officer] fire a round and I remember asking if he shot him or shot at him. He said yes.”⁴⁵⁴ The Committee has requested a copy of the autopsy report.⁴⁵⁵

The FBI reported, “we have no forensic evidence indicating that [] [the round fired by the local officer] either struck our subject or the subject’s rifle.”⁴⁵⁶ The Butler ESU officer who told the Committee that he fired a round said that Crooks “did not get another shot off after I engaged.”⁴⁵⁷ The Butler ESU officer said that he believed that he shot Crooks in the right shoulder or right side of his neck.⁴⁵⁸ After the officer shot at Crooks, the Butler ESU officer told the Committee,

[Crooks] went down and slowly came back up. As he was coming back up, I was ready to press the second one, and that’s when [USSS counter sniper] Hercules took him out. [...] He went down. He wasn’t, like, getting down like a reaction – he slowly slumped over, my left, his right – and then slowly came back up and then got taken out [by the USSS counter sniper].⁴⁵⁹

According to the USSS Counter Sniper Advance Agent, after Crooks fired and the Butler ESU officer fired back, a USSS counter sniper in the Hercules 1 position on top of the southern barn behind the stage said to his partner “I got him,” meaning he had Crooks in his sights as he

⁴⁵³ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴⁵⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Hercules 2 Counter Sniper (Aug. 16, 2024); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance (Aug. 16, 2024); Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Interview of PSP Trooper on July 22, 2024 (received Aug. 26, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁵⁵ Email communication from Committee staff to Solicitor for the County of Butler, Butler County Commissioners’ Office (Sept. 18, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁵⁶ Press Conference with Assistant Director Cathy Milhoan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Special Agent in Charge Kevin Rojek (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴⁵⁷ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴⁵⁸ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

⁴⁵⁹ Butler County ESU Briefing with the Committee (July 26, 2024).

pointed his weapon toward Crooks.⁴⁶⁰ At approximately 6:11:40, that USSS counter sniper fired a single shot that killed Crooks.⁴⁶¹

At 6:12 pm, a Butler ESU sniper in the AGR building radioed on the local ESU channel, “Shooter is down, [local sniper call sign,] shooter is down.”⁴⁶² Several seconds after that, a Butler County Sheriff’s Deputy radioed on the Sheriff’s Office radio channel, “[s]hooter is down, shooter is down.”⁴⁶³ A USSS counterassault agent also told the Committee that he heard a USSS agent on former President Trump’s protective detail say “[t]he shooter’s down.”⁴⁶⁴

* * *

USSS agents from former President Trump’s protective detail then evacuated the former President. A medic from Beaver County ESU pronounced Crooks dead at 6:25 pm.⁴⁶⁵

V. FEDERAL AGENCIES’ LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMMITTEE’S BIPARTISAN INQUIRY

Federal departments and agencies including DOJ and DHS have failed to provide complete responses to the Committee.

DHS and USSS Incomplete Response to the Committee’s Requests

DHS and the USSS continue to provide heavily redacted or incomplete documents and productions in response to the Committee’s bipartisan inquiry. On July 24 and 25, 2024, the Committee requested information on planning, resources, intelligence, and related communications for each, as well as transcribed interviews with 13 USSS individuals and teams connected to the Butler rally.⁴⁶⁶ To date, the USSS has produced approximately 2,800 pages of

⁴⁶⁰ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴⁶¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony Submitted for the Record of U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Sniper Team Leader, Hercules 1 (Aug. 28, 2024).

⁴⁶² Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for PD Ops 4* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁶³ Butler County Emergency Services Unit, *Radio Log for Sheriff’s Channel* (received July 27, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁶⁴ Transcribed Interview with U.S. Secret Service Counter Assault Team Advance (Aug. 16, 2024).

⁴⁶⁵ Beaver County Emergency Services Unit, *FPOTUS After Action, Beaver County ESU/SWAT*, Timeline at 6 (received July 29, 2024) (on file with Committee).

⁴⁶⁶ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service. (July 24 and 25, 2024).

documents to the Committee. Despite not obtaining all records related to these individuals the Committee believes it was necessary to move forward and interview these individuals close in time to the assassination attempt. The Committee has conducted 12 transcribed interviews with USSS personnel who were involved with the Butler rally. These interviews were with the following individuals:

- The USSS Lead Technical Security Division Advance Lead;
- The USSS Counter Assault Team Advance Lead;
- The USSS Counter Assault Team Operator;
- The USSS Officer Technician serving as a Hercules 2 Counter Sniper;
- The USSS Counter Unmanned Aerial System Advance Lead (from the Donald Trump Protective Division);
- The USSS Senior Special Agent serving as the Site Counterpart for the July 13 Butler rally (from the Pittsburgh Field Office);
- The USSS Special Agent serving as the Site Agent for the July 13 Butler rally (from the Donald Trump Protective Division);
- The USSS Senior Special Agent serving as the Lead Advance Agent for the July 13 Butler rally;
- The USSS Officer Technician serving as the Team Leader for the USSS Counter Sniper Team at the July 13 Butler rally;
- The USSS Special Agent serving as the Intelligence Advance Agent for the July 13 Butler rally;
- The USSS SAIC of the Pittsburgh Field Office; and
- The USSS Assistant Director of the Office of Protective Operations.

The Committee will continue its review and ensure all necessary personnel are made available for interviews. The Committee is releasing with this interim report the transcripts of interviews conducted to date, with redactions, where appropriate, to protect individual privacy and law enforcement sensitive information.

