

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/13/2019

(U) [REDACTED], date of birth [REDACTED], was interviewed at Not Your Average Joe's, 1845 Fountain Dr, Reston, VA 20190. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

(U) Since leaving House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), [REDACTED] has encountered various HPSCI staffers at various times, but these encounters were not significant. The encounters were cordial. Almost all of the staffers who he worked with on HPSCI are still with HPSCI, except for [REDACTED], who has left HPSCI. [REDACTED]'s successor on HPSCI was [REDACTED] who has since left the position. [REDACTED] did not agree with a HPSCI member on something, which put him in a tough spot.

(U) [REDACTED], who is a HPSCI staffer, likely provided guidance and instruction to HPSCI staffers regarding media contact, in particular, they were not authorized to have such contact. [REDACTED] did not know if [REDACTED] received guidance or instruction regarding media contact while [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] probably pushed back on this because he did not like this policy. It is possible [REDACTED] was authorized to have media contact. The HPSCI rules would specify whether media contact is authorized and who is authorized to have such contact.

(U) [REDACTED], who is the HPSCI [REDACTED] likely has the non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that were signed by HPSCI members and staffers. She is an employee of the House of Representatives, not of a particular Representative or Committee, such as HPSCI. It is possible the [REDACTED] or FBI also have the NDAs since they maintain records of TOP SECRET or SCI access. [REDACTED] could instruct [REDACTED] to grant access to classified information for a particular staffer.

(U) According to the ethics rules of the House of Representatives, there is

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Investigation on 11/04/2019 at Reston, Virginia, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 11/06/2019by [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 11/04/2019, Page 2 of 2

to be no contact between current and former staffers for one year after a staffer leaves the House of Representatives. These ethics rules allow for criminal prosecution in case of ethics violations, however the House of Representatives must vote to forward the ethics violations to a prosecutor.

[(U) Note - [REDACTED] recounted information regarding potential unauthorized public disclosures of classified information, which he previously provided to the FBI on August 2, 2017 and December 5, 2017. See [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].]

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 06/28/2023

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] [Protect Identity], Date of Birth (DOB) [REDACTED], was interviewed at the Marriott St. Louis Grand Hotel, located at 800 Washington Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri (MO) 63101, by Special Agents (SA) [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] previously had a positive experience working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), related to incidents in 2017 that occurred when [REDACTED] worked on the United States (U.S.) House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In this position, [REDACTED] worked with senior political leaders from both major political parties including Congressman Adam SCHIFF and former Congressman Devin NUNES. [REDACTED] was friends with both SCHIFF and NUNES.

(U//FOUO) When working in this capacity, [REDACTED] was called to an all-staff meeting by SCHIFF. In this meeting, SCHIFF stated the group would leak classified information which was derogatory to President of the United States Donald J. TRUMP. SCHIFF stated the information would be used to Indict President TRUMP. [REDACTED] stated this would be illegal and, upon hearing his concerns, unnamed members of the meeting reassured [REDACTED] that they would not be caught leaking classified information.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was, again, approached about leaking classified information in a separate meeting by unnamed individuals. [REDACTED] believed this activity to be unethical and treasonous. [REDACTED] was concerned about the discussions and, as a result, reached out to contacts from his prior [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) employment for guidance on where to report this experience. These discussions led [REDACTED] to contact the FBI regarding his concerns. [REDACTED] had several conversations with two (2) unnamed FBI agents related to the matter and was eventually invited to attend a mock

Reason: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 05/23/2023 at St. Louis, Missouri, United States (In Person)File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 06/05/2023by [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U//FOUO) Interview with [REDACTED], On 05/23/2023, Page 2 of 2

grand jury hearing with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).

[REDACTED] was advised not to bring his attorney to this meeting. However, [REDACTED] invited the two (2) FBI agents he worked with to attend this event.


(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] was eventually informed that the issue would not be investigated further by the DOJ, as Congressmen have immunity to all speech and actions made on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. [REDACTED] did not believe that the activity he witnessed would be protected by this legal provision.

