

**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

PRC

Analysis on U.S. Voter Registration Information from 18 States,  
Plans to Conduct U.S. Person Matching and Public Opinion Analysis;

[REDACTED] The PRC [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] analysis on [REDACTED] U.S. voter registration  
data from 18 states, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] it obtained from the [REDACTED]  
voter registration records from the [REDACTED] Mid-term Elections. [REDACTED]  
types of information [REDACTED] on U.S. registered voters. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] contained  
[REDACTED] of personal identifiable information (PII), and would be used [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for [REDACTED] mining PII on U.S. citizens [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
could be used as a [REDACTED] resource to analyze, discover, [REDACTED] the identities of  
important U.S. targets [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] the  
[REDACTED] information would be used to conduct U.S. [REDACTED] General Election [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] analysis. Furthermore, [REDACTED] continue  
[REDACTED] state voter registration data.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The PRC [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] analysis on [REDACTED] U.S. voter  
registration data from 18 states, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] it obtained the voter registration data [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], and its contents contained voter registration information from [REDACTED] U.S.  
Mid-term Elections. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the [REDACTED] voter registration  
data included the following types of information on registered voters:



- voter names,
- birth dates,
- [REDACTED]
- home mailing address, and
- political party affiliation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some data included detailed historical records of detailed voter ballot and polling records and election donation expenses, as well as [REDACTED] demographic information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] voter registration data from 18 states. [REDACTED] Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, [REDACTED] Maryland, New York, [REDACTED], and Washington, D.C. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], the North Carolina data contained information for over 8 million voters, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Kansas data

contained the following types of PII:

- first, middle, and last name, suffix;
- [REDACTED]
- date of birth;
- telephone area code, telephone exchange number, and telephone number last four digits;
- [REDACTED]
- historical voting records;
- home and mailing address;
- military affiliation;
- political party affiliation,

1 [REDACTED]

- polling place name and address.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the [REDACTED]  
data [REDACTED] contained [REDACTED] voter demographic PII, which  
would be used [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] mining PII on U.S.  
citizens. [REDACTED] the voter registration information could be  
used to evaluate [REDACTED] U.S. [REDACTED] identities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] could be used [REDACTED] to analyze, discover,  
[REDACTED] the identities of important U.S. targets [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Additionally, [REDACTED] voter registration data served as [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] source for [REDACTED] opinion analysis on the U.S. [REDACTED] General  
Election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] the rest of the  
voter registration information [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PII on U.S. citizens' occupation and  
education background was a priority [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

[REDACTED] ) PRC [REDACTED] : PRC [REDACTED]  
Possesses List of Likely Leaked, Compromised Data that  
Included U.S., [REDACTED] Entities in [REDACTED]  
2019; Data Sets Apparently Include Those Related to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], and Voter Data / PII

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ) A PRC [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was in possession of a document as of [REDACTED] 2019 that contained a list of [REDACTED] entities  
and the data [REDACTED] yielded. While a comparatively small portion of the list's entries featured  
entities in [REDACTED] the U.S., most of the entries were targets in other countries. The  
data was primarily dated from between 2009 and 2018, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Of particular note, the majority of the entities consisted of [REDACTED] data sets of personally  
identifiable information (PII), potentially indicating that the bulk collection of such PII had been their goal.  
Furthermore, these PII-related data sets included several characterized as voter registration records.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]-possessed a document as of [REDACTED] 2019 that listed some [REDACTED] data sets, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]. Of particular note, this list included 97 entries that were  
explicitly identified as originating from U.S., [REDACTED] entities--though the majority of [REDACTED] list  
consisted of data from other countries, with the entries' descriptions indicating that most of the data came from  
[REDACTED]. The list appeared to be organized based on certain factors-- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Most  
of the data involved private companies, government organizations, and NGOs.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

( [REDACTED] ) U.S. Voter, Election-Related Data

[REDACTED]

| Name                                             | Data Volume                 | Date of Information | Apparent Contents                                                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Unspecified U.S. voter data <sup>(5)</sup>       | 204,822,241 records (45 GB) | 2016                | Includes voters' names , ages, phone numbers, addresses, etc. A file, downloaded by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], indicated his possible possession of this data as well. |
| Named U.S. state 1 voter database <sup>(5)</sup> | 1,746,069 records           | 2017                | Includes voter IDs, full names, current addresses, previous addresses, birth dates , gender, and phone numbers.                                                       |

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]  
■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



|                                                  |                           |         |                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Named U.S. state 2 voter database <sup>(5)</sup> | 7,893,248 records         | 2017    | Includes voter IDs, full names, current addresses, former addresses, birth dates, gender, and citizenship information. |
| Named U.S. state 3 voter database                | 5,578,302 records (6+ GB) | 2017    |                                                                                                                        |
| Named U.S. state 4 voter database                | Unknown                   | Unknown | Unknown                                                                                                                |
| Named U.S. state 5 voter database                | Unknown                   | Unknown | Unknown                                                                                                                |
| Named U.S. state 6 voter database                | Unknown                   | Unknown | Unknown                                                                                                                |
| Named U.S. state 7 voter database                | Unknown                   | Unknown | Unknown                                                                                                                |
| Named U.S. state 8 voter database                | Unknown                   | Unknown | Unknown                                                                                                                |
| Emails from a named U.S. person <sup>(5)</sup>   | 7.42 GB                   | 2016    | Includes election-related materials                                                                                    |

**U.S.-Origin PII**

| Name | Data Volume | Area | Date of Information | Apparent Contents |
|------|-------------|------|---------------------|-------------------|
|------|-------------|------|---------------------|-------------------|

5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

|                                                          |                                  |            |            |                                                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Unspecified U.S. citizen medical database <sup>(5)</sup> | 28 million records<br>[REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] social security numbers.<br>[REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. medical group's servers and important data    | [REDACTED]                       | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                        |
| Named U.S. biogenetics group                             | [REDACTED]                       | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                        |
| Named U.S. school                                        | [REDACTED]                       | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                        |
| Named U.S. business services company 1 <sup>(5)</sup>    | [REDACTED]                       | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                        |

5 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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**( ) Compromised Websites**

( )

| Name                                                            | Data Volume | Date of Information | Apparent Contents                                                                                                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Named U.S. business services company 2's complaints website     | records     | 2016                | Unknown                                                                                                               |
| data from named U.S. business services company 3 <sup>(5)</sup> |             |                     |                                                                                                                       |
| data from named U.S. business services company 4                | records     |                     | Data that is unable to be updated                                                                                     |
| Named U.S. web services company 1                               | records     |                     | Includes email addresses, passwords and data.                                                                         |
| Named U.S. web services company 2                               |             |                     |                                                                                                                       |
| Named U.S. web services company 3                               | records     |                     | Includes domain names, registered email addresses, login IDs, passwords, account numbers, dates of registration, etc. |
| Named U.S. web services company 4                               | records     | 2017                | Data unable to be updated                                                                                             |

5.