On September 11, 2024, the Committee sent a letter to the USSS Acting Director raising concerns about the timing of document production and the number of redactions applied to the records.⁴⁶⁷ A response received from the Assistant Secretary for Legislation for DHS the same day did not adequately address the Committee's concerns.⁴⁶⁸ The Committee will continue to pursue full and complete responses to its requests, and all records necessary to complete its investigation.

⁴⁶⁷ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service. (Sept. 11, 2024).

⁴⁶⁸ Letter from Zephrañie Buetow, Assistant Sec. for Leg. Affairs, Department of Homeland Security to Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. (Sept. 11, 2024).

FBI's Responsiveness to the Committee's Requests

On July 24, 2024, the Committee sent a request to FBI Director Wray seeking records and information connected to the July 13 assassination attempt.⁴⁶⁹ To date, the FBI has produced 27 pages of documents.

At the July 30, 2024 hearing, and in follow up after the hearing, Ranking Member Johnson requested all 302s for all USSS personnel interviewed by the FBI in connection with the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt and the Butler rally.⁴⁷⁰ Deputy Director Abbate testified, "Senator, I'll take that back and we'll get those to you as soon as possible."⁴⁷¹ The SAIC of the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office has stated publicly that, as of August 28, 2024, the FBI has conducted "nearly 1,000 interviews."⁴⁷² On September 20, 2024, the FBI notified the Committee that it will begin to make 302s available for the Committee to review in camera on a rolling basis with the first set consisting of 15 interview records (approximately 64 pages of classified and unclassified documents).⁴⁷³ The Committee will continue to seek all 302s and related information from the FBI.

ATF's Responsiveness to the Committee's Requests

On July 25, 2024, the Committee sent a request to ATF Director Dettelbach seeking to interview an ATF Agent who was reported to be present at the July 13 rally.⁴⁷⁴ To date, the Committee has received an informal briefing regarding the agent's presence at the rally, but continues to seek a transcribed interview.

⁴⁶⁹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letter to Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (July 24, 2024).

⁴⁷⁰ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX); Email from Committee staff to Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 2, 2024 (on file with Committee). "302s" or "FD-302s" are the FBI's official interview summaries.

⁴⁷¹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Examination of the Security Failures Leading to the Assassination Attempt on Former President Trump*, 118th Cong. (July 30, 2024) (S. Hrg. 118-XX).

⁴⁷² Statement by Kevin Rojek, Special Agent in Charge, FBI Pittsburgh Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Aug. 28, 2024, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fbi-pittsburgh-special-agent-in-charge-s-remarks-to-media-on-updates-to-the-butler-pennsylvania-assassination-attempt-investigation>.

⁴⁷³ Letter from Assistant Director Patrick N. Findlay, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, to Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Sept. 13, 2024).

⁴⁷⁴ Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Steven Dettelbach, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (July 25, 2024).

Outstanding Requests Regarding the July 13, 2024 Rally and Assassination Attempt

The Committee's investigation into the events surrounding the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt on former President Trump remains ongoing. The following represent additional and outstanding lines of inquiry that the Committee plans to pursue as a part of its ongoing investigation:

1. Information related to federal law enforcement agencies' preparations for and participation in the July 13 rally, including but not limited to:
 - a. Information regarding USSS' decision not to participate in the July 13, 2024, 9:00 am briefing for local SWAT and sniper units;
 - b. The time at which USSS first arrived at the AGR building on July 13, 2024, and total number of USSS personnel present; and
 - c. The total number of FBI personnel involved in the security preparations for the July 13, 2024 rally, including the total number on-site during the rally.
2. Information related to coordination between federal, state, and local law enforcement in preparation for the rally, including but not limited to:
 - a. Information regarding the creation and implementation of the security plan presented at the July 13, 2024 briefing between Butler ESU and USSS; and
 - b. All official or unofficial unredacted electronic communications, including but not limited to text messages, between and among USSS, FBI, and other state or local law enforcement agents from July 11, 2024, to July 14, 2024, referring or relating to the July 13, 2024 rally.
3. Information related to Thomas Crooks and the FBI's investigation into the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, including but not limited to:
 - a. All FD-302 FBI interview reports;
 - b. All security footage from the Clairton Sportsmen's Club in possession of the FBI;
 - c. Information regarding all encrypted messaging applications used by Crooks, including when he used them, who he communicated with, and the content of his communications;
 - d. Information regarding all social media platforms used by Crooks, including when he used them, who he communicated with, and the content of any posts or communications; and
 - e. Copies of Crooks' other online activity, including, search history, any communications, online posts, handwritten notes, or other statements by Crooks related to mass shooting or assassination events, including but not limited to the possible assassination of former President Trump.
4. Information related to the investigation of the crime scene on or after July 13, 2024, including but not limited to:
 - a. Protocols for responding to and documenting a crime scene involving an assassination attempt;
 - b. Information related to any ATF facial recognition searches of Crooks' body;

- c. Information related to the discovery, location, and subsequent search of Crooks' car identified after the July 13 assassination attempt, including but not limited to information about the length of time the car was present prior to the rally;
 - d. Crooks' autopsy and toxicology report;
 - e. Time sequence and trajectory analysis of all rounds fired at the July 13 rally;
 - f. Crime scene photos from the AGR building roof and other points at the Butler rally site;
 - g. The weapons, including firearms or explosives devices, bullets recovered, all firearm tracing requests connected to the assassination attempt, and all ATF Form 4473 associated with the gunman's weapon(s); and
 - h. Information from subject matter experts regarding the handling of crime scenes, including crime scene expert analysis of the processing of the crime scene at the Butler grounds and AGR building.
5. Information related to intelligence regarding threats to presidential candidates and other high-ranking officials, including former President Trump, in advance of or during the July 13, 2024 rally.
 6. Information related to requests from former President Trump's campaign, his protective detail, or anyone else within USSS for additional protective resources.
 7. Information regarding the incident involving USSS that occurred on September 15, 2024 in West Palm Beach, FL, including information related to threats to former President Trump between July 13, 2024 to September 15, 2024, and information related to the suspect who was arrested and subsequently charged.
 8. Additional transcribed interviews of federal, state, and local personnel, including without limitation, USSS, DHS, FBI, and ATF officials with knowledge of the planning and securing of the Butler rally.

