



U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

July 17, 2020

The Honorable Lindsey Graham
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Marco Rubio
Acting Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark Warner
Ranking Member
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice (Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

As we described in our letter of February 7, 2020, the Attorney General has determined that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). We began to provide such documents to you on February 7. A twelfth production is enclosed herein, Bates numbered SENATE-FISA2020-001106 to SENATE-FISA2020-001167. This submission contains a February 9, 2017 Electronic Communication and an annotated *New York Times* news article. The attached production is unclassified in its current format.


Pursuant to longstanding Department policy, the Department has made redactions relating to certain personally identifiable information or to ongoing investigations, enforcement activities, and certain law enforcement operations, methods, or techniques.

Today's submission, along with forthcoming productions of additional documents, is based on extraordinary and unique circumstances, and should not be construed as precedent setting in any regard. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

The Honorable Lindsey Graham
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
The Honorable Marco Rubio
The Honorable Mark Warner
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We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.

Sincerely,



Stephen E. Boyd
Assistant Attorney General

Enclosures



OFFICIAL RECORD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource

Date: 02/09/2017

From: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - CD1

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DRAGON [REDACTED]
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE FURY
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource . Primary Subsource was interviewed for three days, this is a consolidated write-up of the interview.

Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple
Sources
Declassify On: 20421231

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Info from Primary Subsource
2. (U) Proffer Agreement signed by Primary Subsource

Details:

[REDACTED]

Declassified by FBI - C58W88B61
on 7/16/2020
This redacted version only

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

[REDACTED] During the course of three days, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was interviewed in the FBI's Washington's Field office (WFO) by FBI personnel along with attorneys from the US Department of Justice, National Security Division. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was accompanied by his attorney Primary Subsource' Attorney [REDACTED]. Below is a consolidated write-up of the three days of interviews.

24 January 2017 (1330 - 1700)

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

Primary Subsource [REDACTED], interviewee

Primary Subsource's Attorney [REDACTED], interviewee's attorney

FBI Agent [REDACTED], FBI Special Agent [REDACTED]

FBI SIA [REDACTED], FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Chief, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Primary Subsource Background

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was born in the SIA [REDACTED] city SIA [REDACTED] on SIA [REDACTED]. He describes his family as SIA [REDACTED] which included SIA [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] completed his high school course in SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED]. He indicated that his SIA [REDACTED] is probably tied [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

to the fact that SIA was a SIA city. During his high school years, he traveled to the SIA for SIA and was also an SIA. SIA, he attended a high school in SIA. In SIA, he also spent some weeks in SIA which at that time was SIA."

(U//FOUO) For university, Primary Subsource attended SIA between SIA, at which time he graduated with a degree SIA. Primary Subsource began work during and after college with a number of Russian SIA. He worked for SIA (SIA), SIA. While with SIA, he made friends with a number of individual in the field of SIA. He was also employed by a SIA company, SIA, during which time he traveled SIA. Also, during and immediately after his time at SIA, he traveled SIA with an SIA and served as a facilitator. The SIA is associated with the Library of Congress, and during SIA, he assisted and traveled with the delegation SIA and other cities in the SIA.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource desire had always been to obtain a graduate degree in the United States. He applied to a number of schools, and received the best - and one of the only - offers from the SIA. He said that his choice of SIA didn't involve SIA, but it just happened that the school gave him a full fellowship for his SIA studies in SIA. He graduated from SIA and wanted to stay and work in the SIA, with the hope of getting his Ph.D. He eventually was accepted not to a SIA, but to SIA

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

[REDACTED] program with a focus on SIA and SIA (as he described it, SIA [REDACTED]). During and after his time at SIA, Primary Subsource worked at the SIA in varying ranks - SIA; [REDACTED]. He worked on research projects for SIA and SIA. [ANALYST NOTE: Later in the debriefing, Primary Subsource attorney asked if we'd all heard about Primary Subsource work on uncovering [REDACTED]. We indicated that we had, and that it was our understanding that he had done that work with SIA. Primary Subsource confirmed that.]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that he soon hit a glass ceiling at SIA because of his SIA and his lack of a SIA. At that time, he was also SIA SIA [REDACTED], who was SIA and was noted as SIA on his SIA. He left SIA circa SIA, stayed SIA in SIA and began to try his hand at independent consulting. For a time, he did various analytical pieces on [REDACTED] with SIA. In time, some of the work moved into the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Primary Subsource says that he saw opportunities to use his existing network of friends and colleagues in the United States and Russia - e.g. high school SIA; SIA [REDACTED], SIA, SIA. In SIA, he began work for SIA, again doing research and analysis and due diligence work. At SIA, he served as the SIA, which meant that he directed others in doing business intelligence on various topics/sub-regions, including SIA. He helped analysts under him figure out how to best handle assignments and talk to clients. He also put together weekly, bi-weekly and monthly reports. Primary Subsource worked for [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

SIA through the summer of SIA, at which time SIA parent company went bankrupt and SIA.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource described his travel to [REDACTED] up through the SIA period as sporadic and personal. He took a trip back to [REDACTED] during SIA in order to do research for his SIA. The rest of his trips SIA during this time - which he said took place every SIA years or so - were centered on SIA, SIA and celebrating New Year's.

II. Primary Subsource Early Relationship and Eventual Employment with Christopher Steele and Orbis Business Intelligence

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource first met Christopher Steele [hereafter Steele] in the mid-to-late SIA. The introduction was brokered through SIA, who, according to Primary Subsource, SIA with Steele's SIA. In the period that Primary Subsource was looking for work, following the end of his tenure at SIA, SIA was involved with helping Primary Subsource to try and find new employment opportunities. SIA found out that Steele was setting up a new business, Orbis, and that he was on the lookout for analytical help. SIA suggested that Primary Subsource might consider looking at Orbis, and helped to broker an email introduction to Steele. According to Primary Subsource this was just one of the companies SIA helped to broker introductions.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource met in person with Steele at a Starbucks in [REDACTED]. They met for about an hour in the coffee shop, and then went to Steele's hotel, where they sat and talked for about 30 minutes. Primary Subsource said that they really didn't talk in-depth about Primary Subsource background, but rather discussed Primary Subsource basic biographical

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

information, his contacts/network, and his connections in SIA [REDACTED]. No work was offered at this time, but Steele said that "If we [Orbis] get a project, we'll get in touch."

(U//FOUO) In circa [REDACTED], Steele contacted Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and asked that he fulfill a project - an open source analysis of what Primary Subsource [REDACTED] thought were three of the best sectors of low-risk investment. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] wrote a few pages, highlighting risks and opportunities, and submitted them to Steele. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] still wasn't sure at this time what Orbis' primary focus was - he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that it was not clear if it was about due diligence and business intelligence. For the short risk assessment report, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was paid a few hundred dollars, direct-deposited into his account. He said he was very appreciative of this, because he didn't really have an income at this time.

(U//FOUO) Later in SIA [REDACTED], Steele told him that he had read and liked his risk assessment and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was formally brought on board with Orbis. He signed a confidentiality agreement, which he didn't think twice about signing because it was fairly standard - he compared it to the types of paperwork he signed at SIA [REDACTED], including sexual harassment policy, etc. All contact with Steele was being done at this time via email and Skype. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] signed the confidentiality agreement, scanned it, and sent it back to Steele via email. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not sign a "non-compete" agreement with Orbis, and he described his work with Orbis initially as "[REDACTED] work" and "[REDACTED] projects" as he was still with SIA [REDACTED]. Orbis was just part of his overall portfolio at this time.

(U//FOUO) Initially, his work with Orbis was in the open source sphere.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

He did not have any visibility into Orbis' end clients. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource commented that during his time with Orbis, he has always been trying to understand the tangible results of his work - [REDACTED] Primary Subsource attorney added that his client, "never asked, and was never told [about final clients]." The project requirements were always kept vague with few concrete parameters - e.g. "Can you do some checking on this?" Also, initially with Orbis, his sole contact was with Steele. He was in email and Skype communication with Steele and was informally introduced to other Orbis employees during Skype calls, but [REDACTED] Primary Subsource was never flown out to the UK to meet with Steele and the Orbis team.

(U//FOUO) In [REDACTED] SIA, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource had his first Orbis-financed trip [REDACTED]. His specific project involved inquires about a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [which [REDACTED] Primary Subsource did not name] and the company's owner, which he described as a former Russian senator and Duma deputy. It was a due diligence assignment, and he was meant to look for company/management links to organized crime and Russia's regional and federal power structures. For this, he was wired \$3,000. He used \$1,500 to purchase a round-trip ticket, and \$1,500 to cover expenses for the trip. He used his existing contacts and daisy-chained from them to try to identify others with relevant information. For example, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource explained, he would use pre-existing contacts to find out if anyone he knew had worked in public relations or advertising for a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource did not pay anyone for information, and reported back to Steele verbally either via Skype or in-person in London.

(U//FOUO) In circa [REDACTED] SIA, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource traveled for the [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] in his life [REDACTED]. It was both a personal trip and a business trip. Orbis paid for the trip, and during his time in the UK, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource met Steele - "for the second or third time in my life" - and [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

also introduced to other Orbis employees, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], about whom Primary Subsource described as an analyst who had graduated from an English university. Primary Subsource described the time with Orbis as "general meetings, [pitching] potential projects, and discussing general rumors about Putin and Putin's new third term as president. There was talk about what the "biggest rumors" or the "biggest compromising info" regarding the Russian government was.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource could not remember exactly when he had first learned that Steele was a former intelligence officer. He thought it was around 2012 or 2013. He couldn't remember if someone told him that fact, someone mentioned it, or if it was just "common knowledge" that he had picked up over time. [ANALYST NOTE: In discussing his knowledge of Steele's former intelligence service employment, Primary Subsource remarked that he didn't really care to know such things and wanted to "stay out of the government's business" - to which his attorney said, "Well, you haven't done a very good job of that."]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource continued to work on a number of projects for Orbis on all kinds of subjects, including Russian leadership, banking, and the SIA. He would provide reports every month or every other month.