Page 6





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

|  |  |  |                                                      |
|--|--|--|------------------------------------------------------|
|  |  |  | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
|--|--|--|------------------------------------------------------|

[REDACTED] ) Social Networking Websites

[REDACTED]

| Name                                       | [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|------------|
| [REDACTED]                                 | [REDACTED] records | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED]                                 | [REDACTED] records |            | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 1 (5) | [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 2 (5) | [REDACTED] records | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 3     | [REDACTED]         | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 4     | [REDACTED]         |            | [REDACTED] |

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                                                                 |            |            | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 5                          | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. social networking company 6                          | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| Account information from named U.S. social networking company 6 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

(U//F [REDACTED]) U.S. NGOs, Religious Groups, and Professional Organizations

[REDACTED]

| Name                                       | Data Volume | Date of Information | Apparent Contents |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Named U.S. labor organization 1 [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]  | [REDACTED]          | [REDACTED]        |

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

|                                |            |            |                                                                    |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                |            |            | [REDACTED]                                                         |
| Named U.S. trade association 1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
| Named U.S. think tank 1 (5)    | Unknown    | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                                         |
| Named U.S. travel company      | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                                         |

(U [REDACTED]) Other Private U.S. Entities

[REDACTED]

|                  |                                        |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Sector           | [REDACTED]                             |
| Industry         | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
| U.S. Think Tanks | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]               |
| Software         | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |

5. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

[REDACTED]

(U/[REDACTED]) United States Government Entities

[REDACTED]

|            |            |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

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[REDACTED]

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|            |            |            | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

[REDACTED] ) United States Government Data

[REDACTED]

| Name | Data Volume | Date of Information | Apparent Contents |
|------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------|
|------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------|

[REDACTED]

|                                                                                                       |                                                                                 |                        |                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Named U.S. publisher                                                                                  | [REDACTED]                                                                      | [REDACTED] 2017        | Military maps and records in PDF format                                                                                                                                            |
| ((publicly released information about alleged NSA intelligence collection activities)) <sup>(5)</sup> | [REDACTED]                                                                      | 2013 - 2016            | Publicly leaked U.S. data                                                                                                                                                          |
| Publicly leaked emails from a named former U.S. official                                              | [REDACTED]                                                                      | [REDACTED]             | [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                         |
| F-15-Related Data <sup>(5)</sup>                                                                      | [REDACTED] and more                                                             | 1998 - 2012            | Downloaded data from a [REDACTED] computer--such as the initial evaluations F-15 fighter jet maintenance and technical manual, and other documentation dated between 1998 and 2012 |
| Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 1                                                               | [REDACTED] documents and [REDACTED] database records in a TXT file ([REDACTED]) | 2015 - [REDACTED] 2017 | A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor, with a catalog                                                                                                                               |
| Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 2                                                               | [REDACTED] documents and [REDACTED] documents ([REDACTED])                      | 2012                   | A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor                                                                                                                                               |
| Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 3                                                               | [REDACTED]                                                                      | 2013                   | A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor                                                                                                                                               |
| Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 4                                                               | [REDACTED] attachment [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] emails                          | 2015                   | [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                         |

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                                                       |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                                                       |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |

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## China: Cyber Activities Probably Prelude to Election Espionage

**China is probing the presidential campaign for opportunities to tailor collection and gather insight on policy positions on US-Chinese issues.** US policy on China is a longstanding high collection priority for Beijing, and Chinese cyber actors have conducted such activity in every US presidential election campaign since at least 2008, according to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] open-source reporting.

- Since [REDACTED] 2018, Chinese cyber actors known in the private sector as APT31—[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]—have targeted the personal e-mail accounts of senior US leadership, including officials in the Executive Office of the President and high-ranking officials in multiple Executive Branch organizations, Congress, and the federal judiciary, [REDACTED]
- Since 2017, a separate [REDACTED] has worked with the [REDACTED] to enable more stealthy operations by identifying the e-mail addresses of high-level US officials, then requesting that [REDACTED] obtain or crack the passwords for targeted accounts, [REDACTED]



**Chinese cyber actors are targeting US presidential campaign information, probably to gather intelligence that enables future operations.**

**As the 2020 election approaches, the IC has detected Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors targeting the former Vice President's presidential campaign, probably to gather intelligence that could enable future operations, the first instance this election cycle that we have seen them directly targeting a US presidential campaign** China has also conducted cyber espionage against other US election-related entities, [REDACTED] The IC assesses that China does not currently intend to covertly interfere to try to sway the outcome of the election, although this activity could enable such operations, if Beijing made a decision to do so.

- As of 20 May, APT31 actors had sent spear-phishing e-mails containing tracking links to the G-mail accounts of staffers associated with a presidential campaign, [REDACTED] On 4 June, Google announced that APT31 was targeting the campaign.
- Google and the FBI both briefed campaign officials on the Chinese cyber operations shortly after discovering the activity. Google officials have publicly stated that the spear-phishing attempts were unsuccessful; [REDACTED]
- During the past year, Chinese cyber actors have collected US election-related information from US voter databases, a polling data company, political and nonprofit organizations, fundraisers, and advisory organizations for political campaigns, [REDACTED]

**APT31's method of sending tracking links suggests that the Chinese operators are mapping out the target network for follow-on approaches, possibly including tasking campaign staffers' e-mail accounts in the Chinese military's signals intelligence system for collection.** Tracking links collect metadata such as

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Internet activity and system information that the operators can use to exploit the accounts and identify other targets of interest.