APPENDIX I

To date, the Committee has sent the below correspondence as part of its ongoing investigation. These letters are included as attachments.

1. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024)
2. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 24, 2024)
3. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 24, 2024)
4. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Undersecretary Kenneth Wainstein, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security (July 24, 2024)
5. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to District Attorney Nathan Bible, Beaver County District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024)
6. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to District Attorney Richard Goldinger, Butler County District Attorney's Office (July 24, 2024)
7. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Sheriff Michael Slupe, Butler County Sheriff's Office (July 24, 2024)
8. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and

Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Chief of Police Lt. Matthew Pearson, Butler Township Police Department (July 24, 2024)

9. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris, Pennsylvania State Police (July 24, 2024)
10. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 2024)
11. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to President Bill Sellitto, Clairton Sportsmen's Club (July 25, 2024)
12. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Director Steven M. Dettelbach, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (July 25, 2024)
13. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, Department of Homeland Security, and Director Christopher Wray, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (August 14, 2024)
14. Letter from Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Commissioner Colonel Christopher Paris, Pennsylvania State Police (Aug. 21, 2024)
15. Letter from Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Chairman Richard Blumenthal and Ranking Member Ron Johnson, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to Acting Director Ronald Rowe, U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security (September 11, 2024)

GARY C. PETERS, MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 15, 2024

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, DC 20528

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
935 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Director Wray:

We are gravely concerned by the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of an innocent bystander and injuries to several others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on Saturday, July 13, 2024. In light of Saturday's shooting, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) is initiating a bipartisan investigation into how this was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.

Accordingly, we request that the appropriate representatives of your Departments, including the U.S. Secret Service, provide a briefing to members of the Committee on the security failures that allowed this alarming incident to transpire. Specifically, we would like to understand the security posture at the Trump campaign rally, how the suspect was able to get this close to a Secret Service protectee and cause injury to the protectee, and what steps the Department is taking to increase its protection of presidential candidates and ensure the safety of the election. We also would like information on whether any additional security requests were made by former President Trump's campaign or protective team since November 15, 2022. This briefing should occur no later than Thursday, July 25, 2024. Additionally, we request you, or your appropriate designee, appear before the Committee in a public hearing on this matter as soon as possible but no later than August 1, 2024.

Finally, we request that you provide the Committee with updates on this incident and the agencies' responses on a rolling basis. The Committee will be sending additional requests in the near future and we urge you to respond thoroughly and promptly.

If you have any questions about this request, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] with Chairman Peters' staff and [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] with Ranking Member Paul's staff.


The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
The Honorable Christopher A. Way
July 15, 2024
Page 2

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Gary C. Peters
Chairman



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 24, 2024

Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.
Acting Director
United States Secret Service
245 Murray Lane SW, Bldg. T-5
Washington, D.C. 20223

Dear Acting Director Rowe:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. **Planning**. All documents and information related to planning for the July 13, 2024 event, including without limitation:
 - a. site security plans, including maps, diagrams, and operational plans;
 - b. the designation of security perimeters;
 - c. roles and responsibilities of all federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command;

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

- d. risk or threat assessments and identified vulnerabilities, including without limitation, those that specifically address the building from which the shooter operated;
 - e. plans for responding to an attack during the event, including coordinating and communicating with SLTT and any other law enforcement partner agencies; and
 - f. any mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other memoranda or documents between USSS and SLTT law enforcement partner agencies, or any other federal government agency establishing responsibilities, plans, or procedures, that were activated or in effect for the July 13, 2024, event.
3. **Resources.** All documents and information related to resources dedicated to former President Trump’s protective detail as of July 13, 2024, including:
- a. the number of USSS agents, their roles and duties;
 - b. the number of non-USSS personnel, including without limitation Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) or any other personnel within DHS, their roles, and duties;
 - c. the number of other federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies that supported USSS’s security and protection efforts at the July 13, 2024 event, including their roles, and duties;
 - d. the USSS footprint for the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of agents, their roles and duties, and any other USSS assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and C-UAS capabilities and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs) or any other assets dedicated to the event;
 - e. what actions, if any, USSS took to further enhance the security of former President Trump’s USSS protective detail in response to intelligence indicating a potential Iranian plot to assassinate former President Trump, and when USSS took those actions;
 - f. any internal reviews or audits conducted regarding resource allocation for this event;
 - g. any requests from former President Trump’s campaign, his protective detail, or anyone else within USSS for additional protective resources to his USSS security detail from January 20, 2021, to the present, including any approvals or denials, justifications for any denials, or modifications; and
 - h. any changes, including without limitation “additional security enhancements” USSS made to former President Trump’s USSS protective detail after the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt, as referenced in the USSS Director’s July 15, 2024, statement.
 - i. To the extent that the number of USSS agents or any other officers, assets, or resources from any federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies provided

for the event was less than initially planned, requested, or offered, please indicate for what USSS, or federal or SLTT law enforcement partner fewer resources were provided, the reasoning/justification, the number or type of resource not provided, and all supporting documents and information related to such decisions.