Identifiers for [REDACTED] are as follows:

Address: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]

Phone Number: [REDACTED]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: (S//NF) Call with FBI Special Agent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Date: 10/18/2017

From: WASHINGTON FIELD

WF-[REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

Approved By: A/SSA [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) BURIED LEAD;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM);
MEDIA LEAK;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM AGENCY;
OO: WFO

Synopsis: ([REDACTED]) To document a call with SA [REDACTED] on 6 October 2017

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Details:

([REDACTED]) On 6 October 2017, writer was contacted via Microsoft Lync by [REDACTED], a Supervisory Special Agent and an FBI liaison to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).

[REDACTED] volunteered the following information:

([REDACTED]) Earlier that day, [REDACTED] had spoken with an unnamed Republican staffer for HPSCI (the "Staffer") who described the sudden firing of a minority staffer named [REDACTED]. The Staffer told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED], who had worked for the committee for about twelve years and handled much of the technology used by the minority, was suddenly fired due to a perceived lack of party loyalty. The

[REDACTED]

SECRET//NOFORN

Title: () Call with FBI Special Agent
Re: , 10/18/2017


rationale sounded plausible to the Staffer and, on 's last day, the Staffer went to to express his sympathy. In response, told the Staffer that he had been fired because there was an expectation of leaking and he refused to participate. described a systematic process through which leaks were effected. The Staffer did not press for details.

() According to the account given to , the Staffer met with for a drink later that evening, during which provided the same detailed description of the leaking process within the HPSCI minority. emphasized that this was not a one-time thing. Under the system established by r , notes would be run up to the ranking member, ADAM SCHIFF, after which a decision was made as to who would leak the information. alleged that this process remained in place under the Minority Staff Director who succeeded , though two other minority staffers- and -also refused to leak.

() According to , operates a company called , telephone number , e-mail address , mailing address .

(U) The account provided above was documented by writer via typed notes taken in real-time during the conversation with . Accordingly, there are no original handwritten notes.

♦♦



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/19/2017

(U//FOUO) On 5 December 2017, Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] [PROTECT IDENTITY], social security number (SSN) [REDACTED], at his residence, [REDACTED]. The interviewing Agents advised [REDACTED] the voluntary nature of the interview. [REDACTED] then signed a classified non-disclosure agreement and provided the following information:

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] is a former staffer for the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Prior to joining HPSCI in 2005, [REDACTED] worked in the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) for [REDACTED] years, including time spent with the [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). [REDACTED], a democratic staffer, most recently worked under the HPSCI minority's ranking member, ADAM SCHIFF. As an intelligence advisor to the committee, [REDACTED] educated members and other staffers on technical collection methods, USIC functioning, and even assisted in drafting authorization bills for agencies including the [REDACTED], the [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), and the [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). Though [REDACTED]'s role with HPSCI did not generally include direct interaction with the news media, he did occasionally sit-in during interviews of committee members to ensure that no classified information was mistakenly divulged.

(U//FOUO) According to [REDACTED], the HPSCI work environment started to change around August 2016 as the U.S. presidential election approached. [REDACTED] recalled a particular staff meeting in September 2016 which was led by then-minority staff director [REDACTED] and staffer [REDACTED]. As [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] addressed the other minority staffers, they acknowledged that they had been in contact with unnamed journalists and had provided "on background" their impressions of Russian activity surrounding the upcoming election. [REDACTED] understood their use of the term "on background" to mean that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had provided information to the media with the understanding that it would be published, provided that there would be no reference to the source

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Investigation on 12/05/2017 at Sterling, Virginia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/08/2017

by [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 12/05/2017, Page 2 of 5

of the information. _____ reminded them that HPSCI policy prohibited staffers from speaking with the media, on background or otherwise. Nevertheless, _____ noted that journalists would routinely call the HPSCI offices and ask for staffers by name. On one occasion, _____ answered a call from DAN (LNU) from NBC News who specifically _____ to speak with _____ or _____. This upset _____, who told _____ (LNU) that no one was available to speak with him.