- [REDACTED] Knowledge of a campaign official's operating system and software would allow cyber actors to determine whether they could quickly exploit known vulnerabilities or if they needed to develop malware to gain undetected access to the victim's machine.
- [REDACTED] If a target opened a spear-phishing e-mail with a tracking link—even without clicking on any links—it would confirm an active account for the cyber actors, potentially narrowing the target set for future [REDACTED] operations.

(U) For additional information:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) Produced jointly under the auspices of the Chief of Analysis, [REDACTED] the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## DOCUMENT DETAILS

### CONTENTS

**Produced By:** CIA **Product Type:** World Intelligence Review **Document Number:** WIRe2020-05063

**Publication Date:** 01 Jul 2020

**Contact:** [REDACTED] (secure), [REDACTED] (open)

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From: [REDACTED]  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Everyone's favorite topic  
Date: Thursday, December 23, 2021 12:52:29 PM

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

[REDACTED]

Take a minute and read through this report. It cites some of the same intel and logic used in 2020 to say that these same units were NOT engaged in election influence but were instead only issue-focused, to now argue that China IS influencing the [REDACTED] election. The regional influence, focus on issues, etc. They literally cite as support for their argument some of the same reporting used in the mainline assessment in our minority report.

For example, they cite [REDACTED] activity as being "the Chinese military" even though in 2020 the IC said we didn't know who it was. *This report describes the same unit that [REDACTED] and I said were influencing the US 2020 election and now characterizes it as an election-influence unit and attributes it to the Chinese Government.* That's a weird coincidence, and one we should highlight for oversight. FBI and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

We should consider how this looks and on what logical, non-partisan basis the IC makes calls one way or the other. Why is this unit engaged in election influence in the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] "to promote China's interests" but when they do it here it's "issue influence" but somehow not election-related? *It's the same personnel doing the same kind of activity.*

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber  
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]  
Email: [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
Unclass email: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]



**From:** [REDACTED] -DNI-  
**To:** [REDACTED] -DNI-; [REDACTED] -DNI-  
**Subject:** RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team  
**Date:** Friday, November 20, 2020 1:49:13 PM  
**Attachments:** [image003.png](#)  
[image004.png](#)  
[image005.png](#)

---

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED]

You have brought this to my and [REDACTED] attention and we see an opportunity to prevent an analytic objectivity mistake from happening.

Who would be the decision maker here to reconnect the thread on election security to what is about to go out?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chief of Solutions Group ODNI/DMI/MPAC

Executive Secretary, National Intelligence Analysis Board and National Intelligence Collection Board

IC Analytic Ombudsman

[REDACTED]

SECURE  
TANDBERG

UNCLAS e-mail

ICE-mail



---

**From:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, November 20, 2020 12:55 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team  
**Importance:** High

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

I think I mentioned to you before that there is some pending, [REDACTED] that makes it clear China has been caught conducting election influence. At least that's how it was described to us. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] But as you scroll up, note that NSA is "deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election."

While this is important for your report I'm sure, it also has the potential to be a near-term issue we will need to draw attention to. This is a really good example, but far from the only one, of what I've been raising since the summer—that the IC is deliberately avoiding mentioning a connection to elections for non-substantive reasons.

Obviously since the [REDACTED] isn't released yet—they're holding it until next week—there isn't a PDB so maybe it won't end up being an issue. But this is a highly irregular way to do things, especially as someone trying to raise tradecraft and substantive objections to the mainline analysis and isn't getting our work incorporated or even mentioned.

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber  
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Unclass email: [REDACTED]

Tandberg: [REDACTED]

*"The spice must flow."*

---

**From:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]

**Sent:** Friday, November 20, 2020 10:48 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]

**Subject:** FW: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Small update from NSA below. Their PDB isn't going to tie to the election? The mind boggles.

Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

---

**From:** [REDACTED] -DNI-  
**Sent:** Friday, November 20, 2020 10:02 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] @nsa [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED]  
USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA  
[REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA  
GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] @nsa [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Thanks [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

I haven't heard from the China drafting group yet either. My impression is that they've been waiting for the new [REDACTED]/PDB to update the story before feeding that into the ICA. I don't want to preempt what the reports or PDB will say, but with the ICA in mind, I really think we need to comment on how the new information relates to the election story or not—customers will want and expect that from us. NIO Cyber and I think the new info is highly relevant, though I realize we're in the minority there. I understand you're trying to navigate various perspectives on this, so just fyi. Happy to discuss further.



As far as downgrades/crossposting for ICA purposes—like [REDACTED] said, as long as we can get to the [REDACTED] level we're good. NSA has been fantastic about making election-relevant [REDACTED] usable, and we really appreciate your commitment to that.

[REDACTED]  
Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

---

**From:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, November 20, 2020 9:20 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED] DNI- [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED]  
USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
OK, thx. Regarding cross-posting into various [REDACTED] or downgrading to [REDACTED] for the 45 day piece, if you make sure there are [REDACTED] versions, we're good.

[REDACTED]  
CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]  
Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]  
Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]  
Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]  
National Security Agency  
Secure: [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
Team email: [REDACTED]





Regards,

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, November 20, 2020 8:22 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

All,

[REDACTED] has heard/received nothing.

We have deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election. The massive report we have been waiting on has been chopped up into 13 reports that likely will not get out until late next week. Many/all of them will be cross-posted into [REDACTED] or downgraded to [REDACTED] so that can be more readily incorporated into the 45-day piece, if needed.

---(U [REDACTED])---

[REDACTED]  
Strategic Intelligence Analyst  
[REDACTED] China & North Korea Strategic Assessments

ICemail: [REDACTED]

NSTS: [REDACTED]

Bldg/Room: [REDACTED]

---(U [REDACTED])---

---

**From:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:25 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

[redacted]@nsa [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]@nsa [redacted]

[redacted]@nsa [redacted]

**Subject:** RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

**Classification:** [redacted]

Hello All,

Greetings...just wanted to touch base to see if anyone has contacted you about this and/or if you are doing any work on this product yet. Thanks in advance.