4. **Policies.** All documents and information related to USSS policies, procedures, and protocols for:
 - a. USSS's Advance Planning Methodology and conducting pre-event security assessments;
 - b. responding to potential threats to a protectee;
 - c. USSS counter sniper teams; and
 - d. training for agents assigned to protect high-risk individuals.
 - e. Please also provide documents and information identifying (i) whether any deviations were made from any of the above policies, procedures, or protocols related to former President Trump's protective detail before or on July 13, 2024, who approved such deviations and when, and (ii) whether any updates or changes to these protocols were made following the July 13, 2024.
5. **Timeline.** A detailed "tick-tock" timeline of USSS's actions: from selection of the location for former President Trump's event on July 13, 2024, on July 13, 2024 prior to the attempted assassination of former President Trump (including any advance security planning); on July 13, 2024, through the shooting (including when USSS became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination); and until the rally site was declared secure.
6. **Intelligence.** All documents and information related intelligence generated or received by USSS in advance of or during the July 13, 2024 event, including finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence, regarding:
 - a. potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event;
 - b. the perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump;
 - c. a potential assassination plot by Iran or any of its proxies against former President Trump; or
 - d. the elections threat environment.
7. **Communications.** All documents and information related to:
 - a. any communications internally within USSS or externally to or from any outside office, agency, or entity, related to the July 13, 2024, event, from any time up to and including July 13, 2024; and
 - b. any communications internally within USSS or externally to or from any outside office, agency, or entity, related to former President Trump's protective detail or other security measures, between November 15, 2022, and July 13, 2024.

8. **Investigations.** All documents and information related to (i) the independent investigation into the July 13, 2024, event for DHS, and (ii) the USSS internal investigation into the July 13, 2024 event. For both investigations please provide:
- all documents relating to the scope of the investigation, who is leading the investigation, and the deadline of the investigation;
 - all directives, guidance, or parameters given to the entity conducting the investigation; and
 - all assessments of what failures occurred (by either USSS or other federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies) that allowed the attempted assassination of former President Trump, including without limitation resource constraints.
9. The Site Post Log from Butler, SSF 3048.


The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”² Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”³

Please see attachment A to this letter for a description of the documents and information covered by this request. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact Committee staff at (202) 224-2627.


Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

² S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

³ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

July 24, 2024

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
935 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Wray:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. What role, if any, did FBI play in the planning for the July 13, 2024, event and in providing security at the event? Please provide supporting documentation, including any data, reports, or documents related to FBI's involvement before or during the event, demonstrating the numbers of agents, their roles and duties, or any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs) dedicated to the event.
3. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about:

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

- a. Potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by FBI in advance of the event;
 - b. The perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by FBI in advance of the event;
 - c. A potential assassination plot by Iran or any of its proxies against former President Trump generated or received by FBI in advance of the event; and
 - d. Elections threat environment generated or received by FBI in the last two years.
 - e. Please also provide an accounting of how and when such intelligence was disseminated by or to FBI; who the intelligence was shared with, both internally and externally; and what actions were taken in response to the intelligence.
Please provide copies of all documents supporting these statements.
4. FBI's assessment of what failures occurred (by either FBI or other federal or SLTT law enforcement partner agencies) that allowed the attempted assassination of former President Trump to occur.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”² Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”³

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
² S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

³ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

July 24, 2024

The Honorable Kenneth L. Wainstein
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
Department of Homeland Security
245 Murray Lane SW
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Undersecretary Wainstein:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about:
 - a. potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by I&A in advance of the event;
 - b. the perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by I&A in advance of the event;
 - c. a potential assassination plot by Iran or any of its proxies against former President Trump generated or received by I&A in advance of the event; and
 - d. the elections threat environment generated or received by I&A in the last two years.

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

- e. Please also provide an accounting of how and when such intelligence was disseminated by or to I&A; who the intelligence was shared with, both internally and externally; and what actions were taken in response to the intelligence. Please provide copies of all documents supporting these statements.


The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”² Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”³

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Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
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Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

² S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

³ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

July 24, 2024

Nathan Bible
District Attorney
Beaver County District Attorney's Office
810 Third Street
Beaver, PA 15009

Dear District Attorney Bible:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. All documents in possession of your agency related to planning the July 13, 2024 event, including but not limited to: site security plans, operational plans, risk or threat assessments, designation of security perimeters, plans for responding to suspicious activity or an active threat or attack, mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documents establishing roles and responsibilities of federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.
3. Documents or data on the involvement of your agency and personnel at the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of officers, their roles and duties, and any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems) and their respective deployments,

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

assignments, and duty logs. To the extent that the number of officers, assets, or resources from your agency provided for the event was less than initially planned or offered, please indicate that and provide copies of all supporting documents or data.

4. All documents and information regarding directives or orders given to officers from your agency at the July 13, 2024, event, and how those directives or orders were communicated.
5. A detailed “tick-tock” timeline of your agency’s actions prior to the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Trump (including any advance security planning); on July 13, 2024, through the shooting (including when your agency became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination); and until the rally site was declared secure.
6. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.
7. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about the perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”² Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”³

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
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
Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
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Rand Paul
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Committee on Homeland Security and
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Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

July 24, 2024

Richard Goldinger
District Attorney
Butler County District Attorney's Office
124 Diamond Street
Butler, PA 16001

Dear District Attorney Goldinger:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. All documents in possession of your agency related to planning the July 13, 2024 event, including but not limited to: site security plans, operational plans, risk or threat assessments, designation of security perimeters, plans for responding to suspicious activity or an active threat or attack, mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documents establishing roles and responsibilities of federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.
3. Documents or data on the involvement of your agency and personnel at the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of officers, their roles and duties, and any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems) and their respective deployments,

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

assignments, and duty logs. To the extent that the number of officers, assets, or resources from your agency provided for the event was less than initially planned or offered, please indicate that and provide copies of all supporting documents or data.