(U//FOUO) Through Primary Subsource, SIA and Orbis were in a contractual relationship, and it was Primary Subsource hope that SIA would result in SIA and Primary Subsource eventual ability to get a security clearance and set up his own business. However, with the SIA bankruptcy of SIA parent company - and the subsequent closing of SIA itself - Primary Subsource found himself in a difficult situation, SIA. He

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

needed an entity to SIA [REDACTED] - and as Orbis couldn't do it [as Primary Subsource [REDACTED] attorney put it, because Orbis was a British company] - Primary Subsource [REDACTED] went to a friend, SIA [REDACTED] who is the SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED] was receptive about bringing Primary Subsource [REDACTED] on board with SIA [REDACTED] but said that they could only help him out if he had a source of income. At that point, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] introduced Steele and SIA [REDACTED] and a formal arrangement was set up between Orbis and SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED] served as the "contract vehicle" through which Primary Subsource [REDACTED] would be paid a monthly salary for his work for Orbis. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] became a salaried employee of SIA [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED] his SIA [REDACTED]. Out of the approximately SIA [REDACTED] people employed at SIA [REDACTED] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was the only one - as far as he knows - who was working solely for Orbis, and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] believes that only SIA [REDACTED] knows of his work for Orbis. Prior to this arrangement, the only paperwork tie between Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and Orbis was through the banking/wire transactions, but after this, the only regular paperwork tie would be between Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he received after deductions, etc. about SIA [REDACTED] in cash/month. [ANALYST NOTE: Primary Subsource [REDACTED] also gave a figure of SIA [REDACTED] /month, but is not clear how much SIA [REDACTED] charges Orbis for Primary Subsource [REDACTED] services, which would indicate the profit SIA [REDACTED] makes from Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Orbis-related work.] Since Primary Subsource [REDACTED] is on a monthly salary with SIA [REDACTED], Steele can reach out directly, give assignments and direct his Primary Subsource [REDACTED] travel.

III. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Policies and Procedures While Traveling Abroad for Orbis; Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Services

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked how he "covers" his queries with his [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

sources. He typically tells his sources that he is working on a research project or an analytical product. He was also asked if there were friends, associates and/or sources who knew that he was collecting information for Orbis. He said "yes and no," and explained that some of his closer friends understand that he works in the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Many of them think that he is doing projects for entities like SIA [REDACTED], the SIA [REDACTED], or think tanks SIA [REDACTED]. They don't know that he works for Orbis, as he signed a non-disclosure agreement and told not to talk about the company. He has never mentioned Chris Steele or Orbis to his friends and associates. He emphasized that "you [the FBI] are the first people he's told."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if he takes notes on the information he is collecting from his sources, or if he keeps any kind of records. He was told by Steele that it is a security risk to take notes; he hasn't kept notes or electronic records. He occasionally makes scribbles and/or chicken scratch notes here and there, but gives verbal debriefs in SIA [REDACTED] following his trips SIA [REDACTED]. Altogether, with respect to the election-related reporting, he had three trips SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED]. He also had one additional United Kingdom trip. While SIA [REDACTED], he was primarily SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] had no communications with Steele while SIA [REDACTED]. He was always advised by Steele that they were not to have communications, or to minimize communications, saving them for only emergency or urgent matters.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) During the conversation about Source 1 [REDACTED] [see below], Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if Orbis had ever asked him to broker direct contact with one of his Primary Subsource [REDACTED] sources, or whether Orbis was comfortable keeping Primary Subsource [REDACTED] as the intermediary between the sources and the company. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] indicated that Orbis has always kept him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] as the intermediary.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] indicated that, to his knowledge, he has not had any contacts with the Russian intelligence or security services. [ANALYST NOTE: His attorney emphasized "to his knowledge" during this part of the discussion.] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he had contacts with Russian government officials SIA [REDACTED], as he said, in the SIA [REDACTED] - but he denied any contact - again, "as far as he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] knew," with anyone in the SVR, GRU or FSB.

IV. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Initial US Election-Related Assignments for Orbis

(U//FOUO) Around March 2016, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and Chris Steele had a voice conversation during which time Steele asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to see what he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could find out about Paul Manafort, including his reputation in the United States, his connections to the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine, and any corruption ties. He related some of Steele's collection-related questions - "Do you know [about] Manafort? Find out about Manafort's dealings with Ukraine, his dealings with other countries, and any corrupt schemes [to which Manafort is connected]." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he was "clueless" about who Manafort was, and that this was a "strange task" to have been given. It was strange because Primary Subsource [REDACTED] had not done US-related projects for Orbis before, and he was a bit uncomfortable working on a topic dealing with SIA [REDACTED]. Steele did not give him a tight deadline on this assignment. At this

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

point, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was on salary with Orbis through SIA [REDACTED], and there was no difference in financial remuneration for this assignment. He had no inclinations as to why, or for whom, Steele was asking about Manafort. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] carefully asked around some of his SIA [REDACTED] friends. He said he may have asked friends and contacts in Russia, but he couldn't remember off-hand. He added that, for this topic, his friends and contacts in Russia couldn't say very much because they were "too far removed" from the matter. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] recalled that he was able to find articles about Manafort's ties to Ukraine and the Philippines. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reported some of the findings on this assignment to Steele using SIA [REDACTED], a secure messenger app, which he has used, in addition to Skype, for communicating with Steele.

(U//FOUO) In the last week of SIA [REDACTED], Primary Subsource [REDACTED] took an Orbis-related trip SIA [REDACTED]. He was working primarily on a business intelligence matter - a SIA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. For this trip, Chris also asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to look for information dealing with the US presidential election, including compromising materials on Donald Trump. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said he could not remember if Steele had asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to ask around for compromising materials on just Trump, or Trump and Hillary Clinton - at which point Primary Subsource [REDACTED] attorney indicated that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] had told him [the attorney] previously that it had been both presidential candidates. The request did not shock Primary Subsource [REDACTED], but it was - again - outside the normal scope of work and it wasn't completely comfortable for him. Like the Manafort assignment, it was not really a Russia-specific job and it involved, indirectly, his SIA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. He was nervous and cautious when asking around about the topic in Russia, but he felt like he had to report something back to Steele about it. Steele did not place any higher priority on the

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED] 02/09/2017

election-related requirements; it was still a side effort to the SIA [REDACTED]. It was, to Primary Subsource [REDACTED], "unpleasant," but he made inquiries and had a few election-related conversations, but it wasn't the main focus of his trip.

V. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Contacts on his SIA [REDACTED] Trip SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 2 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 2 [REDACTED] is in SIA [REDACTED], probably around [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has known Source 2 [REDACTED] for about SIA [REDACTED] years. They first met at a SIA [REDACTED]. They were together at the SIA [REDACTED] and struck it off well. He is now a good friend. Source 2 [REDACTED] comes from a SIA [REDACTED] and, more distantly, SIA [REDACTED]. Source 2 [REDACTED] himself is a SIA [REDACTED], and a SIA [REDACTED]. He runs his own Facebook page, and has served as SIA [REDACTED] of two different SIA [REDACTED]. He is SIA [REDACTED]. He has been Primary Subsource [REDACTED] source of information regarding economic sanctions, and actions taken by SIA [REDACTED] - a friend of Source 2 [REDACTED] knows a SIA [REDACTED] handling the company's public and governmental relations (PR/GR). Another of Source 2 [REDACTED] close friends works as a SIA [REDACTED]. Source 2 [REDACTED] is an avid SIA [REDACTED]. He often tries to monetize his relationship with Primary Subsource [REDACTED], suggesting that the two of them should try and do projects together for money. Source 2 [REDACTED] told Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that there was compromising material on Trump.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Source 3 [REDACTED] was born in SIA [REDACTED]. She is a close, personal friend to Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. She is originally from SIA [REDACTED], and then SIA [REDACTED]. They have been friends since [the equivalent of] the 8th grade SIA [REDACTED] - SIA [REDACTED]. Upon reflection, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] corrected himself, indicating that she had been a year behind him in the SIA [REDACTED]. She moved SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED], where she worked in the SIA [REDACTED] field. She did a bit of SIA [REDACTED], worked in SIA [REDACTED], and also SIA [REDACTED]. She went to the SIA [REDACTED] [ANALYST NOTE: what is now called SIA [REDACTED], where she took SIA [REDACTED] as her first language, SIA [REDACTED] as her second language, and also studied SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] added that Source 3 [REDACTED] family has a vacation home in SIA [REDACTED]. Source 3 [REDACTED] worked for SIA [REDACTED], SIA [REDACTED]. In the SIA [REDACTED], Source 3 [REDACTED] moved to SIA [REDACTED], where she served as SIA [REDACTED]. For about a year now, Source 3 [REDACTED] has lived in SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he was not exactly sure what she does now in SIA [REDACTED], but she has done SIA [REDACTED] and works SIA [REDACTED] a Russian SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 3 [REDACTED] and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] have remained friends for many years. Her SIA [REDACTED] helped him financially years ago - he would borrow money from her SIA [REDACTED], and her SIA [REDACTED] wouldn't ask for repayment. More recently, he has helped out Source 3 [REDACTED] financially - probably around SIA [REDACTED] over the last SIA [REDACTED] years.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 [REDACTED] has a vast network of people who are employed in the SIA [REDACTED]. Through Source 3 [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED], Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has been able to collect