Regards,

[redacted]

[redacted]

CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [redacted]

Office of Strategic Analysis [redacted]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [redacted]

Directorate of Operations [redacted]

National Security Agency

Secure: [redacted]

Unclass: [redacted]

Team email: [redacted]



---

**From:** [redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV [redacted]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 12:58 PM

**To:** [redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV [redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV [redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV [redacted]

[redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV [redacted] NSA [redacted] USA GOV

[redacted]

**Cc:** [redacted]@nsa [redacted]



[REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]

**Subject:** (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

All,

Greetings, hope all is well. I just wanted to send you a note with a few thoughts on this coming project. First, thanks in advance for your work on this product. Second, when you begin communicating with co-drafters across the community, please cc those on the cc line so we can maintain visibility on progress, provide assistance where needed, and help alleviate any potential problems. I also wanted to let you know that we optimally would like to keep [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Let us know if you have any questions. Thx!

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer (CNIO) for Cyber and Election Threats & Security

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]

Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]

Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]

//

**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]  
**Dated:** [REDACTED]  
**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

---

**From:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 23, 2020 2:18 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

I think we have two albeit related things going on here-

- i Jeremy One, the PDB which apparently they've worded away from elections. I haven't seen the draft ([REDACTED]?) but [REDACTED]'s characterization is familiar as to what we heard a couple weeks ago (and I would be concerned as to why they are "deliberately massaging" analysis away from elections). I haven't heard that it is off but it may be further delayed pending the upcoming releases.
  - Two, there is a larger effort in NSA that they will get all [REDACTED] reporting needed for the 45 day report into [REDACTED] for ease of reporting (we have this request into all the agencies). I've asked [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to check in with the regional NIOs to see if they are making progress toward the 30 November date on the ICA draft per our email exchange with the DNI.
- [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 23, 2020 1:45 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

I'm not sure what to make of this.

If this is off, why does [REDACTED] say, "ok"?

**From:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 23, 2020 8:17 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB



Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 9:20 AM

To: [REDACTED] NSA C1205 USA GOV [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OK, thx. Regarding cross-posting into various [REDACTED] or downgrading to [REDACTED] for the 45 day piece, if you make sure there are [REDACTED] versions, we're good.

[REDACTED]

CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]

Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]

Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]



**ELECTION**  
SECURITY GROUP

Regards,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 8:22 AM

To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

All,

[REDACTED] has heard/received nothing.

We have deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election. The massive report we have been waiting on has been chopped up into 13 reports that likely will not get out until late next week. Many/all of them will be cross-posted into [REDACTED] or downgraded to [REDACTED] so that can be more readily incorporated into the 45-day piece, if needed.

---(U [REDACTED])---  
[REDACTED]  
Strategic Intelligence Analyst  
[REDACTED] China & North Korea Strategic Assessments  
ICemail: [REDACTED]  
NSTS: [REDACTED]  
Bldg/Room: [REDACTED]  
---(U [REDACTED])---

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:25 PM  
To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV  
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Hello All,

Greetings...just wanted to touch base to see if anyone has contacted you about this and/or if you are doing any work on this product yet. Thanks in advance.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]  
Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]  
Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]  
Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]



**ELECTION**  
SECURITY GROUP

**From:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 4, 2020 12:58 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV

[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV

[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

**Cc:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

All,

Greetings, hope all is well. I just wanted to send you a note with a few thoughts on this coming project. First, thanks in advance for your work on this product. Second, when you begin communicating with co-drafters across the community, please cc those on the cc line so we can maintain visibility on progress, provide assistance where needed, and help alleviate any potential problems. I also wanted to let you know that we optimally would like to keep [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Let us know if you have any questions. Thx!

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer (CNIO) for Cyber and Election Threats & Security

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]

Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]

Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]

//

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber  
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]



Email: [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
Unclass email: [REDACTED]  
Tandberg: [REDACTED]

*"The spice must flow."*

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED] -DNI-  
**To:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED] -DNI-  
**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 07, 2020 9:32:03 AM

---

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

Hey that is great news. [REDACTED] is an NSA senior, one of the few seniors that remained analytically focused, so having him on board is a big deal.

---

**From:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 7, 2020 9:29 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

[REDACTED]  
Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

---

**From:** [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 07, 2020 9:28 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

**Classification:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

I think it speaks exactly to what has been on my mind but what was left out of the mainline IC assessment. I think it looks very good!

\*\*\*\*\*

(U)

CI SME

East Asia CI Division

Operations/IIA/Office of East Asia Pacific

Senior Advocate, English as a Second Language (ESL) Employee Resource Group

(U)

\*\*\*\*\*

**From:**

-DNI-

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 6, 2020 3:40 PM

**To:**

NSA

**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Good to know. I've heard a few other similar comments from some analysts in CIA, though not in the main China office. Maybe this will draw them out of the woodwork.

Here's a [REDACTED] version of the paper. I sent this to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] earlier, but wanted to make sure your team had a chance to take a look.

## Director, Election Threat Analysis

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

**From:**

NSA

**Sent:** Tuesday, October 06, 2020 10:48 AM

**To:**

-DNI-

**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

Classification: [REDACTED]

Thanks. Just for your awareness, as that last COI meeting was going on, everyone around the table at NSA had thoughts similar to what I shared at the meeting. I think many were reticent to express them to the group because FBI and CIA seemed so adamant about their stances. I'm happy to see that we can have the alternative view point. : )

[REDACTED]

\*\*\*\*\*

(U [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CI SME

East Asia CI Division [REDACTED]

Operations/IIA/Office of East Asia Pacific

Senior Advocate, English as a Second Language (ESL) Employee Resource Group

[REDACTED]

(U [REDACTED]

\*\*\*\*\*

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From: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 9:44 AM

To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: (U) RE: For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Thanks to you too for sharing your thoughts in the last COI meeting. It sounded to me like your take on this is at least somewhat similar to ours. I felt like jumping in to agree with you, but I've burned enough political capital arguing with CIA and FBI about this that I thought it might be more productive for me to sit the discussion out. The positions are not really that far apart, so I'm not sure why so many in the community want to close down the possibility that China might have done or be doing \*something.\* But, hopefully this piece sparks some more thought and discussion.