4. All documents and information regarding directives or orders given to officers from your agency at the July 13, 2024, event, and how those directives or orders were communicated.
5. A detailed “tick-tock” timeline of your agency’s actions prior to the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Trump (including any advance security planning); on July 13, 2024, through the shooting (including when your agency became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination); and until the rally site was declared secure.
6. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.
7. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about the perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.

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
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
Gary C. Peters
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Committee on Homeland Security and
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Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

July 24, 2024

Michael Slupe
Sheriff
Butler County Sheriff's Office
300 S. Main Street
Butler, PA 16001

Dear Sheriff Slupe:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. All documents in possession of your agency related to planning the July 13, 2024 event, including but not limited to: site security plans, operational plans, risk or threat assessments, designation of security perimeters, plans for responding to suspicious activity or an active threat or attack, mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documents establishing roles and responsibilities of federal

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agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.

3. Documents or data on the involvement of your agency and personnel at the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of officers, their roles and duties, and any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems) and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs. To the extent that the number of officers, assets, or resources from your agency provided for the event was less than initially planned or offered, please indicate that and provide copies of all supporting documents or data.
4. All documents and information regarding directives or orders given to officers from your agency at the July 13, 2024, event, and how those directives or orders were communicated.
5. A detailed “tick-tock” timeline of your agency’s actions prior to the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Trump (including any advance security planning); on July 13, 2024, through the shooting (including when your agency became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination); and until the rally site was declared secure.
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
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Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
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Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

July 24, 2024

Lt. Matthew Pearson
Acting Chief of Police
Butler Township Police Department
290 South Duffy Road
Butler, PA 1600

Dear Lt. Pearson:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

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To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. All documents in possession of your agency related to planning the July 13, 2024 event, including but not limited to: site security plans, operational plans, risk or threat assessments, designation of security perimeters, plans for responding to suspicious activity or an active threat or attack, mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documents establishing roles and responsibilities of federal

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agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.

3. Documents or data on the involvement of your agency and personnel at the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of officers, their roles and duties, and any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems) and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs. To the extent that the number of officers, assets, or resources from your agency provided for the event was less than initially planned or offered, please indicate that and provide copies of all supporting documents or data.
4. All documents and information regarding directives or orders given to officers from your agency at the July 13, 2024, event, and how those directives or orders were communicated.
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
³ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

Please see attachment A to this letter for a description of the documents and information covered by this request. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact Committee staff at (202) 224-2627.


Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 24, 2024

Colonel Christopher L. Paris
Commissioner
Pennsylvania State Police
1800 Elmerton Avenue
Harrisburg, PA 17110

Dear Colonel Paris:

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we write to request documents and information related to the assassination attempt on former President Trump and the loss of life of one attendee and injuries to two others during a campaign rally in Butler, PA, on July 13, 2024. As Senator Peters and Senator Paul indicated in their letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Wray on July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Committee) has initiated a bipartisan investigation into how this attack was able to occur, what security, personnel, or other failures contributed to the attempt, and steps that must be taken to ensure any mistakes are avoided in the future.¹ To assist in our investigation, please provide the following documents and information by August 7, 2024.

1. All documents and information provided to any other Congressional committees or Members related to the attempted assassination of former President Trump.

To the extent responsive documents and information are not covered by the above request, please provide the following documents and information:

2. All documents in possession of your agency related to planning the July 13, 2024 event, including but not limited to: site security plans, operational plans, risk or threat assessments, designation of security perimeters, plans for responding to suspicious activity or an active threat or attack, mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, or other documents establishing roles and responsibilities of federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partner agencies, and associated chains of command.

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Gary Peters and Ranking Member Rand Paul letter to Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security and Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (July 15, 2024).

3. Documents or data on the involvement of your agency and personnel at the July 13, 2024, event, demonstrating the numbers of officers, their roles and duties, and any other assets or resources (including unmanned aircraft systems) and their respective deployments, assignments, and duty logs. To the extent that the number of officers, assets, or resources from your agency provided for the event was less than initially planned or offered, please indicate that and provide copies of all supporting documents or data.
4. All documents and information regarding directives or orders given to officers from your agency at the July 13, 2024, event, and how those directives or orders were communicated.
5. A detailed “tick-tock” timeline of your agency’s actions prior to the July 13, 2024, attempted assassination of former President Trump (including any advance security planning); on July 13, 2024, through the shooting (including when your agency became aware of the suspicious person who would eventually commit the attempted assassination); and until the rally site was declared secure.
6. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.
7. Any intelligence (including but not limited to finished intelligence products, bulletins, or raw intelligence) about the perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by your agency in advance of the event.


The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”² Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”³

Please see attachment A to this letter for a description of the documents and information covered by this request. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact Committee staff at (202) 224-2627.


² S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

³ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).


Sincerely,




Gary C. Peters
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and
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Richard Blumenthal
Chair
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations

United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 25, 2024

Ronald L. Rowe, Jr.
Acting Director
United States Secret Service
245 Murray Lane SW, Bldg. T-5
Washington, DC 20223

Dear Acting Director Rowe:

On July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee initiated a bipartisan investigation into the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump at a rally in Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024.