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

information for Orbis across a wide range of topics - major Russian firms; Russian state entities, including the Kremlin. Source 3 "big connection" - though Primary Subsource emphasized that it is not necessarily her direct contact - is SIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Source 3 may have met him in person, but she knows a couple of SIA [REDACTED] who have good access to SIA [REDACTED] and upon whom SIA [REDACTED] has relied to get out his own messaging. Primary Subsource wasn't sure, but he thought these contacts may include SIA [REDACTED] who Primary Subsource met while he was at SIA [REDACTED] and who used to head SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Through Source 3, Primary Subsource has also become good friends with the SIA [REDACTED], who was assaulted in Russia for SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 3 is one of the individuals who knows that Primary Subsource works for due diligence and business intelligence. [As an aside at this point, Primary Subsource insisted that Source 2 probably has a better idea about this than does Source 3 because Source 2 is always trying to monetize his relationship with Primary Subsource. Primary Subsource reiterated again to the interviewers that Source 2 will often pitch money-making ideas or projects - "Let's work together. I Source 2 can try and get SIA [REDACTED] to answer a question, but I'll need some money to do it."] Source 3 has an understanding that Primary Subsource is "connected." In fact, either SIA [REDACTED] morning or SIA [REDACTED] morning, Source 3 reached out to Primary Subsource and asked him for help in SIA [REDACTED] on how SIA [REDACTED] living in the United States are viewing the Trump administration. She is asking him SIA [REDACTED] by the weekend, probably so she can sell it to a friend in Moscow.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Source 3 was one of the key sources for the "Trump dossier." She is directly quoted at points; however, Primary Subsource is not sure if she realizes that the quotations come from her. Right now, SIA [REDACTED]. She is keeping SIA [REDACTED] with her [REDACTED]. Source 3 used to work in the country of SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 4 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 4 is a SIA [REDACTED]. He is SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource met him while he was on an exchange scholar program at SIA [REDACTED] for about SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource spent a lot of time with Source 4 during Source 4 time in SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 4 specializes in regional politics, particularly SIA [REDACTED], but also addresses US-Russian relations, US elections, and a host of issues involving US-Russian competition and conflict, including SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 4 everyday job duties as a SIA [REDACTED] vary. One day, he could be SIA [REDACTED] for a visiting SIA [REDACTED]; the next day, he could be SIA [REDACTED] a large group of SIA [REDACTED]; while the next, he could be handling SIA [REDACTED]. At SIA [REDACTED], he also has contact with friends and associates in the SIA [REDACTED]. As Primary Subsource explained, it would not be uncommon for Source 4 to remark to Primary Subsource things like, "I just heard such-and-such from someone in the [REDACTED]"

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

SIA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED], " or "I just heard this from a Deputy Minister," or "I just overheard such-and-such about an issue."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and Source 4 [REDACTED] drink heavily together, and Source 4 [REDACTED] always looks forward to getting together with Source 4 [REDACTED] when Primary Subsource [REDACTED] is in town. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] knows that Source 4 [REDACTED] travels to SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 1 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has known Source 1 [REDACTED] since late SIA [REDACTED], when Source 1 [REDACTED] was part of a SIA [REDACTED]. He has visited both SIA [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED] as part of [REDACTED] visits to the United States. Source 1 [REDACTED] is about SIA [REDACTED] years old and comes from SIA [REDACTED], where he served in city and regional government positions, including SIA [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained that things did not work out well for Source 1 [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED], so he moved to SIA [REDACTED] and began working in the SIA [REDACTED] - particularly with respect to SIA [REDACTED]. From the SIA [REDACTED] Source 1 [REDACTED] worked for SIA [REDACTED]. Over the last few years, he had served in the capacity of SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 1 [REDACTED] background as a former SIA [REDACTED] means that, from a young age, he has been involved in political activities. He's been in some form of politics since he was a teenager. He is also a SIA [REDACTED] but Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could not recall if it was in economics, political science or philosophy. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has been taking politics with Source 1 [REDACTED] since his Primary Subsource [REDACTED] days as a SIA [REDACTED] at the SIA [REDACTED]. Now, they meet together whenever Primary Subsource [REDACTED] goes to SIA [REDACTED].

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Orbis knows more about Source 1 because, as a favor to Source 1, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reached out to Orbis to see if Orbis could help get Source 1 SIA [REDACTED] a scholarship for language courses in the United Kingdom. Source 1 asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] for assistance, and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] turned to Orbis for help. As part of this, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained who Source 1 was, and why he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asking Orbis for assistance.

(U//FOUO) Source 1 is always trying to get Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to start projects and make money together - Primary Subsource [REDACTED] related how Source 1, like others, is always asking questions like, "Can you get us some projects?" or "Can you get us financing?" or "Let's do something together dealing with SIA [REDACTED]!" Primary Subsource [REDACTED] doesn't consider this as his source "tasking him" but as simply the normal course and scope of networking in these circles. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did help Source 1 with an academic book about SIA [REDACTED]. He made about SIA [REDACTED] for his assistance with the academic book. For it, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] went to the Library of Congress, performed archival research, and also talked to academics he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] knew."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] knows that Source 1 travels to the SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 1 has a good relationship with Russian Intelligence Officer [REDACTED]. Source 1 considers Russian Intelligence Officer [REDACTED] a good friend, and he Source 1 hears, from Russian intelligence officer [REDACTED], many things about, and from, Russian intelligence officer [REDACTED] circles. From Source 1 relationship with Russian intelligence officer [REDACTED], Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has been able to collect information of interest to Orbis, including Russian domestic politics and more specialized subjects like SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] understands that Source 1 relationship with Russian intelligence officer [REDACTED] stems from Source 1 tenure in SIA [REDACTED]. There, Source 1 had contacts with the regional Federal Security Service (FSB),

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

as well as with individuals in the SIA [REDACTED] who were associated with politically-conservative and strongly Russian SIA [REDACTED] circles. It was through these connections that Source 1 [REDACTED] was introduced to [REDACTED] Russian intelligence officer.

Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if Source 1 [REDACTED] was a devout Orthodox believer - Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not believe so, but thought that he might have been at one time.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has never met [REDACTED] Russian intelligence officer. He's never been to one of [REDACTED] Russian intelligence officer, and said that he doesn't believe he's ever been in the same room as [REDACTED] Russian intelligence officer.

(U//FOUO) Source 5 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 5 [REDACTED] is an SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has met her in person, and they are also connected through [REDACTED]. They have been friends [REDACTED] for about SIA [REDACTED] years. They have many mutual SIA [REDACTED] friends. She is tied to Russia's SIA [REDACTED], and she has ties to the SIA [REDACTED], as well as ties to the Russian intelligence and security services. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] remarked that things have become "personal" between Source 5 [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED] because of stories that have been written [ANALYST NOTE: This may be a reference to the fact that in SIA [REDACTED]. The Carter Page-Sechin meeting references in the "Trump dossier" would have been derived from Source 5 [REDACTED].

VI. Dossier Report Number 2016/95

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to review Report 2016/95. This material was collected during the period where the [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

election-related theme was still a "side project." The election-related material became a much more important project in the July-August 2016 period.

(U//FOUO) This report involves reporting from "Source E" - reporting which Primary Subsource [REDACTED] ties, at least in part, to Source 6 [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] related the story about his contact with Source 6 [REDACTED]. In either late June or July 2016, SIA [REDACTED] - he reached out to USPER [REDACTED], a SIA [REDACTED] journalist for SIA [REDACTED]. He asked USPER [REDACTED] some of the same questions Orbis had tasked him with regarding Trump's Russian connections, and USPER [REDACTED] put him in contact with another of his USPER [REDACTED] colleagues, USPER 2 [REDACTED]. USPER [REDACTED] said that USPER 2 [REDACTED] had Source 6 [REDACTED] contact information, and that Source 6 [REDACTED] was someone with whom Primary Subsource [REDACTED] should speak. Source 6 [REDACTED] was, according to Primary Subsource [REDACTED], someone with whom "they" SIA [REDACTED] were talking. There was even talk about Primary Subsource [REDACTED] meeting up with USPER 2 [REDACTED] in person, but it did not happen.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reached out to Source 6 [REDACTED] via email twice. He never received a response from the first attempt, but after the second attempt, he received in circa late [REDACTED] 2016 a very strange phone call from a Russian male who he believed to be Source 6 [REDACTED], but who never identified himself. The individual on the other end of the call never identified himself. The two of them talked for a bit, and the two of them tentatively agreed to meet in person in US City [REDACTED] at the end of July. At the end of July, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] traveled with SIA [REDACTED] to US City [REDACTED], but the meeting never took place and no one ever called Primary Subsource [REDACTED] back. Altogether, he had only a single phone call with an individual he thought to be Source 6 [REDACTED]. The call was either a cellular

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

call, or it was a communication through a phone app. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] will look back at his phone to see if he can get caller information.

VII. Dossier Report Number 2016/94

(U//FOUO) This report involves the purported Carter Page meeting with Sechin, as well as the purported Carter Page meeting with Igor Diveykin. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] indicated that the sourcing for this report derives from his Primary Subsource [REDACTED] conversations with Source 5 [REDACTED] and Source 3 [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) As Primary Subsource [REDACTED] recalls, Carter Page was one of 4-5 names that Steele provided to Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. Carter Page, as Primary Subsource [REDACTED] relates, had his meetings in Moscow in early July 2016 - either the 6th through the 8th, or the 5th through the 9th. Source 5 [REDACTED] told Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that she had heard that Carter Page was going to meet with Sechin, and then later, in writing, Source 5 [REDACTED] confirmed that the Page-Sechin meeting had actually taken place. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he would confirm the date, time and circumstances under which Source 5 [REDACTED] confirmed to him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place. He will check his phone, but he recalls that he received the confirmation from Source 5 [REDACTED] via text in September 2016 when he was at SIA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was able to confirm that the Page-Sechin meeting took place through one of her contacts - SIA [REDACTED]. Altogether, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] summarized, Source 5 [REDACTED] told him about the Sechin-Page meeting, and then later confirmed via text that the meeting had taken place.