[REDACTED]





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED] -DNI-  
[REDACTED]

**Subject:** For IC coord by Wed. 7 Oct.: NIC alternative analysis on china/election

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Hello everyone,

As I'm sure many of you have gathered through coord comments, COI discussions, or other conversations, NIO Cyber and I have a somewhat different take on the China/election story than what has appeared in production so far. Rather than continue to argue about this and drive you all nuts, we are opting to publish an alternative analysis NIC memo. We think this is the best way for us to put our perspective on the record while not getting in the way of what the rest of the community wants to say. The lead, in short non-compartmented form, is that we assess that Beijing has taken some low-level, exploratory steps to denigrate the President and shape voter perceptions ahead of the election.

We have really appreciated everyone's efforts to community coord all election-related production, and in that spirit I'd like to offer you all the chance to comment on this piece. However: we are clearly labeling this as alternative analysis and highlighting that it is the perspective of NIO Cyber and myself **only**. Which means that we will most likely not be taking comments on board; we already know most of you disagree. But fear not. We are including a large text box laying out the mainline view. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have helped us craft this, but we would very much appreciate your input on it to make sure that we're capturing your views accurately. The intention is to show an honest analytic difference, not to set up a straw man version of the IC line to knock down.

Like most of the China/election production, this piece uses [REDACTED]. The IC Mainline Analysis text box uses [REDACTED]. Though mostly [REDACTED] If you have at least [REDACTED] and would like to coordinate on this box, please let me know. We are looking for input by **COB Wednesday 7 Oct.**

The full piece uses [REDACTED]. I'm still fixing some formatting issues, but can work with you to get you some version of the paper.

Thank you all—we look forward to continuing conversation on this topic.

[REDACTED]  
Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]=====

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]



Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Dated: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic  
**Date:** Thursday, September 03, 2020 10:09:59 AM

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Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

I am concerned about politics seeping into this. There's no reason we can't say that we have [REDACTED] confidence, etc. That they have a preference. I don't disagree that the consensus view is most likely, but I strongly disagree that we can be so confident about it given [REDACTED] and all that has happened since then. I am troubled by CIA's comments at the recent COI.

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber  
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Unclass email: [REDACTED]

Tandberg: [REDACTED]

*"The spice must flow."*

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 3, 2020 8:56 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

Is it just me, or are they basically saying we should self-censor our assessment on preference because it could be misused? They do have a preference, [REDACTED] that they're acting on that preference and we assess they think it's probably not worth the risk. If we can't communicate our thinking clearly, maybe we should just quit and go home.

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

██████████

11/11/2016

\_\_\_\_\_

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 02, 2020 6:31 PM

To: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

\_\_\_\_\_

Cc: [REDACTED]

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\_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic --- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

Good evening,

FBI concurs on both the edit to the [REDACTED] language from [REDACTED] and with CIA and INR's language edits and concerns.

We've expressed our concern in coord on multiple products that the preference line, when included as a top line in products that are explicitly election related, could imply the opposite of the what community consensus seems to be – namely that activities are focused on policy preferences and that election related activity is not worth the risk.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Unit Chief

Foreign Influence Task Force – China

[REDACTED] (desk)

[REDACTED] (secure)

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 2, 2020 5:45 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

In regard to the [REDACTED] sentence, I think if we are going to raise that we also need to preserve some of the caveats noted in the [REDACTED], especially if we use the NIC's proposed language.

"Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] s // [REDACTED] u

[illegible]

Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

**Classification:** [REDACTED]

**Classified By:** [REDACTED]  
**Derived From:** [REDACTED]  
**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Thanks for offering your thoughts. At this point, I'm not sure it would be productive for me to address them one by one, though I do think you're mischaracterizing what it is we're asking for and our rationale for it.

We were hoping to avoid a dissent, hence this long email chain. Especially because the edits we'd like to see are about inserting IC-coordinated language, adding a caveat to a judgment but not changing it, and describing some relevant online content. In my experience, those are the types of things that can and should be worked out in coordination. But if we can't resolve them here, then we can consider a dissent.

[REDACTED]  
Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, September 02, 2020 4:33 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

INR supports using the original language.

Additionally, we want to highlight three concerns that we have here at INR as we've watched this exchange:



- [REDACTED] we believe our evidence for China not interfering in the U.S. election is stronger than you are acknowledging. We can and should make a judgement call about whether China is interfering, not leave it up to the reader to read between the lines.
  - [REDACTED] should not be used to justify a conclusion that "it could be happening but we just don't see it." This sets an artificially high bar for evidence—that we must possess empirical evidence to *disprove any possible alternative outcome*. This flawed logic could be used to justify any conceivable argument one wants to make, and implies more uncertainty than actually exists. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - In this case, we actually *do* possess positive evidence about China's intent—and it suggests China probably is not interfering in the election. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- China's influence efforts to shift public opinion on particular policy issues are not the same as election interference, nor are they intended to influence the election. We object to language that blurs the line between these two activities and implies interference is happening, without stating it directly.
- Lastly, based on the last interagency call and lack of dissent to the original draft, it appears there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China's activities. If the NIC election threat team disagrees, then it would be more appropriate to insert these views as a standalone dissent to the majority view, rather than rewriting the community consensus every time we publish on this topic.

Thanks, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
INR/EAP, Department of State  
[REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 4:13 PM

To: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[illegible]

We think we need to keep the language on preference in. It illuminates why we're discussing China in this context in the first place and provides context for the rest of the para. That line has been IC-coordinated multiple times and briefed to a wide variety of customers—it's strange to suddenly stop using it, especially if you're going to mention risk calculus (why would risk calculus be relevant if they didn't have a preference?). This is important for providing a complete picture of China's considerations on this issue. And we have language for the other countries that shows what their preferences are. Our alternative was supposed to only apply to the second half of that first sentence, so apologies if that wasn't clear.

Thanks for putting the “pro-China influence actors” sentence back in the para. For that one, we ask you use the sentence we provided: “Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President’s policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED]” We think we need to acknowledge the partisan nature of some of that content.

DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026



the graphic, especially since it [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] efforts. We would be fine either including the sentence we tacked on below in the paragraph or in the graphic body itself where we discuss [REDACTED] but feel a separate paragraph about it is unnecessary given the [REDACTED] around the activity. Please see below for our suggested language.

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection, but we have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We assess that China is not at this time trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This assessment is based partially on [REDACTED] as well as judgements regarding Chinese leaders' risk calculus and overall understanding of the bilateral relationship. We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective. Beijing also continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. (CIA Note: Removed for redundancies.) China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the social, political, and policy environments in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government, efforts which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election. However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that echo Beijing's rhetoric, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Let us know if this works for you and we will move it forward.