(U//FOUO) Following the U.S. presidential election in November 2016, the mood within HPSCI was indescribable, said _____. Ranking member SCHIFF was particularly upset, as he believed he would have been appointed as the Director of CIA had candidate HILLARY CLINTON won the election. The HPSCI minority viewed the election and its aftermath as a constitutional crisis and, by February 2017, _____ stated that all hell broke loose. During a meeting on 13 February 2017, _____ instructed the staff that he wanted to drive the "Russian involvement" issue into a joint inquiry, similar to the 9/11 commission. To do so, _____ instructed the staffers to use any sources they had developed _____ in the USIC to gather information, which would then be made public through the media in order to compel public opinion. According to _____, this was an explicit request to gather classified information for public disclosure. After the meeting, _____ approached _____ and asked _____ to reach out to his contacts at _____ in order to collect information on MICHAEL FLYNN's contact with Russia. _____ tried to deflect the request by telling _____ that such information was likely held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). _____ nonetheless asked _____ again, to which _____ said he _____d give it a try, though _____ never actually reached out to his _____ contacts. _____ documented the meeting with his own notes and, the next day, sent himself an e-mail detailing what had happened. [Writer's Note: _____ provided the interviewing Agents with copies of both his handwritten notes and the e-mail.]

(U//FOUO) Around the time of the February 2017 meeting, _____ had assisted in drafting a request to _____ for materials re the "Russian involvement" issue. In response, the _____ made available to HPSCI over one-thousand documents, some of which were maintained in a read-room at _____. According to _____, the _____'s production of materials was facilitated at least in part by one _____. In spite of his involvement with drafting the request, _____ advised that he did not want access to the requested information. Later, around April 2017, a read-room was

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 12/05/2017, Page 3 of 5

[REDACTED] established at [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] materials were made available to committee members and certain staff—though [REDACTED] again recused himself from viewing these materials. Within HPSCI's minority staff, a "Russia team" was established, which initially consisted of [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. The team would visit [REDACTED] view the [REDACTED] materials, and return to HPSCI's offices where they would immediately compose summaries on a stand-alone computer. This stand-alone computer, which was set up by the committee's network administrator, [REDACTED], was situated in one of the backrooms in the HPSCI office space. Though the room itself was accessible to all staffers, the stand-alone computer was reserved for use only by the Russia team members. After the team would return from the read room and compose their notes, they would brief certain other staffers, including [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and SCHIFF's communications director, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not included in these briefings.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] noted concerns he had about various staffers who were briefed the Russia matter. [REDACTED] was brought to the committee by [REDACTED], and the two developed a close relationship, often traveling together and meeting privately. After [REDACTED] left the committee in the summer of 2017, [REDACTED] acknowledged that the two stayed in contact and discussed matters involving HPSCI. [REDACTED] felt that [REDACTED] functioned as [REDACTED]'s insider at the committee and, on at least one occasion, [REDACTED] warned [REDACTED] that committee rules prohibited communication between former staffers on official matters. This continued correspondence was particularly alerting given [REDACTED]'s previous concerns with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] recalled a particular incident that occurred shortly after [REDACTED] joined the HPSCI staff. In the aim of facilitating [REDACTED]'s transition, [REDACTED] shared certain information with [REDACTED] concerning a sensitive intelligence matter for which the committee exercised oversight. Upon receiving the information, [REDACTED] insisted to [REDACTED] that the information must be shared with a particular foreign government. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that the information could not be shared and [REDACTED] reported the incident to HPSCI's [REDACTED], [REDACTED]. Before [REDACTED] left the committee, [REDACTED] overheard [REDACTED] tell other staffers on more than one occasion that he would use his spouse's phone to make calls, which [REDACTED] believed was a purposeful measure to conceal his activity.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of _____, On 12/05/2017, Page 4 of 5

(U//FOUO) _____ was also uncomfortable with _____'s involvement with the Russia briefings, as _____ believed that _____ did not have the appropriate clearance to be briefed on the matter. _____, whose desk was located just outside the backroom in which _____'s briefings were held, noted that _____ was always coming and going and, after one such briefing, heard SCHIFF ask whether _____ "was on board." _____ believed that the other communications staff were upset with _____ because of his involvement with leaks to the press. _____ viewed _____ as an orchestrator of the leaks and even heard _____ remark that he was able to tell who had provided certain pieces of information to the press.