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we request that you make the following United States Secret Service (USSS) personnel available for transcribed interviews with Committee staff as soon as possible, but no later than August 9, 2024. We believe these individuals have personal knowledge of information relevant to our ongoing investigation. Please coordinate with our staff to schedule these interviews.

1. Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] – Pittsburgh Field Office Supervisor
2. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Lead Advance Agent for Butler County Site
3. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Head of President Trump’s Protective Detail
4. Special Agent [REDACTED]
5. Assistant Director [REDACTED] – Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information
6. Assistant Director [REDACTED] – Office of Protective Operations
7. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Farm Show Site Lead
8. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Farm Show Site Lead
9. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Intelligence Lead
10. Technical Security Investigator [REDACTED] – Technical Security Lead
11. Special Agent [REDACTED] – Counter UAS Lead
12. Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED] – Farm Show Supervisor
13. All USSS Counter Sniper and Counter Assault Agents at the July 13, 2024, event, including Teams Hercules and [REDACTED]

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”¹ Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the

¹ S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”²

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Gary Peters
Chairman
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations

² S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

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WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 25, 2024

Mr. Bill Sellitto
President
Clairton Sportsmen's Club
412 Coal Valley Road
Clairton, PA 15025

Dear Mr. Sellitto:

Our offices are conducting a review of the events surrounding the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump.¹ According to reports, the shooter, Thomas Matthew Crooks, was a member of the Clairton Sportsmen's Club. Reports also indicate that the day before the assassination attempt, Crooks was at the club and utilized the rifle range to practice shooting.² We request that you make yourself available for an interview with our staff the week of July 29, 2024. Please contact [REDACTED] with Chairman Blumenthal's staff, [REDACTED] with Ranking Member Johnson's staff, [REDACTED] with Chairman Peter's staff, and [REDACTED] with Ranking Member Paul's staff to schedule this interview.


Sincerely,



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations




Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Gary Peters
Chairman
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs

¹ Jamie Stengle, A Timeline of the Assassination attempt on Former President Donald Trump, AP, July 21, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/trump-assassination-attempt-timeline-59e2f4fcdf8379aa2cb5f141825d60a3>.

² Julia Reinstein, What Thomas Matthew Crooks did in hours leading up to attack on former President Trump, ABC News, July 18, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/US/trump-rally-gunman-thomas-matthew-crooks-shooting/story?id=112027831>.



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
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on Investigations

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DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

July 25, 2024

Steven M. Dettelbach
Director
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
99 New York Ave NE
Washington, DC 20002

Dear Director Dettelbach:

On July 15, 2024, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee initiated a bipartisan investigation into the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump at a rally in Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024.

Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we request that you make Special Agent [REDACTED] of the ATF Philadelphia Field Office available for transcribed interviews with Committee staff as soon as possible, but no later than August 9, 2024. We believe Special Agent [REDACTED] has personal knowledge of information relevant to our ongoing investigation. Please coordinate with our staff to schedule the interview.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”¹ Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”²

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Gary Peters
Chairman
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs

¹ S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

² S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).

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DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

August 14, 2024

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Christopher Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Director Wray:

On July 24, 2024, as part of this Committee's bipartisan investigation into the assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump, we requested documents and information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), including any intelligence regarding a series of enumerated threats known or being investigated in advance of the July 13, 2024 rally.¹ We reiterate that request, which remains outstanding. Since our initial request, on August 6, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced charges against Asif Merchant, a 46-year-old Pakistani national with ties to Iran, who "orchestrated a plot to assassinate a politician or U.S. government officials on U.S. soil."² Press reports indicate that former President Donald Trump was one of Merchant's

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Honorable Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice and Undersecretary Kenneth L. Wainstein, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (July 24, 2024). These letters requested information on:

- "Potential threats to the July 13, 2024, event, generated or received by FBI in advance of the event;
 - The perpetrator of the attempted assassination of former President Trump generated or received by FBI in advance of the event;
 - A potential assassination plot by Iran or any of its proxies against former President Trump generated or received by FBI in advance of the event; and
 - Elections threat environment generated or received by FBI in the last two years.
- [and] how and when such intelligence was disseminated by or to FBI; who the intelligence was shared with, both internally and externally; and what actions were taken in response to the intelligence. Please provide copies of all documents supporting these statements."

² Press release, Pakistani National with Ties to Iran Charged in Connection with Foiled Plot to Assassinate a Politician or U.S. Government Officials, Dep't of Justice, Aug. 6, 2024, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/pakistani-national-ties-iran-charged-connection-foiled-plot-assassinate-politician-or>.

potential targets.³ Merchant was arrested on July 12, 2024 just before he was going to leave the United States.⁴

According to recently unsealed court documents, Merchant had been orchestrating his assassination plot since at least April 2024 when he “flew from Pakistan to Istanbul and then on to Houston, Texas on or about April 13, 2024, to recruit individuals to carry out his plot to assassinate U.S. government officials.”⁵ These documents state that shortly after arriving in the U.S., he began interacting with a confidential source (CS) working with law enforcement. Merchant traveled from Texas to New York to meet with the CS and then eventually returned to Texas.⁶ In June 2024, Merchant flew from Texas to LaGuardia Airport in New York to meet with the CS again.⁷ During this meeting, the complaint alleges that Merchant told the CS he needed the CS to arrange a meeting for Merchant to meet hitmen in New York.⁸ According to the complaint, on June 10, 2024, Merchant and the CS met with two undercover law enforcement officers posing as hitmen.⁹ After the meetings, Merchant traveled to Boston, Massachusetts, and then “[o]n or about June 21, 2024, Merchant traveled from Boston to New York to make the advance payment to the hitmen for the assassination plot.”¹⁰