Thank you very much for your patience,  
CIMC, EAPMC, CCI

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 1:37 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]





be used to influence the 2020 election. However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains.

We also disagree with excluding the language on [REDACTED], etc. We think this is the most notable new information on the China election story and should be addressed up front somehow in our current update. If we can't compromise on building that into the chapeau, then we'd like to add a separate paragraph with our comment on this.

██████████ National Intelligence Council note: Unidentified pro-China influence actors ██████████ have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, ██████████

[REDACTED] we have observed China-based actors spreading narratives regarding the election; so far, the campaigns have been small in scale, gained little traction, and were promptly shut down by social media companies. If these activities are directed or sanctioned by Beijing they could be the precursor to [REDACTED] targeting the election [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Director, Election Threat Analysis  
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 02, 2020 11:31 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]

| Administration          | Percentage of respondents |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| Current administration  | 100%                      |
| Previous administration | 0%                        |

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Thank you for your continued engagement on this issue. Below, please see our suggested language taking on board your comments about a desire to see an increased reflection of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as well as more description about what Beijing is doing at this time. Our language below also incorporates comments we received from the IC throughout the coord process:

We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective, but at this time is not trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. Beijing continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government, which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains.

For transparency, below is how we parsed your suggestions:

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection. Although as of [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, Chinese officials have [REDACTED] that they could use to try to sway the outcome: [REDACTED]

[CIA Note: We are cutting



this because it does not parallel with the rest of the graphic, which leads with China's candidate preferences, rather than an assessment on potential Chinese actions. We also feel that the inclusion of [REDACTED] discussions is outdated for the [REDACTED] update.) We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective, but is not at this time trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. Beijing continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government (CIA NOTE: Taken from NIC language.), which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (CIA NOTE: Taken from NIC language.) However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains. Beijing has begun incorporating election-related themes and direct mention of political candidates into its efforts to influence US attitudes and policies on China, and we assess Chinese officials are aware that these efforts could impact the election. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him; [REDACTED] however, we do not know if these campaigns are directed by the Chinese Government or if they are the work of individuals operating on their own. (CIA Note: We are cutting this because to our knowledge, the only campaign this refers to is the [REDACTED], which we as an IC have not finished evaluating, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], none of which we assess are authoritative. We include the [REDACTED] in the body of the graphic but don't feel it rises as of yet—pending further analysis-- to the level of inclusion in the chapeau). China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government overt and covert influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government.

Please let us know what you think! We look forward to engaging further on this issue.

Best,  
EAPMC, CIMC, CCI

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 10:19 AM

To: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
=====

Hi all,

Thanks for your willingness to discuss this. For the China lead para, we think that the original and the alternative we talked about yesterday are too definitive, given the [REDACTED] about the

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]

We suggest the following, which is a combination of language from our recent NICA and your original. We think this better accounts for our [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection.

Although as of [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, Chinese officials have

[REDACTED] that they could use to try to sway the outcome. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Beijing has begun incorporating election-related themes and direct mention of political candidates into its efforts to influence US attitudes and policies on China, and we assess Chinese officials are aware that these efforts could impact the election. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED] However, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government.

For the two footnotes on 2016 and 2018, I suggest editing to say "which **would have been** inconsistent with **our understanding of** its strategic foreign policy objectives **at the time**" to be clear that this is our assessment and that it applies to past years. Again, we think there is more gray area with regard to what's going on in 2020 than the original implies.

Let us know what you think. Thanks.

[REDACTED]  
Director, Election Threat Analysis

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2020 2:17 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Please see consolidated CIA comments on your inclusions and let us know if or when you would like to chat about the language.

Best,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, August 31, 2020 12:54 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Classification:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

As always, thanks for the chance to coord. NIC comments are in the attachment. We'd like to see the China and [REDACTED] language again before we sign off. Happy to chat about our input on those or the other sections. Thanks.

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

**From:**

**Sent:** Thursday, August 27, 2020 3:57 PM

**To:**

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Please see attached for the latest edition of our graphic, "Election Security: Status of Adversary Efforts TO Influence the 2020 US Presidential Election, as of 25 August." This edition mentions **Russia, China, Iran, and [REDACTED]** Please send comments to the cc line by COB Tuesday, 1 September.

- Russia: [REDACTED]
- China: [REDACTED]

Thanks!

■

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EEMC/RUMB/Strategic & Asymmetric Warfare

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]  
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Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Derived From: [REDACTED]  
Dated: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]  
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Classification: [REDACTED]  
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Classification: [REDACTED]  
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Classification: [REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]

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INFO PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE  
FM DIRECTOR FBI  
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/ROUTINE  
INFO 24AF LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/  
543 ISR GP LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING/ROUTINE/  
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CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/ROUTINE/  
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2///ROUTINE/  
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI/ROUTINE/  
CDR USPACOM JECG HONOLULU HI/ROUTINE/  
CDR USPACOM LO WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
CDR USSTRATCOM ABNCP OFFUTT AFB NE/ROUTINE/  
CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE/ROUTINE/  
CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//J2/ROUTINE/  
CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL/ROUTINE/  
CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL/ROUTINE/  
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CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA /ROUTINE/  
CDRNGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA/ROUTINE/  
CIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DCIS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC//INTEL///ROUTINE/  
DIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/  
DIRMSIC REDSTONE ARSENAL AL/ROUTINE/

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIRNAVCRIMINSERV WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/  
DNI WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
DTRA OPSCENTER WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
HQ AFOSI ANDREWS AFB MD/ROUTINE/  
HQ AFOSI DOQ ANDREWS AFB MD/ROUTINE/  
HQ AFOSI QUANTICO VA/ROUTINE/  
HQ NORAD USNORTHCOM INTEL PETERSON AFB CO/ROUTINE/  
HQ USNORTHCOM//J2///ROUTINE/  
HQ USSOUTHCOM SECURITY AND INTEL MIAMI FL/ROUTINE/  
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LEGAT BEIJING/ROUTINE/  
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NRO WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/  
BT

SERIAL: [REDACTED] IIR 4 212 7305 20

DATE OF PUBLICATION: [REDACTED] 2009251123Z

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-----  
COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: [REDACTED] United States; China

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Chinese Government Production and Export of Fraudulent US Drivers Licenses to Chinese Sympathizers in the United States, in Order to Create Tens of Thousands of Fraudulent Mail-in Votes for US Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, in late August 2020

DATE OF INFORMATION: [REDACTED] 00 AUG 2020

SUMMARY: [REDACTED] None.