(U//FOUO) Source 5 [REDACTED] travels to the SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

VIII. Media Contact/Outreach to Primary Subsource

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource received two media inquiries on the dossier. One was from a specialized [REDACTED] journal, while the other was from [REDACTED]. He has not responded to either inquiry

25 January 2017

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

Primary Subsource, interviewee

[REDACTED], interviewee's attorney

[REDACTED], FBI Special Agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Recent Communication by Christopher Steele

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource reported that Christopher Steele had reached out to him today SIA [REDACTED]. He has not replied, but is planning to do so either tonight or tomorrow. His plan is to simply say that he has been meeting with his SIA [REDACTED].

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

II. Documents

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource brought three documents for the interviewers. The first was the Russian-language text interaction between Primary Subsource and Source 5 regarding the Sechin-Page meeting in July 2016. The second were copies of SIA profiles for Source 2, Source 1, Source 3, Source 5, and Source 4, with an added picture of a SIA belonging to Source 2. The third document was a copied pastiche of a number of profiles, business cards and pictures, which will be explained in further detail below.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #1, the text interaction between Source 5 and Primary Subsource, he explained that the date he had given yesterday was incorrect. The text interchange took place in SIA versus SIA, and it would have been during Primary Subsource's visit to SIA immediately following his SIA trip SIA. He was in SIA when they had the interaction. Interviewers indicated that it would be translated, but Primary Subsource wanted to point out that the Russian initials [which, transliterated into English would be I.I.S.] stand for Igor Ivanovich Sechin.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #2, these are pictures and profiles of the friends and associates in Primary Subsource's network discussed the previous day. Primary Subsource's attorney balked at the use of the term "network," stating that the preferred term was "social circle." One of the interviewers noted that Source 3's profile shows her as having studied at SIA.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #3, the following information was provided:

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) In the upper left hand corner, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] as the head of the Russian [REDACTED]. He has never met [REDACTED] and has never had direct interaction with him, but Source 2 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have direct contact. Source 2 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are on friendly terms.

(U//FOUO) Underneath [REDACTED] photo is a business card from [REDACTED], noted as Deputy Director, [REDACTED]. Underneath that business card is what appears to be a Windows Outlook references to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] work in the same office, and [REDACTED] may actually serve under [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said stood for SIA [REDACTED]. It was from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] heard about the fears and concerns among "[Dmitriy] Medvedev's people" about what the Kremlin was doing with respect to involvement in the US presidential election. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] remarked how the Russian influence issue was considered an "open secret" and that he was hearing similar stories from other sources - probably Source 3 [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Next to the Windows Outlook screenshot on [REDACTED] there is a list of pricing with the title, translated from Russian as "collection banknote United States.doc." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] attorney emphasized that he did not believe this represented anything illegal or illicit on the part of his client. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained this in reference to Source 2 [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and his interest in SIA [REDACTED]. During Primary Subsource [REDACTED] travel to SIA [REDACTED], he went to SIA [REDACTED] and, while there, withdrew bank notes from [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

a number of different bank ATMs SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Primary Subsource brought those notes
to Source 3, who would exchange the Scottish bank notes for
rubles - using the current exchange rate. As he remarked the
previous day, Source 2 is an SIA [REDACTED] and has been doing so
for decades. The pricing list is a "wish list." [As an aside,
Primary Subsource identified another of Source 2 friends, SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) In the upper right hand corner, Primary Subsource identified
Russian Government Employee [REDACTED]. She is currently serving as the head of SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], which is run by Russian Government Employee [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]
[ANALYST NOTE: This may be a misidentification. The head of
SIA [REDACTED], who in turn is
connected with Russian Government Employee [REDACTED]. In her position, Russian Government Employee [REDACTED] has
direct access to Russian Government Employee [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource said that he has not
used Russian Government Employee [REDACTED] as a source for the reports, but that they are
good friends and that he has known her for at least SIA [REDACTED] years.

III. Russian official [REDACTED], Russian official [REDACTED], Veterans Pension System, and
Dossier Report 2016/111, including Paragraph #5

(U//FOUO) Underneath the picture of Russian Government Employee [REDACTED] is a business card
belonging to Russian official [REDACTED], identified on the card as SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Primary Subsource
has known Russian official [REDACTED] for several years - SIA [REDACTED]. They were
together SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], during which time Primary Subsource recalls that he tried to
get conversation SIA [REDACTED] started about Ukraine and sanctions.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED] 02/09/2017

Primary Subsource first said that he knows that Russian official has been back in Russia since August 2016, but then thought a bit more and said, "maybe summer 2016." Primary Subsource described Russian official as "not a direct source, but he does appear in the [Trump] dossier." SIA

[REDACTED] . According to Primary Subsource, Russian official is the only person he Primary Subsource knows SIA . Primary Subsource believes that SIA but he isn't positive about that. He recalls that they had a conversation later in spring 2016 during which time Russian official said that he Russian official had "put in a word" and wondered if it had helped. They had a 5-10 minute chat [ANALYST NOTE: It is unclear if it was the same spring 2016 conversation or a later conversation] during which time Russian official confided in Primary Subsource that he Russian official was getting tired of doing what he wasn't really supposed to be doing in his job - SIA - and that he Russian official didn't want Russia "exposed" in the US election. It was Primary Subsource understanding that Russian official was moving back to Russia and hoped for an SIA .

(U//FOUO) As an aside while talking about Russian official , Primary Subsource explained that since his time at SIA , he has maintained distance from diplomats at the Russian Embassy. He and USPER had contact with a SIA secretary at the Embassy - a strange guy who was pestering them. They gave this individual open source information. Primary Subsource identified this individual as Russian official , SIA . Primary Subsource knew Russian official about SIA while Primary Subsource was working at SIA . Russian official asked for information about Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, and USPER recommended

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

that they keep him at a distance. Primary Subsource did talk to Russian official - he related to the interviewers that Russian official SIA [REDACTED]. [This was how, explained Primary Subsource, he picked up information about how the SIA [REDACTED].] Russian official had to travel to SIA [REDACTED] - sometimes driving and sometimes flying - to deliver cash SIA [REDACTED]. Russian official completely dropped off the map sometime around 2007-2008.

(U//FOUO) Looking at Report 2016/111, Primary Subsource was asked about the report's use of the descriptor, "a trusted compatriot." - as in paragraph one, "Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016..." Primary Subsource was asked if he was the "trusted compatriot" in these reports. Primary Subsource said that it might be him, but that it could also be others. Primary Subsource attorney then jumped in, stating that the "literary device" used by Steele in the dossier was not consistent and not clear, so he wanted to be careful about matching that descriptor to his client. Primary Subsource said that, to the best of his knowledge, he is not sure if he was the only one working on this issue for Orbis [and therefore he is not clear if he is always the "trusted compatriot" mentioned in the documents].

(U//FOUO) Interviewers drew Primary Subsource attention to paragraph 5 of the same report, where Mikhail Kalugin [written as Kulagin] is mentioned. Primary Subsource is not clear how this paragraph was put together. Primary Subsource indicated that no MFA official told him SIA [REDACTED] because of the election issue. About SIA [REDACTED] Primary Subsource knows that Primary Subsource that SIA [REDACTED] was his replacement - SIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Primary Subsource SIA [REDACTED]. Kalugin had described Bondarev as [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

"a bright young guy." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has no idea where the language in this paragraph regarding SIA [REDACTED] being "clean in this regard" (with respect to knowledge and involvement in US election matters SIA [REDACTED]).

IV. Dossier Report 2016/94

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraphs 1 and 2, interviewers went back over Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explanations from the previous day, particularly the issue of whether Primary Subsource [REDACTED] had heard from Source 5 [REDACTED] that the Page-Sechin meeting was going to happen, that it had happened, or both. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained that he didn't recall who had told him that the meeting was going to happen - it might have been through Source 5 [REDACTED], but the more he thought, the more he believed it was from someone else, and he couldn't recall who. He reported the meeting to Steele in July, and then, in October, he received Source 5 [REDACTED] text with the confirming information from someone SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] does not know the identity SIA [REDACTED] executive.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraph 3 on Carter Page's meeting with Igor Diveykin, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that this information came from Source 3 [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and Source 3 [REDACTED] had a phone conversation, or maybe Skype, but Primary Subsource [REDACTED] remembers that it was a voice communication which lasted about 30 minutes. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said it was during the summer, because he remembers having the conversation while was at the public swimming pool SIA [REDACTED] and "whatever" with SIA [REDACTED]. Source 3 [REDACTED] was relating information that she was hearing from her sources - Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not ask her about the identities of these sources. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could probably follow-up with Source 3 [REDACTED] about the sources, but he explained that he has no reason to doubt Source 3 [REDACTED]. He trusts Source 3 [REDACTED] 100%.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) On the Diveykin identification, this was the name her sources gave her. He was in the Domestic Policy entity and was one of the people in charge of US-Russia relations [ANALYST NOTE: Primary Subsource description was someone unclear here, because he added, "election-related stuff," but then went back to referring to it as "US-Russia relations."] Source 3 suggested that there was an attempt to masquerade things or craft a façade because "the folks who were in domestic policy were working external [foreign] policy, while the folks doing external were working domestic matters."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that, on the whole, his conversations with Source 3 were done in an opaque way, so as to be careful security-wise. Source 3 and Primary Subsource knew that when they talked, they were talking about the US election issue, but wouldn't necessarily refer to it.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] is the one who told Primary Subsource that the Russian government was sitting on "kompromat" as stated in paragraph 4.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource attorney stated that it was his client's assessment that this information from Source 3 was credible and accurate. It is Primary Subsource conclusion that the information in paragraph 3 came from his conversation with Source 3

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource is "inconclusive" about where exactly the information in paragraph 4 came from. He thinks he and Source 3 may have spoken about it - Source 3 is tied to both [REDACTED] and Ivanov - but he would not have described Source 3 as "an official close to Ivanov." When asked by interviewers how he Primary Subsource described Source 3 to

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED] 02/09/2017

Christopher Steele, Primary Subsource said that he described her as "my friend who knows someone in the Kremlin with direct/indirect access to Sergey Ivanov."