(U//FOUO) In or around April 2017, _____ had become very uncomfortable with the rampant leaking and, having already raised the issue with _____, he contacted _____, who previously served as the _____'s Inspector General. _____ put _____ in touch with _____ (LNU), the acting _____ IG, which precipitated _____'s _____ meeting with the FBI. Around the same time, a particular leak caused _____ to confront HPSCI on the issue. According to _____, a particularly sensitive document made available by _____ viewed by a small contingent of staff, as well as SCHIFF and Representative ERIC SWALWELL. Within 24 hours, the information appeared in the news almost verbatim and _____ officials descended upon HPSCI's offices, threatening to stop providing information unless the leaking ended. _____ suspected that SWALWELL played a role in the leak and noted that SWALWELL previously had been warned to be careful because he had a reputation for leaking classified information. As HPSCI's focus on the Russia matter continued, _____ remained isolated from all Russia briefings. _____ and _____ were also excluded from the meetings, and _____ feared that she might lose her job.

(U//FOUO) _____ was certain that SCHIFF was behind the February 2017 meeting during which _____ instructed the staff to collect information from the USIC for purposes of making it public. _____, who considers SCHIFF a friend, asserted that it was SCHIFF's plan to release classified information in order to compel public opinion, which SCHIFF justified as a response to a constitutional crisis. Even the other committee members acknowledged SCHIFF's involvement. _____ cited a particular business meeting for which he was present along with SCHIFF and Representatives JIM HIMES, JACKIE SPEIER, MIKE QUIGLEY, and JOE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 12/05/2017, Page 5 of 5

HECK. HIMES asked SCHIFF, *what is your strategy, why are you going after Trump?* SCHIFF answered that it was the right thing to do, but followed by acknowledging that there was not enough for impeachment. SPEIER also questioned SCHIFF as to his strategy and reminded him that democrats were better off running against TRUMP than Vice President MIKE PENCE.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] provided various other insights into the minority staffers. At some point during the summer of 2017, [REDACTED] was added to the staff and became part of the team that was briefed on the Russia matter. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] all believed their conduct was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, though [REDACTED] tried to advise them otherwise. In addition to [REDACTED]'s [REDACTED] his spouse's phone, [REDACTED] noted three "cut-outs" through which classified information might be leaked to the press: (i) [REDACTED] relaying information to [REDACTED], (ii) [REDACTED] divulging information to her husband, a reporter for the BALTIMORE SUN who has worked with [REDACTED] of the WASHINGTON POST, and (iii) [REDACTED] through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] journalists were in [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] a story broke in order to confirm final details, sometimes calling around 3:30 - 5:00 pm if a story was posting that evening. As such, [REDACTED] believed that call-chain analysis would indicate the source(s) of leaked material. [REDACTED] also advised that [REDACTED] in particular liked to use the phrase "elections have consequence" and [REDACTED] believed that articles including that phrase could be a reference to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] felt that of the staffers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the least experienced with intelligence matters, and [REDACTED] suggested that [REDACTED] was the most likely to misstate information related to intelligence collection methods. Finally, [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] had functioned as the [REDACTED] monitor, while [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] monitor.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 09/21/2017

(U) [REDACTED] (PROTECT IDENTITY), social security account number [REDACTED], was interviewed at Bullfeathers Restaurant 410 First Street SE, Washington D.C. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent, the nature of the interview, and executing a non-disclosure agreement, [REDACTED] provided the information summarized below:

(U) By way of background, circa October 2016, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Staff Member House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), was told by various HPSCI staff colleagues if Hillary Clinton were to win the election Representative Adam Schiff (D - California) would be offered the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As such, [REDACTED] opined Schiff had reasons to support Clinton beyond his political affiliation. At that time normal partisan politics continued at HPSCI but there was no significant problem with regards to leaking classified information.

(U) Things changed after the election. Schiff believed Russia hijacked the election and the United States was in the middle of a constitutional crisis. Classified information began leaking to the media. The Democratic minority leadership of HPSCI was aware of the leaks but was under the impression that leaking the information was one way to topple the administration and fix the constitutional crisis.