SOURCE: [REDACTED] A collaborative source with indirect access, none of whose reporting has been corroborated for less than one year.

CONTEXT: [REDACTED] The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.

WARNING: [REDACTED] This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence. It is being shared for informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated, integrated with other information, interpreted or analyzed. Receiving agencies are requested not to take action based on this raw reporting without prior coordination with the FBI. Unless a conviction in a criminal proceeding occurs, a presumption of innocence exists for any person being reported on in this IIR.

TEXT:

1. [REDACTED] In late August 2020, the Chinese government had produced a large amount of fraudulent United States drivers licenses that were secretly exported to the United States (NFI). The fraudulent drivers licenses would allow tens of thousands of Chinese students and immigrants sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party to vote for US Presidential Candidate USPER Joe ((Biden)), despite

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

not being eligible to vote in the United States. China had collected private US user data from millions of TikTok accounts, to include name, ID and address, which would allow the Chinese government to use real US persons' information to create the fraudulent drivers license. The fraudulent drivers licenses were to include true ID number and true address of US citizens, making them difficult to detect. China planned to use the fraudulent drivers licenses to account for tens of thousands of mail-in votes.

COMMENTS:

1. [REDACTED] FBI COMMENTS: A persons address information was not a valid field when creating a TikTok account. It was unspecified how China would attain US address data from the application.
2. [REDACTED] Source is available for re-contact.

TOPIC: [REDACTED]

FUNCTIONAL CODE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

INSTR: [REDACTED] US Yes. Contact FBIHQ for additional details

DATE OF ACQUISITION: [REDACTED] 24 AUG 2020

POC: [REDACTED]

Please direct Requests for Information (RFIs) to

[REDACTED] on [REDACTED] or  
[REDACTED] Advise if the request is  
time-sensitive, and include a date or time-frame required for a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

response. Direct comments, evaluations, and SDRs to

[REDACTED] or

[REDACTED] Request for direct  
declassification should be sent to

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Requests concerning foreign disclosure and ORCON release should be  
sent to [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED] Include the  
serial number and subject line of the report in the correspondence.

WARNING: [REDACTED] Report classified [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

=====DISSEMINATION=====

AGENCY: [REDACTED] CIA; Coast Guard; DEA; DHS; Defense; Energy; FBI;  
Justice; NGA; NRO; NSA; ODNI; State; Treasury; White House

U.S. MISSION: [REDACTED] Beijing

MILITARY: [REDACTED] Air Force; Army; DIA; Defense; Navy

STATE/LOCAL: [REDACTED] None

=====CLASSIFICATION=====

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

## ASSESSMENT

19 August 2020

NICA 2020-06885D

### Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections

#### (U) Key Takeaways

*Scope Note: This is a downgraded version of a paper originally published on 19 August, 2020, and includes information current as of that date. This paper updates NICM 2020-32, [REDACTED]*

*[REDACTED] and NICM 2020-033, [REDACTED] which also addresses China's broader influence efforts. This paper does not make assessments about the impact of these efforts on the US. It also does not discuss efforts that the IC cannot attribute to foreign actors.*

(U) Ahead of the 2020 US elections, foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures in their attempts to sway US voters' preferences and perspectives, shift US policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our democratic processes.

- [REDACTED] Foreign states or other actors may seek to compromise our election infrastructure for a range of possible purposes, such as interfering with the voting process, stealing sensitive data, or calling into question the validity of the election results. We judge that Russia, China, Iran, as well as many nonstate actors, have the capability to conduct such activities, although it would be difficult for them to

manipulate voting processes at scale and without detection.

[REDACTED] We are primarily concerned about ongoing and potential influence activity by Russia, China, and Iran.

- [REDACTED] We assess that Russia is using a range of measures primarily to denigrate former Vice President Biden and what it sees as an anti-Russia establishment. For example, it is directing or encouraging proxies to spread claims about Vice President Biden. Some Kremlin-linked actors are also seeking to boost President Trump's candidacy on social media. More broadly, Moscow's efforts seek to amplify social discord in the US and undermine Washington's global standing.
- [REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that President Trump be defeated; in the past few months it has stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration, which it recognizes may affect the election. Although [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] online [REDACTED] influence, and collecting

(U) This assessment was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Cyber. It was drafted by the National Intelligence Council [REDACTED]

Questions may be directed to the NIO [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED] | Derived From: [REDACTED] | Declassify On: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



derogatory information about US public officials [REDACTED]

[illegible]

- [illegible]

██████ We also are monitoring for signs that other countries or nonstate actors such as criminal groups are acting on their preferences for the election and attempting to covertly influence public opinion, disrupt election operations, or jeopardize election data with tactics such as the use of ransomware.

(U) Election Terminology

(U [REDACTED]) **Election influence** includes overt and covert influence activities of foreign governments or actors serving as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign governments intended to directly or indirectly affect a US election—including activities targeting candidates, political parties, voters or their preferences, or political processes. **Election interference** is a subset of election influence involving the technical aspects of the election, including activities targeting voter registration, casting and counting of ballots, and the reporting of results.

(U) **Russia**

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] President Putin and senior Russian officials are overseeing efforts by proxies—[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]—to spread claims about former Vice President Biden as well as Ukrainian politicians and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 US election. These claims include that when the former Vice President was in office, he engaged in criminal activity in his dealings with Ukraine and individuals tied to Ukrainian energy firm Burisma. Derkach, Kilimnik, and other proxy actors

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affiliated with the Russian Government are advancing such narratives with US officials and other prominent persons as well as online, including through personal interactions and audio and documentary film releases via US and Ukrainian media outlets.