IV. Dossier Report 2016/134

(U//FOUO) The information in the first paragraph of this report came from Primary Subsource text interchange with Source 5 in October 2016.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was less conclusive about the construction of paragraph 2. The final sentence about the lifting of sanctions was taken from Source 5 text in October, but Source 5 never mentioned to Primary Subsource that Page had been offered any brokerage of the 19% Rosneft stake. There were speculations and "open secrets" about Rosneft and foreign offerings. For example, [REDACTED], an energy analyst and professor [ANALYST NOTE: This appears to be identical to [REDACTED] who as of [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of Russia's [REDACTED] [REDACTED] suggested in broad terms to Primary Subsource in SIA during the [REDACTED] that once sanctions were lifted, Rosneft could find itself in a "privileged" state. As an aside, Primary Subsource remarked that [REDACTED] is often dismissed intrinsically as being a Gazprom lobbyist.

V. Michael Cohen, Prague and Dossier Reports 2016/135, 2016/136, and 2016/166

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource began his explanation of the Prague and Michael Cohen-related reports by stating that Christopher Steele had given him 4-5 names to research for the election-related tasking. He could only remember three of the names: Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Cohen. When he talked to Source 3 in the fall of 2016 - he believes

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

it was a phone call - he rattled off these names and, out of them, he was surprised to hear that Source 3 immediately [later Primary Subsource softened this to "almost immediately"] recognized Cohen's name.

(U//FOUO) In Report 2016/135, Primary Subsource did not know the origins of paragraph 1. He said that it didn't come from him, and that he doesn't know where the information is from. He described it as "too general."

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2 of the same report (2016/135), Primary Subsource recognized material from his conversations with Source 3 in the middle of the paragraph. Source 3 had told Primary Subsource that Cohen and three other unidentified people had flown [or, as Primary Subsource put it later, "assumed they had flown"] into Prague in August-September 2016 and had met with a group from Russia. Primary Subsource asked her who else besides Cohen had come into Prague from the US side - she didn't know, but she was willing to go back and find out. She never got back to him about this. Primary Subsource also asked about the participants on the Russian side. She didn't know, but she indicated that her "best guess" or "her understanding" was that they were from "Legal Affairs" or "Legal Department." Primary Subsource indicated that Source 3 did not say why she thought that. Primary Subsource wasn't aware that such an entity existed - he was not able to find it through research.

(U//FOUO) Reflecting on the Prague-related material, Primary Subsource believes he had 2, maybe even 3, conversations with Source 3 on this topic later in October. Nothing on Prague and Cohen was collected during the SIA trip in SIA. The first conversation is the one during which he believes Source 3 noted her recognition of Cohen's name. The second conversation is the one in which she discussed Prague, the visit of Cohen plus three other individuals,

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

and the meeting with the Russian side. There may have been a third conversation on the topic, but [REDACTED] Primary Subsource could not recall exactly and said that they had also talked about "a private subject."

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource doesn't believe he discussed Paul Manafort with [REDACTED] Source 3. [REDACTED] Source 3 didn't bring up Carter Page or Manafort during these October conversations. The direct quote "...to sweep it all under the carpet..." is from [REDACTED] Source 3. [REDACTED] Source 3 did not say, however, why Cohen went to Prague instead of Carter Page.

(U//FOUO) In Dossier Report 2016/166, [REDACTED] Source 3 is the one who provided the Rossotrudnichestvo information and the identification of [REDACTED] SIA. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that during either the second or third conversation with [REDACTED] Source 3 about the Cohen matter, [REDACTED] Source 3 had initially thought the meetings involved the "legal department" but then identified [REDACTED] SIA and Rossotrudnichestvo. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource kept pushing [REDACTED] Source 3 for information about the identities of the US participants, but she did not know. On the Russian side, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource requested that she go back to her sources, and it was after that she came back with the identification of [REDACTED] SIA. However, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that [REDACTED] Source 3 never mentioned or said that [REDACTED] SIA was working "under Rossotrudnichestvo cover," as is stated in the report. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource had done his own research and confirmed that [REDACTED] SIA existed.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, [REDACTED] Source 3 is the one who mentioned "deniable cash payments" and "wires." [REDACTED] Primary Subsource pushed [REDACTED] Source 3 for the substance of the meeting in Prague, but he is not sure if [REDACTED] Source 3 was brainstorming here, or if she is relating information from her sources.

(U//FOUO) As an aside here, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource spoke about some personal details regarding [REDACTED] Source 3. [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED]) Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

SIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Primary Subsource reiterated a story from the previous day - Source 3 had just reached out to him the other day to ask him to SIA [REDACTED] an article about Russian speakers and Trump. [REDACTED] currently has a visa to come to the United States. To questions posed by FBI SA [REDACTED] FBI Agent and comments made by his attorney, Primary Subsource indicated that he could carefully Source 3, perhaps even meet her in a third country. To try and get additional information of interest to the FBI would require in-person conversation, and Primary Subsource quipped that he'd never been SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource said that he had plans to visit her earlier this year SIA [REDACTED], but that it didn't work out. Primary Subsource said that she knew that he had plans to visit her in SIA [REDACTED], because the two of them had talked through the plans. When asked if Source 3 would be comfortable talking to the FBI, Primary Subsource said that he wasn't sure.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource summarized that, when it comes to the dossier, the Page material regarding Sechin came from Source 5 [REDACTED], while the Cohen/Prague material came from Source 3 [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 3 of Report 2016/166, Primary Subsource said that he believes that the material "strongly corresponds" to a recent, December 2016 conversation that he had with Source 3 [REDACTED]. This was a separate, follow-on conversation to the October conversations mentioned before. The material is not word-for-word from his conversation with Source 3 [REDACTED], but partially-based on their December 2016 telephone conversation. For example, in their conversation, while he doesn't remember her saying SIA [REDACTED] he does recall her saying SIA [REDACTED]. He recalls that she talked

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

about SIA [REDACTED] "affiliates" but she did not mention the Democratic Party in the way that the report says. As he mentioned earlier, he stated their conversations were held in the overall context of the US elections and hacking, but he is not sure if she mentioned a specific political party or candidate at this time. She did mention "porn traffic" as mentioned in this paragraph. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource does not recall [REDACTED] Source 3 reference to a specific time frame of March through September 2016.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Source 3 did mention both SIA [REDACTED] who she mentioned - as stated in the report - work "under the FSB." She mentioned SIA [REDACTED] and all of his smaller subsidiaries and companies. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that [REDACTED] Source 3 SIA [REDACTED], which [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said was one of SIA [REDACTED] companies. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource admitted to the interviewers that his understanding of this topic (i.e. cyber) was "zero" and that [REDACTED] Source 3 is not an IT specialist herself. [REDACTED] Source 3 never said that SIA [REDACTED] was involved in any of this. He said that paragraph 3 has references and keywords involving payments and cover-up from his conversation with [REDACTED] Source 3.

(U//FOUO) With respect to paragraph 4, [REDACTED] Source 3 gave this as a kind of example. She didn't offer any specific information or evidence, but that this (e.g. Romanian hackers heading to Bulgaria to lay low) is a kind of example [ANALYST NOTE: It seemed by [REDACTED] Primary Subsource description that this might be [REDACTED] Source 3 analysis]. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource is not sure where the term "bolt hole" is from, and tried, unsuccessfully, to think about what Russian term this might be representing. When asked if everything in this paragraph came from [REDACTED] Source 3, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that it was difficult to say with certainty. It sounds like material that [REDACTED] Source 3 would say. Looking back through the paragraph, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

everything before the term "lay low" is definitely from Source 3 while he is not sure about everything after that term. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] is not sure about the specifics in this paragraph and agreed with interviewers that the report has more specific language (place names; ethnicity of hackers) than other reports. Interviewers brought up the fact that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] had mentioned the previous day that Source 3 spoke SIA [REDACTED] and had a family vacation home SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not know if the family home was in SIA [REDACTED], but asked if SIA [REDACTED] was "on the coast" because that's where typical family vacation homes were located.

VI. Source 6 [REDACTED], RIA Novosti, and Dossier Report 2016/95

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked to go back over the reports discussed in brief the previous day regarding his interaction with Source 6 [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that Christopher Steele had asked him to find sources linked to the Trump team, who could answer the overarching questions regarding Russia's connections to the team, etc. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] turned to his contacts at [REDACTED], and his contacts there told him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that there was "this guy, Source 6 [REDACTED]" that he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] should talk to.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] first met in person with USPER [REDACTED], SIA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED], who is still around (as Primary Subsource [REDACTED] understands) and who is one of Primary Subsource [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that USPER [REDACTED] has offices SIA [REDACTED], and the two of them met over lunch at a Thai restaurant. He didn't want to ask USPER [REDACTED] very targeted or revealing questions for the election assignment, so he kept them broad in scope ("Do you SIA [REDACTED] know anyone who can talk about all of this Trump/Manafort stuff, or Trump and Russia?" USPER [REDACTED] commented about how there was a great

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

amount of speculation about Russian influence and Russian ties, but that he was skeptical and nothing substantive had turned up.