(U) The leaks were driven from the top; they were structured and intentional. The message conveyed to the staff was the U.S. was facing a constitutional crisis and something needed to be done. While [REDACTED] had no information indicating Schiff was directing the leaks, he opined Schiff was aware it was going on and provided tacit approval.

(U) On February 13, 2017 during a weekly staff meeting, and later in the day at the Committee's "Hot Spots" meeting, [REDACTED], HPSC [REDACTED], advised the minority staff he wanted to drive the "Russian Involvement" issue into a Joint Inquiry "similar to the 9/11 Commission." He instructed the staff to use any sources they had

Investigation on 08/02/2017 at Washington , District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 08/04/2017

by [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) , On 08/02/2017 , Page 2 of 5

developed within the Intelligence Community to gather facts. [REDACTED] stated he wanted to make the information public and use the media to compel public opinion to bring about the Joint Inquiry.

(U) During the Hot Spots meeting, [REDACTED] approached [REDACTED] and asked [REDACTED] to reach out to his friends at the [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) and find out what they have about Lt. General Michael Flynn's contacts with the Russians. [REDACTED] advised the information would likely reside with law enforcement and recommended [REDACTED] ask another staffer, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to give it a try, to which [REDACTED] advised he would do his best and let the issue drop. [REDACTED] never reached out to contacts at [REDACTED] for information regarding Flynn.

(U) [REDACTED] reported his concerns about the meetings and private conversation with [REDACTED] to HPSCI Security Director, [REDACTED]. He subsequently discussed all the leaks that appeared to come out of HPSCI with [REDACTED]. Since having those conversations with [REDACTED] has become marginalized on the HPSCI staff.

(U) When asked about the Flynn contacts, [REDACTED] opined everything is directed at Trump and trying to get him impeached. Flynn just happened to be the issue of the day.

(U) HPSCI personnel contacted [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and requested the number of documents the agencies had related to President Trump. The staff wanted to know how many of these documents were masked. They planned to request the unmasking of the individuals and then deal with them.

(U) HPSCI put together a team of three people, the Russian Team, to read the aforementioned documents. The team and, at times, a Representative went to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to review the documents. They were not allowed to take notes or retain the documents; the documents would remain at the respective agencies. The team would come back and brief the broader group of HPSCI staff and Congressional members of HPSCI.

(U) The Russian Team was comprised of [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] were part of the broader team which received briefings from the others upon their return. [REDACTED], a new hire, subsequently joined the team.

(U) HPSCI'S Russian investigation is comprised of a review of a specific set of documents located at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The documents at [REDACTED] are compartmentalized. The number of documents at [REDACTED] is in the triple digits. [REDACTED] Legal Affairs, [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) and [REDACTED], facilitated pulling the documents.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) _____, On 08/02/2017, Page 3 of 5

(U) _____ documents are kept in a _____ room designated for congressional review and a bigot list is kept of the individuals who review the documents. _____ did not know who pulled the _____ documents.

(U) HPSCI attorneys _____ and _____ requested the unmaking of the identities of US persons in the documents.

(U) One _____ document contained very specific reporting and only three people from HPSCI (possible two staff- _____ and _____ - and one House member - Rep. Eric Swalwell (D - California)) read it. The document was read right before the Fourth of July recess, sometime late June to early July. Within twenty four hours of HPSCI reviewing the document the information contained in the document appeared in the press. Subsequently, _____'S G _____ went to HPSCI and read them the riot act about the disclosure.

(U) _____ noted Swalwell has been the source of a lot of leaked information and had to be counseled to be more careful.

(U) Approximately six weeks ago the Russian Team plus some HPSCI attorneys and other minority staff members held a meeting. _____ was told he did not need to attend. _____ opined that she, _____ and _____ were being pushed out because they were not providing the leadership with what it wanted; i.e. "dirt." Additionally, _____ opined he was seen as a threat because he would not put up with the leaking and has addressed the issue to staff and HPSCI security on many occasions.

(U) Over the past week or two _____, Schiff's communications director, not a member of Russian team, has been briefed on whatever the Russian Team has been learning from their classified document review. According to _____, _____ did not hold a security clearance.