According to a press report, law enforcement sources said that the “FBI had eyes on Merchant before he arrived in the U.S. and needed him to physically enter the country so they could build a case and arrest him. If they arrested him at customs, they would not have been able to gather evidence and information about his plot[.]”¹¹ The unnamed law enforcement sources reportedly said that Merchant “was admitted into the United States via immigration parole for the ‘significant public benefit’”¹² and noted that the “FBI sponsored his parole for ‘security interests[.]’”¹³

In light of this new information and to understand the extent of FBI’s and DHS’s awareness of Merchant and his plot, including the justification to allow him to enter the U.S., please provide the following information:

1. When and how was the FBI initially made aware of Merchant?

³ Louis Casiano, et al., Pakistani man accused of plotting political assassination admitted into US via immigration parole: sources, Fox News, Aug. 7, 2024, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/pakistani-man-accused-plotting-political-assassination-admitted-us-immigration-parole-sources>.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ United States of America against Asif Merchant, Complaint and Affidavit in Support at 4.

⁶ *Id.* at 5.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 8.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 12.

¹¹ Louis Casiano, et al., Pakistani man accused of plotting political assassination admitted into US via immigration parole: sources, Fox News, Aug. 7, 2024, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/pakistani-man-accused-plotting-political-assassination-admitted-us-immigration-parole-sources>.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

- a. At the time that the FBI first became aware of Merchant, what did the FBI know about Merchant?
2. What, if any, information did the FBI share with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) about the apparent assassination plot targeting U.S. politicians or government officials on U.S. soil? When was this information shared with the USSS?
3. Did the FBI sponsor Merchant's Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) for "security interests"?¹⁴ On what date was Merchant's SPBP approved and when would it expire? Was Merchant's parole renewed or extended and if so, when and by what agency? Was Merchant ever previously in the country under other authorities?
4. What information did the FBI provide to DHS components involved in making a determination about whether to allow Mr. Merchant into the country in advance of this determination? Did FBI inform DHS about Merchant's assassination plot? When and how did DHS officials become aware of Merchant?
5. Was Merchant on any government watchlists? If so, what watchlists, when was he added, which agency or agencies added him, why was he added, and what, if any, additional information or identifiers was included with his name in the watchlists?
6. Was FBI or DHS aware of Merchant's travel within the U.S. from April 2024 to July 2024?
 - a. What, if any, concerns did FBI or DHS officials raise about Merchant's entry to and travel within the U.S.?
7. Was Merchant ever previously denied entry to the U.S.? If so, when and why?
8. Merchant was apparently in Texas when he was arrested.¹⁵ Does Merchant have ties to Texas? According to the court documents, law enforcement searched Merchant's "place of residence" after he was arrested. Where was Merchant's place of residence? Does anyone else reside at Merchant's place of residence?¹⁶
9. Provide all records shared between the FBI and DHS referring or relating to Merchant and his assassination plot.

¹⁴ Louis Casiano, et al., Pakistani man accused of plotting political assassination admitted into US via immigration parole: sources, Fox News, Aug. 7, 2024, <https://www.foxnews.com/us/pakistani-man-accused-plotting-political-assassination-admitted-us-immigration-parole-sources>.


¹⁵ United States of America against Asif Merchant, Complaint and Affidavit in Support at 14.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 13.


10. According to public reports, “[o]fficials said they had no evidence indicating [Merchant’s] plot was connected to the shooting in Butler, Pa.”¹⁷ Please explain what, if any, steps federal law enforcement has taken to investigate any connection between Merchant’s assassination plot and the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump. Provide all records referring or relating to any investigative activity regarding potential connections between Merchant’s plot and the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt of former President Donald Trump.

Please provide this information as soon as possible, but no later than August 28, 2024. In addition, please provide a briefing on the requested information by no later than August 21, 2024. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Gary Peters
Chairman
Homeland Security
and Government Affairs

cc: The Honorable Joseph Cuffari
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Michael Horowitz
Inspector General
Department of Justice

¹⁷ Glenn Thrush, Justice Dept. Charges Pakistani Man in Alleged Plot to Kill U.S. Leaders, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/06/us/politics/justice-dept-assassination.html>; Evan Perez and Hannah Rabinowitz, Pakistani national with ties to Iran charged in connection to a foiled assassination plot potentially targeting Trump, CNN, Aug. 6, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/06/politics/iran-trump-assassination-charges/index.html>.

August 21, 2024

Colonel Christopher L. Paris
Commissioner
Pennsylvania State Police
1800 Elmerton Avenue
Harrisburg, PA 17110

Dear Colonel Paris:

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee is conducting a bipartisan investigation into the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024. Pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, we request that you make the following individuals available for interviews with Committee staff.

1. The senior Pennsylvania State Police official, or Officer in Charge, present at the July 13th rally;
2. Any Pennsylvania State Police official or officer involved in the planning or advance preparations for any aspect of the July 13th rally; and
3. Any Pennsylvania State Police official present in the United States Secret Service command center or security room during the July 13th rally.

Please contact our staff to coordinate these interviews. Should you have any questions, please contact Committee staff at (202) 224-2627. Thank you for your attention to this matter. .

Sincerely,



Gary Peters
Chairman
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Ron Johnson
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United States Senate

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

DAVID M. WEINBERG, STAFF DIRECTOR
WILLIAM E. HENDERSON III, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, CHIEF CLERK

September 11, 2024

Mr. Ronald Rowe, Jr.
Acting Director
United States Secret Service

Dear Acting Director Rowe,

On July 24 and July 25, 2024, as part of this Committee's bipartisan investigation into the security, personnel, and other failures that contributed to the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on former President Donald J. Trump, we wrote you requesting relevant documents, information, and transcribed interviews from the United States Secret Service (USSS).¹ These requests included information on planning, resources, intelligence, and related communications for each, as well as for transcribed interviews with thirteen USSS individuals and teams. Many of these requests remain outstanding.