USPER [REDACTED] said Primary Subsource [REDACTED] should also speak with his [REDACTED] colleague, USPER 2 [REDACTED]. USPER [REDACTED] said that "there [is] this guy USPER 2 [REDACTED] interviewed and he USPER 2 [REDACTED] could probably get his contact information." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he believes, in the end, USPER [REDACTED] gave him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Source 6 [REDACTED] email, and that he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] never met with USPER 2 [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] added that he will see if he still has the email]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] emailed Source 6 [REDACTED] in either June or July 2016 - but it was after Primary Subsource [REDACTED] trip SIA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not receive a response from this email, but says that it was at that point that "things got strange." In July 2016, he received a telephone call from an unidentified Russian guy. He thought it was Source 6 [REDACTED] - he still thinks it was Source 6 [REDACTED] - but the individual never identified himself as Source 6 [REDACTED]. They talked for about 10 minutes, and then arranged to meet together up US City [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] remembered that they made plans to meet US City [REDACTED], and that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] offered to come up "anytime" Source 6 [REDACTED] was available. Source 6 [REDACTED] wouldn't commit to a specific time, but Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he could be US City [REDACTED] "for a couple of days." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could not recall if Source 6 [REDACTED] said he lived US City [REDACTED] or not, but Primary Subsource [REDACTED] guessed that he did. Following this, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] - SIA [REDACTED] - traveled US City [REDACTED] with prepared questions, but Source 6 [REDACTED] was a no-show. The visit would have been near the end of July. Later, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] spoke with USPER 2 [REDACTED], who mentioned to Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that Source 6 [REDACTED] had been asking about him Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. USPER 2 [REDACTED] said that Source 6 [REDACTED] had asked him USPER 2 [REDACTED] "who the hell you Primary Subsource [REDACTED] were" and that it would be

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

hard to reach out to him Source 6 now because he was in SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource remembers providing Christopher Steele with the information about Source 6 whereabouts in SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource tried one more follow-up with Source 6 in September 2016. He decided to use his friend from SIA [REDACTED], who is involved in [REDACTED]. She has a [REDACTED] project, so, knowing that Source 6 SIA [REDACTED], Primary Subsource sent him a brochure about SIA [REDACTED] project in the hope that it would generate a response. Source 6 never responded. At some point, Source 6 and Primary Subsource became SIA [REDACTED], but Primary Subsource could not remember which of them initiated the SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Altogether, Primary Subsource and the person he believed - and still believes - to be Source 6 had one 10-15 minute conversation. Primary Subsource says that "Source E" in Report 2016/95 sounds like it is from this conversation. During the phone call, he remembers mentioning Manafort and Page. Primary Subsource recalls that this 10-15 minute conversation included a general discussion about Trump and the Kremlin, that there was "communication" between the parties, and that it was an ongoing relationship. Primary Subsource recalls that the individual believed to be Source 6 said that there was "exchange of information" between Trump and the Kremlin, and that there was "nothing bad about it." Source 6 said that some of this information exchange could be good for Russia, and some could be damaging to Trump, but deniable. The individual said that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected, but Primary Subsource did not recall any discussion or mention of Wikileaks.

(U//FOUO) Besides the 10-15 minute conversation, Primary Subsource had no further contact with Source 6 (or the person he believed to be Source 6).

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

VI. Trump, the Ritz Carlton and Dossier Report 2016/80

(U//FOUO) The interviewers brought Primary Subsource attention to the report regarding Trump's alleged unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz Carlton Hotel - specifically paragraph 3 of Report 2016/80. Primary Subsource said that this information came, partially, from Source 2. Source 2 circle of associates and friends, Primary Subsource explained once more, is primarily in the SIA sphere, but his social network is vast, and he has other, random associates. In fact, as another example, Source 2 travels to SIA SIA.

(U//FOUO) When Primary Subsource asked Source 2 in early June 2016 (the SIA SIA) about whether he knew of any compromising materials on Trump, Source 2 said that there was a "well known story" about Trump's activities in the very hotel SIA - the Ritz Carlton. SIA to make preparations for the SIA event. The "well known story" involved the allegation that Trump was "into water sports" and had engaged in that activity "in the presidential suite" at the Ritz Carlton. In terms of whether the story was true, Source 2 explained that people "know" but that it "only becomes fact if people come forward." Source 2 said that the hotel is bugged, and "heaven only knows" who or what has been filmed by the FSB. Source 2 said to Primary Subsource SIA Go and check out the story." SIA

(U//FOUO) As Primary Subsource explained it, the fact of hotel bugging and the

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

use of filmed "kompromat" is not uncommon. Primary Subsource related the names of those who have been targeted in this way - [Yuriy] Skuratov, [Mikhail] Kasyanov, and Vladimir Rushkov [unclear, maybe Ryzhkov].

Primary Subsource has also been able to comment on hotel bugging because it is generally known, as he explained to interviewers, that if you want to visit Moscow and not be vulnerable to being bugged, you have to stay away from the Ritz Carlton, the Hotel Moskva, and the Hotel Peking.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 4 in Report 2016/80, SIA [REDACTED], he had a meeting with the managers SIA [REDACTED]. During a free minute, he asked about "this stuff about Trump at the hotel." His interlocutors laughed it off, stating that "all kinds of things happen at the hotel" and with celebrities, "one never knows what they're doing." Primary Subsource said that it wasn't a denial. And asking the hotel staff who were assisting with the SIA arrangements, one girl commented that "anything goes" at the hotel, and added that, "officially, we don't have prostitutes."

(U//FOUO) For this story, Christopher Steele was given the names of the management at the Ritz Carlton. Primary Subsource said that he reported Trump's unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz as "rumor and speculation" and that he had not been able to confirm the story.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, Primary Subsource identified "Source B" as Former Russian Intelligence Officer [REDACTED] through Source 1 [REDACTED]. Source 1 reported that he and [REDACTED] had "had a conversation" about the content in the report. [REDACTED] said that they had "embarrassing stuff- sexual/pornographic material" on a number of folks, "including Trump." Primary Subsource said that the end of paragraph 4 regarding the

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

ability to blackmail Trump was "logical conclusion" rather than reporting. The conversation with Source 1 took place in June 2016 at SIA [REDACTED] - the particular café near the SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource remarked that [REDACTED] insists on having meetings in SIA [REDACTED] himself]. Primary Subsource said that the mention of the file in paragraph 5 was part of a conversation between [REDACTED] and Source 1, but Primary Subsource has no idea where the mention of "Department K of the FSB" is from. He does not recall hearing that, or mentioning that to Christopher Steele. Additionally, the years over which the "kompromat" file was collected were also never mentioned, to Primary Subsource recollection.

26 January 2017

FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

Present:

[REDACTED], interviewee

[REDACTED], interviewee's attorney

[REDACTED], FBI Special Agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

I. Recent Communication by Orbis Representative; Overall Wellbeing

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and his attorney related that Chris Steele had "signaled" to Primary Subsource [REDACTED] this morning. One of Steele's associates at Orbis, [REDACTED] - an analyst who Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said he has seen approximately 12 times - called Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] remarked that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] "had been lying too low." [REDACTED] said that "[Orbis] hadn't heard from him over the past 10 days, and that they wanted to know what was going on." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he'd been staying in a hotel and at his SIA [REDACTED] place SIA [REDACTED], and that he had been talking to an attorney about his SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not speak with Steele during this conversation. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] heard from [REDACTED] that Steele was still "lying low" but that "everyone" was concerned about Primary Subsource [REDACTED] wellbeing. [ANALYST NOTE: The attorney commented that the fact [REDACTED] reached out is yet another indication of how his client was put through the recruitment cycle - initially recruited by Chris Steele, but passed off to underlings for day-to-day management.] [REDACTED] and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] discussed some possible future assignments - "small due diligence assignments unrelated to politics" - and [REDACTED] indicated that they would run stuff by him if something came up - but [and it was not clear if this was [REDACTED] actual comment or Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reflection] probably not much in the area of Russia. There was talk about wiring past due monies for Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to SIA [REDACTED]. Or, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] added, there was also discussion about getting him money through "someone we know [in the United States]" Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was hesitant about arranging payments in any way that "looked strange."

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] told Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that since the BuzzFeed story hit the news, Orbis has received 20,000 emails.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) No one from SIA [REDACTED] has reached out to check on Primary Subsource [REDACTED] welfare. That said, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] typically works from his home. He works off-hours, given the time difference between SIA [REDACTED] Moscow and London. There is space and some desks he can use at SIA [REDACTED], but most of his work is done at home.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] commented that, unless his name goes public, he is fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn't believe he can travel SIA [REDACTED] - he feels that he would be in danger and, as he put it, SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] indicated that Orbis does know the identities of some of his sources - they have some first and last names. For example, Orbis knows the identity of Source 2 [REDACTED], who, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] added, SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he had gone back to check for electronic communication records, but he said that he had deleted most of the election-related communications "months ago." He also has a different phone from the one he used previously. He didn't delete communication involving USPER 2 [REDACTED] [see previous day's interview], and he had reported that communication to Christopher Steele.

(U//FOUO) Dossier Report 2016/86

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked a number of questions regarding the sourcing and information about the FSB cyber-related dossier report.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 1, the "former senior intelligence officer" is Former Russian Intelligence Officer [REDACTED], through Source 1 [REDACTED]. Source 1 [REDACTED] told this information directly to Primary Subsource [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED] at the SIA [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

café.