(U) _____ opined the HPSCI staff feels it is doing nothing wrong by leaking because they are being told they are in the middle of a constitutional crisis. Some feel they are protected under the speech and debate clause. _____ has counseled members that the speech and debate clause only applies to congressional members not staff.

(U) There has been some dissent among congressional members with regards to the Russian issue. Representative Jim Himes (D. - Connecticut) asked Schiff, if based on all the documents he (Schiff) had seen, did he think there was enough evidence for conviction. Schiff replied probably not. Himes then asked if there was enough evidence for impeachment, to which Schiff replied probably not.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U)

, On 08/02/2017 , Page 4 of 5

(U) In the last year leading up to the election, [REDACTED] brought a new staffer, [REDACTED], to the committee. [REDACTED] travelled extensively with [REDACTED] and for all intents and purposes functioned as his aide. [REDACTED] gave [REDACTED] access to classified information even though [REDACTED] was not cleared. On one occasion [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] with a spiral notebook which contained classified codenames. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] about the notebook and [REDACTED] advised it was no big deal, took the book and left. [REDACTED] opined while [REDACTED] liked and wanted to mentor [REDACTED], he ([REDACTED]) also wanted someone to reach back to a HPSCI to get information once he the committee.

(U) Within two weeks of [REDACTED] leaving the committee for private industry, he wrote an article on Cyber and 702 authority. The HPSCI staff saw the article and were talking about it when [REDACTED] said he had talked to [REDACTED] a couple of days prior to the article being published and helped [REDACTED] with the article. [REDACTED] counseled [REDACTED] on the contact due to [REDACTED] being on a one year time out from contacting any HPSCI member or staff.

(U) [REDACTED] spelled out the three potential pathways he believed were responsible for leaks of classified information originating out of HPSCI:

1. [REDACTED]: He sits in on the Russian briefings after the Russian Team reads documents at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. It is likely he tells [REDACTED] what he learned and [REDACTED] takes it to the media.
2. [REDACTED]: She is married to a reporter for the Baltimore Sun. Supposedly, he does not do any intelligence reporting; however he had a job lined up at the on-line news site Politico that subsequently fell through. [REDACTED]'s spouse has worked with Ellen Nakishima of the Washington Post. He is currently pursuing reporting jobs in D.C. as they live in Capitol Hill. He does not like the commute to Baltimore. [REDACTED] opined [REDACTED] provided information to her husband who had brokered it out to other reporters.
3. [REDACTED]: A. He has had contact with a woman reporter at the Intercept. He has talked about working with her and being frustrated she changed a story and did not do as he told her to do. B. [REDACTED] also appears to be close to Dan LNU from NBC who calls the office on a regular basis. If he is around, [REDACTED] takes Dan's calls; C. Finally, [REDACTED] also provides information he received as part of the Russian Team to [REDACTED], who should not be receiving the information because he is not cleared.

(U) [REDACTED] advised it is likely the leaks are being conducted through cutouts. He believed some individuals may be using their spouse's phones to contact the media. [REDACTED] noted [REDACTED] has made calls from Schiff's office, thereby having some cover for his activities.

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) [REDACTED], On 08/02/2017, Page 5 of 5

(U) Deputy Chief of Staff [REDACTED] is aware of the leaks. She is smart enough to never be a source but would do anything to defend Schiff. The staff believes Schiff will eventually be a Senator or President and plan to ride his coat tails to better career opportunities.

(U) On July 31, 2017 two FBI agents were on the hill conducting a background investigation with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] appeared shook up after the interview. On August 01, 2017 [REDACTED] took two HPSCI attorneys into [REDACTED]'s office. Upon their departure [REDACTED] overheard [REDACTED] state "if they try that it is going to be worse than Watergate." (NFI)

(U) [REDACTED] did not go to FBI Congressional liaison personnel with this information because he believes they are too embedded with HPSCI staff and cannot trust them to do the right thing. Rather he approached a trusted contact at the [REDACTED]'S Office of Inspector General, advised him of the situation, and noted he would be willing to discuss the matter with interested investigators.