To date, the USSS has produced approximately 2,500 pages of documents and the Committee has now conducted eleven transcribed interviews with individuals within the USSS. While we recognize the USSS's actions to date in acknowledgement of its obligations to comply with our requests, records produced to the Committee have been replete with redactions and the USSS has produced limited communications concerning the planning and security preparations for the July 13 rally which, until recently, failed to include agents' notes. These efforts have fallen far short of the USSS's responsibility, and your own commitments, to fully comply with this Committee's requests, in exercise of its constitutional authority to conduct oversight and acquire necessary information to identify any needed legislative reforms.

On July 30, 2024, you testified before this Committee that, "[w]ith respect to Congressional investigations and requests for information, I instructed my staff to provide *full* cooperation and to respond expeditiously, on a continuing basis, to ensure you have the information you need to conduct your critical oversight responsibilities."² That has not occurred. As you noted in your testimony, the Committee is performing critical oversight responsibilities as it investigates the assassination attempt on former President Trump.

The USSS's extensive redactions have impeded the Committee's ability to effectively and efficiently conduct interviews. The USSS has produced heavily redacted records the evenings—or, in one case, even minutes—before the Committee was scheduled to interview

¹ Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations letters to Ronald L. Rowe, Jr., Acting Director, United States Secret Service. (July 24 and 25, 2024).

² Opening Statement, Ronald Rowe, Jr., Acting Dir., U.S. Secret Service, Senate hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Jul. 30, 2024, <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Testimony-Rowe-2024-07-30-REVISED.pdf> at 3 (emphasis added).

USSS personnel. The USSS has applied redactions, not in the standard black boxes, but in electronic white-out, making it even more difficult to distinguish what information is being withheld. On a number of occasions, the redactions have forced the Committee to spend its limited interview time with USSS personnel trying to decipher incomplete records. One USSS agent noted during a transcribed interview that the USSS's redactions hindered his ability to speak with accuracy and certainty about a specific record. At this point, the USSS has failed to articulate any legitimate justification for redacting documents responsive to a congressional request.

While the Committee is cognizant of the USSS's desire to protect the identities of its agents and employees, we understand that many of the names being redacted are of the individuals we requested for transcribed interviews. Furthermore, the Committee understands that the redactions contained within the limited set of documents the USSS has produced to date conceal more than just the names of USSS agents.

On August 21, 2024, the USSS sent a letter to Chairman Peters and Ranking Member Paul responding to these concerns and proposing an accommodation.³ The Committee is willing to agree to reasonable accommodations, however, the USSS's August 21 proposal, was unreasonable. The USSS's proposal included limited access to unredacted information, which would only be provided at the start of an interview and would require the Committee to return the records to the USSS at the end of each interview. These restrictions would have exacerbated the impediments the Committee faces in conducting interviews of USSS personnel, contributed to creating an incomplete record in subsequent transcribed interviews, and unnecessarily and unduly burdened the Committee's exercise of its constitutional authority. Documents that are responsive to the Committee's requests must be produced without redactions. As staff have previously explained, per the Committee's longstanding practice, if the Committee plans to publicly release information obtained from the USSS, the Committee will provide the USSS the opportunity to suggest factual corrections or identify information that presents safety or other relevant concerns for consideration.

To ensure that the USSS will fully comply with our requests, we ask that you or your designee provide us with an in-person briefing on what additional information has been identified by the USSS since the Committee's July 30 hearing, as well as the efforts that you are undertaking to guarantee complete transparency. Please do so no later than September 20, 2024.

Finally, as we have obtained new information requiring additional responsive documents, information, and interviews, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has insisted that those requests be made in writing. While our prior requests and your prior commitments should have made such written notice unnecessary, at this time and pursuant to the authority under Senate Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate and Senate Resolution 59, Section 12, please make available for transcribed interviews, all USSS individuals the Committee may seek to meet with in the course of its investigation into the planning and response to the July 13, 2024 campaign rally in Butler, PA, and the resulting assassination attempt on former President Trump,

³ Letter from Darryl Volpicelli, Deputy Assistant Dir., Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs, to Gary Peters, Chairman, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and Rand Paul, Ranking Member, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Aug. 21, 2024 (on file with Comm.).

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including but not limited to the Special Agent in charge of the Buffalo Field Office and Security Room Agent for July 13, the Counter Sniper Response agent(s), USSS liaisons in Federal Bureau of Investigation threat centers, any USSS employees that interacted with such liaisons regarding former President Trump prior to July 13, all members of the Donald Trump Detail involved in the July 13, 2024 rally, and any protective intelligence agents working the July 13, 2024 rally.

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is authorized by Rule XXV (k)(2)(B) of the Standing Rules of the Senate to investigate matters that aid the Committee in “studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and departments of the Government.”⁴ Under Senate Resolution 59, Sec. 12(e)(2), of the 118th Congress, the Committee’s investigative duties “shall not be construed to be limited to the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government and may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.”⁵

Sincerely,



Gary C. Peters
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs



Richard Blumenthal
Chairman
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations



Ron Johnson
Ranking Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations

cc: The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

The Honorable Joseph Cuffari
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security

⁴ S. Rule XXV(k)(2)(B).

⁵ S. Res. 59, Sec. 12(e)(2).