(U//FOUO) Some of the material in paragraph 2 was not familiar to Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. In general, the material tracks with comments made to Primary Subsource [REDACTED] by Source 2 [REDACTED], with corroboration via open source material. Looking more over the paragraph, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that the Source 2 [REDACTED] material begins with the sentence, "To compensate for this shortfall..." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] does not recall using the terms "first tier" (in the first sentence) in his reports to Steele - he is not sure that information came from him Primary Subsource [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) The material in paragraph 3 could be referencing material gleaned from one of Primary Subsource SIA [REDACTED] friends from SIA [REDACTED], Friend [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. When he was SIA [REDACTED] years old, Friend [REDACTED] was caught "facilitating payments for a pornographic website." He was offered a deal - cooperate with the FSB or potentially go to jail. He ended up doing some work for the FSB, but Primary Subsource [REDACTED] doesn't know what type of work Friend [REDACTED] did for the FSB [ANALYST NOTE: This is in contradiction to Primary Subsource [REDACTED] statement the first day, at which time he indicated that he did not have any contacts associated with the Russian intelligence and security services.] Friend [REDACTED] is a couple of years younger than Primary Subsource [REDACTED], and he Friend [REDACTED] returned to "normal life" [that is, post FSB activity] around SIA [REDACTED]. Friend [REDACTED] told Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that he knew of many other people who have been put in a similar situation [with the FSB]. Presently, Friend [REDACTED] works in SIA [REDACTED]; however, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] is unclear for whom - he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] thought that Friend [REDACTED] might be working for SIA [REDACTED], for the banking industry, and/or doing something in the way of SIA [REDACTED]. When asked if Primary Subsource [REDACTED] would consider Friend [REDACTED] a "contractor," Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said "yes, like myself, but in a different [sector]."

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) In the same paragraph - paragraph 3 - the portion that begins with "In one case a US citizen..." was derived from a conversation with Source 1 [REDACTED]. Source 1 [REDACTED] related this story, indicating that the US citizen was Source 1 [REDACTED] friend who does work with "educational apps or something."

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 4, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could not attribute it to any source in particular. The "foreign director of a company," recalled Primary Subsource [REDACTED], is a foreign director on the board of SIA [REDACTED], but he did know the exact identity.

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 5, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that some of the information came from his discussions with the Russian SIA [REDACTED], Russian contact [REDACTED] - who, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reiterated, SIA [REDACTED] [SIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that "an FSB cyber operative" is an incorrect source characterization and that Russian contact [REDACTED] had mentioned to him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that Telegram had been compromised.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 6, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could not attribute it conclusively to any particular source. He said that he can't confirm it, but he believes the source may have been Source 2 [REDACTED]. Some of it is open source, however.

(U//FOUO) General Summarizing about Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Sources

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] if, generally speaking about the dossier as a whole, the mentions of Dmitriy Peskov [Putin's press secretary] and Sergey Ivanov can be typically sourced to Source 3 [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said yes - Source 3 [REDACTED] has direct and indirect contact with a deputy, or multiple deputies, in SIA [REDACTED]. As stated earlier,

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

she is also tied into SIA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that, through Source 3 [REDACTED], he could try and get the names and the deputies and assistants she uses for getting her information.

(U//FOUO) When it comes to any material on SIA [REDACTED] Source 2 [REDACTED] is the primary source. Source 2 [REDACTED] is friends with Russian official [REDACTED] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] related a story from circa 2015-2016. For a different assignment, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] got Source 2 [REDACTED] to talk to the SIA [REDACTED]. During that interaction, the SIA [REDACTED] indicated that power and authority when it came to press relations had centralized on Peskov. Source 2 [REDACTED] friend indicated that "[we're] all under Peskov now," which Primary Subsource [REDACTED] took to mean that authority within the Presidential Administration's PR/GR circles had entered a pyramid-type stage with Peskov at the top of the pyramid.

(U//FOUO) On the material regarding the replacement of Sergey Ivanov with Anton Vaino, this was also derived from Source 3 [REDACTED], as well as "two other friends" [which Primary Subsource [REDACTED] left vague and didn't identify]. The part of the reports connecting Ivanov's replacement by Vaino to the fallout over Russia's influence efforts against the US election was, according to Primary Subsource [REDACTED], his analytical conclusion. Source 3 [REDACTED] "confirmed that it had to be true," said Primary Subsource [REDACTED]. Source 3 [REDACTED] told him something like "[Ivanov's dismissal because of US-election related fallout] just had to be true" or else she said something like "Of course, it has to be that..."

(U//FOUO) General Summarizing of [REDACTED] Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Debriefings by Orbis

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] about how Christopher Steele would go about debriefing him after his visits, specifically about how

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

Steele asked him about distinguishing between what his sources have told him versus his Primary Subsource analytical judgments. Primary Subsource said that Steele would often ask him, "Are you sure [about what your source is telling you]," and sometimes would repeatedly press him about a certain report - emphasizing "Are you Primary Subsource sure? Are you sure?" Primary Subsource said that he Primary Subsource was very careful about caveating during debriefs with Steele. He would tell Steele if something was his analytical judgment ("As an analyst, I think..."), explain his confidence levels ("It is possible vs. likely" or "It is plausible"), and even tell Steele whether something had just not been explicitly denied ("No one has denied it when I've brought it up."). At times he would tell Steele that "I've told you what I know." When pressed by Steele to try to get additional information, Primary Subsource would explain that he did not want to go back to his friends "3 or 4 times" to try to get additional material - it would look bad and it would raise suspicions. Steele might ask, for example, "Do any of your Primary Subsource sources know if Ivanov was sacked because of the US presidential election?"

(U//FOUO) Not wanting to cause suspicions with friends and associates, Primary Subsource would try and corroborate the reporting he Primary Subsource received in other ways. The interviewers also asked if Primary Subsource would characterize his sources to Steele ("Source 3 told me X" or "Source 1 told me Y"). Primary Subsource said that was not always the case.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource said that his verbal debriefings with Christopher Steele were held at Orbis' office, not at hotels. Steele would debrief Primary Subsource solo, and would take handwritten notes of what Primary Subsource was telling him. Primary Subsource remarked that it [Steele taking handwritten notes] was just like "you [the FBI interviewers] are doing today."

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said that he would not really write detailed notes about his source meetings. Even on the SIA SIA [REDACTED] flight, returning from trips, he might scratch out a few tentative points - i.e. "5 days, 17 meetings" - and maybe some cryptic reminders. He might also write a text message to himself, but he compared it to preparation to a conference panel presentation -- a few notes jotted on a notecard before one heads to the panel. He told the interviewers that he had destroyed any of these scribbled notes.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Primary Subsource was asked how Steele tasked him - by email, Skype or phone. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource said it was a combination of these things. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource described the US election-related tasking came in three waves: (1) the initial tasking about Paul Manafort; (2) the tasking about any compromising materials on Donald Trump; (3) tasking about Sergey Ivanov's involvement in the US election; and (4) later on, in the fall of 2016, 4-5 names to ask about [which [REDACTED] Primary Subsource talked about earlier, including Carter Page and Michael Cohen].

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Primary Subsource was asked if Steele had ever mentioned going to the press about with the election-related information. To [REDACTED] Primary Subsource knowledge, Steele never went to the press about this material. [REDACTED] Primary Subsource never heard Steele voice anything suggesting that this material needed to get into the hands of the press.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Primary Subsource was asked if he was tasked with anything else similar to what was in the dossier, but does not appear in the dossier. He said no, and repeated that these types of taskings [on the election matter] made him uncomfortable. Steele pushed [REDACTED] Primary Subsource to try and either follow-up with people or corroborate the reporting, but [REDACTED] Primary Subsource wasn't able to do so. Moreover, [REDACTED] Primary Subsource added, attempts at

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

getting corroboration on these subjects made him uncomfortable - he was very nervous about the Russians finding out about it.

(U//FOUO) The interviewers later asked Primary Subsource [REDACTED] to review his annotated version of the dossier, asking specifically if there were any additional source names that had not been covered in the 3-day interview. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that there were no other source names.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he did not have any UK-based friends or social network connections from whom he collects information.

(U//FOUO) More Information about Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Trips SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] talked about his SIA [REDACTED] trips SIA [REDACTED] - SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] also had a trip to SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED] 2016.

(U//FOUO) SIA [REDACTED] 2016

(U//FOUO) The SIA [REDACTED] 2016 trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) SIA [REDACTED] 2016

(U//FOUO) He remarked that the SIA [REDACTED] trip was "odd," explaining that, upon entry, he was interviewed more pointedly than usual. This was the only time it has happened. For about five minutes, he was peppered with questions and statements like, "What exactly are you planning to do here? Who are you visiting? Your photo looks different." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] kept his answers vague - he said he was visiting his SIA [REDACTED]. All the while, his questioners at entry were checking on the computer. He reported this incident to Steele.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Going back over the SIA [REDACTED] trip, the interviewers asked if he made it up to SIA [REDACTED], particularly since some of the material in the dossier mentions SIA [REDACTED]. He did travel to SIA [REDACTED]. He went for a "private weekend" to SIA [REDACTED] that had nothing to do with work. He flew SIA [REDACTED] from SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that none of the material in the dossier was derived from his weekend trip to SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) The SIA [REDACTED] trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] 2016

(U//FOUO) What alarmed Primary Subsource [REDACTED] most about his SIA [REDACTED] 2016 visit was "how perfectly it all went." Nothing bad happened. There were a number of events for which he was the facilitator. He had to make sure people were where they were supposed to be, and he also gave a SIA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], but it went off without a hitch.

(U//FOUO) During the SIA [REDACTED] trip, SIA [REDACTED] gave a brief presentation to the delegation SIA [REDACTED] was one of 3-4 speakers during a set of talks SIA [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is the only person during this trip whose name made it into the dossier; however, the material on [REDACTED] was not derived from the SIA [REDACTED] trip. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not spend any time with [REDACTED] during the SIA [REDACTED] trip. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he saw Source 4 [REDACTED], Source 2 [REDACTED], and "SIA [REDACTED]." Primary Subsource [REDACTED] did not collect anything on the SIA [REDACTED] trip.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Steele debriefed Primary Subsource [REDACTED] after the SIA [REDACTED] trip. Nothing specific was provided; he and Steele just had "ongoing conversations" about the general situation. Orbis contributed to the costs of the SIA [REDACTED] trip, but the trip was paid by SIA [REDACTED]. It was during this layover period in London that Primary Subsource [REDACTED] received the text confirming Page's meeting with Sechin.

(U//FOUO) SIA [REDACTED] 2016

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] traveled to the UK at the end of SIA [REDACTED] 2016. The trip was jointly financed by Orbis and Primary Subsource [REDACTED] himself. He met with Steele, but most of the rest of Orbis staff was on a retreat in Dublin. He and Steele went out, had a glass of champagne, and had only general conversations. There was no discussion of the election, and no discussion of the election-related project.

(U//FOUO) St. Petersburg & Dossier Report 2016/112

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained that the overall subject of this report - Govorun, Alfa Bank - has been a topic he Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has been working for over ten years. It harkens back to his time SIA [REDACTED] with USPER [REDACTED], where they would hypothesize about relationships between Russian corruption and the Alfa Fellowship.

(U//FOUO) As an aside, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] told another corruption-related story wherein Source 1 [REDACTED] told Primary Subsource [REDACTED] that [someone had told him] about how Marat Bashirov, who had been head of the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR) and has been sanctioned by the EU, left the LPR after 5-6 months to become a top lobbyist for Renova Group - specifically Renova's arm dealing with heating and power distribution. Bashirov is a Moscow-based lobbyist who is working to get the EU sanctions lifted.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) St. Petersburg-Related Information

(U//FOUO) The material regarding St. Petersburg and Trump real estate deals came from Source 2. Source 2 suggested that one person to look at regarding compromising material on Trump was [Aras] Agalarov, as well as SIA [REDACTED], one of the biggest real estate developers.

- (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] also talked to a friend of his who [ANALYST NOTE: either had or knew someone who had] escorted Trump while in St. Petersburg. Friend [REDACTED], who he knew as a SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED], was a SIA [REDACTED] who lived in Moscow. She was about SIA [REDACTED] years old when she died, suddenly, last SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] heard the news from her boyfriend, who sent him a picture of her gravesite. She wrote stories which were on the critical side of the Russian government. SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. He saw her in Russia during a project circa 2013 SIA [REDACTED] adding that it was about 6-7 months before the Olympics. He also saw her [REDACTED] in 2015 at a get-together SIA [REDACTED]. He said she was also SIA [REDACTED]. SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Reactions of Primary Subsource Friends to the Dossier

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] has had friends reach out to him about Trump and the dossier. He's considered it normal joking - SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

SIA [REDACTED] He simply jokes back. None of his friends or social network has broken off contact because of the election or the release of the dossier.

(U//FOUO) Friends' Travel to the United States; Approachability

(U//FOUO) Source 3 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if he'd ever met Source 3 [REDACTED] in the United States. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he met Source 3 [REDACTED] in the United States during her visit in SIA [REDACTED] 2016. She had a trip to a number of destinations in the United States, and she stopped over in SIA [REDACTED]. She, Primary Subsource [REDACTED], and SIA [REDACTED], went shopping and to a restaurant together. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that she came out for her SIA [REDACTED]. He doesn't know exactly where she visited while in the United States, but he thought it was SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] believes that Source 3 [REDACTED] had also traveled previously to the United States - perhaps as many as SIA [REDACTED] times. He knows that she was on a SIA [REDACTED] visiting SIA [REDACTED] in the mid-2000s. She has stayed at hotels, as well as at Primary Subsource [REDACTED] place.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] is not sure if Source 3 [REDACTED] would talk to the FBI. He can't speak for her. He said that she is in a SIA [REDACTED] right now [SIA [REDACTED]]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] thinks if Source 3 [REDACTED] received a plausible job offer, she might come over. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] offered that he could carefully inquire about her plans over the coming year (2017) and see if there are possibilities - he reiterated that he owes Source 3 [REDACTED] an SIA [REDACTED] over the next few days about the views of Russian speakers in the United States towards Trump.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Source 4 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 4 [REDACTED] has not been to the United States in probably SIA [REDACTED] years.

(U//FOUO) Source 1 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 1 [REDACTED] traveled to the United States in circa SIA [REDACTED] - not long after SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] met him in the United States. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reiterated Source 1 [REDACTED] ties with Former Russian Intelligence Chief [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Source 5 [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Source 5 [REDACTED] has occasional travel to Europe and Southeast Asia SIA [REDACTED]. She would probably be willing to travel to the United States; however, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] reiterated that she reportedly has "senior connections" in SIA [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]. Off-handedly, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that Source 5 [REDACTED] has her own "kurator" [handler] but when interviewers pressed him on this point, he softened that statement, indicating that Source 5 [REDACTED] "projects an image that she has these types of [secret] connections" and "knows the [intelligence] lingo." He never reported to Steele that Source 5 [REDACTED] had a "kurator."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] **Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Services [Redux];** Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Given his language ability and his overseas travel as an SIA [REDACTED] student, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if he had ever been approached by Russian intelligence and/or security services when he was a student in SIA [REDACTED]. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said no. The only individuals with whom he has contact who were connected to Russia's intelligence and security services were

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED] 02/09/2017

(1) his friend, Friend [REDACTED], who worked for the FSB in order to stay out of jail SIA [REDACTED], (2) Russian official [REDACTED], the SIA [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED] who mentioned in the previous interview; and (3) FNU [REDACTED] Russian journalist [REDACTED], who interacted with him and USPER [REDACTED] in SIA [REDACTED] Russian journalist [REDACTED] was the head of SIA [REDACTED] and would pester Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and USPER [REDACTED] for information. [ANALYST NOTE: This contradicted Primary Subsource [REDACTED] earlier statements regarding having no contact with Russia's intelligence and security services, and it also contradicted his earlier statements regarding not really knowing if Russian [REDACTED] was actually connected to Russia's intelligence and security services.]

SIA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] also related a story regarding Source 2 [REDACTED] interaction with the FSB. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] said that he remembered this story "right before I talked to you [the FBI] this week." Circa SIA [REDACTED], Source 2 [REDACTED] was SIA [REDACTED]. Source 2 [REDACTED] told him Primary Subsource [REDACTED] about this, and also SIA [REDACTED] a picture of the doors at SIA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED]. At FSBHQ, Source 2 [REDACTED] was questioned SIA [REDACTED] he Source 2 [REDACTED] had made about the leadership of Russia's SIA [REDACTED]. Source 2 [REDACTED] was also lightly threatened. According to Primary Subsource [REDACTED], he Source 2 [REDACTED] was told that "he Source 2 [REDACTED] should be more careful; that he Source 2 [REDACTED] should watch his mouth and act responsibly." Source 2 [REDACTED] ended up SIA [REDACTED] about this interaction, and received a lot of joking about SIA [REDACTED].

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] brushed aside the idea of being approached by the intelligence and security services as a student. He explained that it was the late SIA [REDACTED], and the university setting was rather lax. He did not really attend SIA [REDACTED] class all that often because his language was already good and the classes weren't that useful. People smoked in class and dressed down.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] and Russia's Diplomatic Corps

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if he had ever considered a career with Russia's diplomatic corps. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] explained that he went to a SIA [REDACTED] for SIA [REDACTED], which he identified as SIA [REDACTED]. Most of the graduates were told, SIA [REDACTED], for example, that they were slated for big things in life and would be aimed towards university at SIA [REDACTED], SIA [REDACTED], or SIA [REDACTED], with future careers in diplomacy, interpretation or "going abroad." SIA [REDACTED] years later, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] remarked, probably 1/3 of the students are abroad, in places like London and elsewhere.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] told the interviewers that he never seriously considered going into the diplomatic corps. He never tested for it, and he never applied for any of the major universities listed above [which would feed into Russia's diplomatic corps].

(U//FOUO) Additional Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Contacts from SIA [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked if - beside Source 3 [REDACTED] and others he has mentioned - if he has used other old friendships, schoolmates, and known associates from SIA [REDACTED] as sources of information. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] balked, meandered in the conversation, and did not really answer the question. The interviewers did not press him on this at this point.

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] Contacts in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA)

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource [REDACTED] was asked about his contacts in the MFA. He remarked that, over the years, he has collected numerous business cards of MFA personnel, usually through contact at conferences and events. He met Yuriy Ushakov a few times SIA [REDACTED] - and remarked how Ushakov is known to operate "independent" of Lavrov. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] also met Sergey Kislyak at a couple of events - he recalled one event that happened on his SIA [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] whispered out loud to himself, "[REDACTED]" The interviewers asked him for additional details. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] could not remember the individual's surname at first. He said that "[REDACTED]" was from SIA [REDACTED], and that he [REDACTED] was a "strange character" Primary Subsource [REDACTED] met last year. He met [REDACTED] briefly in Moscow. [REDACTED] background was in PR/GR with the SIA [REDACTED]. Pavel studied [REDACTED], and then took a career with the MFA. Primary Subsource [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] MFA job as "a delivery boy" but added that it was strange because [REDACTED] "did not seem to be qualified for the job that he had [at the MFA]." Eventually, Primary Subsource [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] surname was Surname [REDACTED].

Title: [REDACTED] Interview of Primary Subsource [REDACTED]
Re: [REDACTED], 02/09/2017

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