- [REDACTED] These figures are conspiring to intensify their efforts as the election approaches to orchestrate a high-profile corruption scandal implicating former Vice President Biden and the Democratic Party at the peak of the 2020 US presidential campaign. Their aim is to defeat the former Vice President and ensure the President's victory. Some of these proxy actors anticipate that Ukraine-themed narratives about Democratic corruption will play a decisive role in the election and that US persons are key to propagating these narratives.

[REDACTED] Since our assessment in May, [REDACTED] Russia continues to use state media, social media, and other online media platforms to denigrate the former Vice President, the Democratic Party, and the US political "establishment," and to promote divisions in the country. This content has largely been favorable to the President, but on occasion it criticizes his administration for policies that run counter to Russian interests.

- [REDACTED] Russian actors have circulated narratives about voter fraud resulting from mail-in balloting and called some US primary voting processes "rigged" by the Democratic Party.
- [REDACTED] Some Russian actors have shifted their focus from social media to on-line news sites. Since last year, the Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation (GRU) have employed cadres of US and other foreign authors to create anti-American and US-focused political content on English-language news platforms, including

"United World International," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These groups leverage their US contacts to seed their narratives more broadly into Western media,

[REDACTED] We continue to assess that Russia's understanding of US electoral dynamics and its assessment of who is likely to win will guide its calculus as the election approaches. Ongoing cyber operations could inform or fuel further influence efforts. For example, as of June 2020, [REDACTED] reconnoitered multiple state and local government websites [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]; we do not know the purpose of this effort. In July, a commercial cybersecurity company believed [REDACTED] may have targeted a US political organization, probably unsuccessfully, though we cannot independently attribute the activity. Russia for years has targeted and collected information about current and former US Government officials, which it could leak to the public at any time.

#### (U) China

[REDACTED] *We assess that China prefers that the President—whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China—does not win reelection. Although [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] online [REDACTED] influence, and collecting derogatory information about US public officials [REDACTED]*

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China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract more pro-China positions and to punish those whom Beijing views as opposed to China's interests. It also employs disinformation and critical statements attacking the US Government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and other issues, such as the closure of the Houston Consulate, Hong Kong, the legal status of the South China Sea, and China's efforts to dominate the 5G market. [REDACTED] a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical of President Trump before it was deactivated by social media platforms; [REDACTED]

We assess Beijing probably calculates that a concerted effort to [REDACTED] influence the Presidential election would [REDACTED] backfiring and offer uncertain benefit, but [REDACTED] also recognizes [REDACTED] critical statements might affect the race.

- [REDACTED] a newspaper owned by the Chinese [REDACTED] claimed that economic measures Beijing could take against supporters of legislation and lawsuits seeking compensation from China over the COVID-19 pandemic may impact US state and congressional races. This is the first time we have observed Beijing issue a public warning that suggests it is willing to impose economic costs that could affect US elections.

[REDACTED] we judge that China will [REDACTED] evaluate the implications of various electoral outcomes on its interests. If Beijing were to assess that the increasingly downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise and could not be dealt with using existing tools, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through online [REDACTED] influence network.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]

the 2020 US elections by carrying out opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities in efforts to collect information on US political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Beijing has expanded its cyber collection of data related to

### Threats to Election Infrastructure

[REDACTED] We assess that hostile actors could exploit Internet-connected election infrastructure—such as voter registration databases, pollbooks, and state or local election officials' websites—because of its ease of access and comparative lack of security. These systems are designed for accessibility, commonly through web portals, making them vulnerable to a range of malicious cyber activities. A committed adversary could potentially use access to these systems to disrupt or sow doubts about our democratic election processes.

[REDACTED] We assess that hostile actors could also manipulate systems that count or tabulate votes—such as voting machines—on a localized basis, but it probably would be difficult to coordinate a campaign to alter voting results on a wide scale. Post-election audits and paper trails also most likely would uncover such efforts in the nearly all US states. Similarly, foreign actors would have difficulty coordinating a large scale campaign to manipulate mail-in voting, and robust postal tracking probably would detect any large-scale effort.

[REDACTED] Cyber operations targeting the reporting of electronic tabulation results could delay reporting but probably would not affect the integrity of certified results. Denial of service attacks would also delay public access to results.

### (U) Iran

[REDACTED] *Iran is conducting an influence campaign to undermine the current President and US democratic institutions, and to divide the country in advance of the 2020 elections.* Tehran sees the current administration as promoting regime change in Iran,

[REDACTED] a view that increases the Iranian leadership's interest in trying to prevent the President's reelection. Iran's efforts probably will focus on online covert influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-US content. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Supreme Leader Khamenei probably has authorized the influence campaign. These efforts focus largely on creating or amplifying social media content that criticizes the President and recirculating existing news reports, memes, and hashtags focused on US civil unrest, domestic protests for racial justice, mail-in voting, and the administration's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

- [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Over the past two years, social media companies have removed thousands of Iranian-origin inauthentic accounts—some with links to the Iranian Government—that have shared information critical of both the current President and other

presidential candidates and that even impersonated a candidate in 2018. Tehran also uses these accounts to attempt to influence US audiences by promoting messages aligned with Iranian policies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Tehran's links to some of these efforts.

[REDACTED] Iran could attempt to manipulate or attack election infrastructure—as it has in elections in the Middle East and South Asia—but we do not have any information indicating that it intends to do so in the United States. It could also seek to collect and publicly release damaging information.

- [REDACTED] In January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FBI worked with the company to remediate the problem.

- [REDACTED] In June, Google announced that Iranian-linked cyber actors had unsuccessfully attempted to spearfish email accounts associated with campaign staffers working for the US President. Iran pursues such efforts in part to acquire derogatory information it could release publicly, as well as to inform its broader aims of weakening the US and damaging its standing abroad.

#### (U) Other Foreign Actors

[REDACTED] A range of other foreign actors have expressed preferences for the outcome of the election. We have reporting on a few that have either considered or taken steps to attempt to covertly influence US voters, presidential candidates, or US politics surrounding the election. For example:

- [REDACTED] Senior Turkish officials, including President Erdogan, believe that segments of the US Government have an entrenched, anti-Turkey viewpoint, and as a result have sought to covertly influence US politicians' and political candidates' thinking on

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Turkey. Ankara's efforts have, over the past year, included covert funding of US municipal election campaigns, unregistered lobbying efforts, and messaging on social media by state-owned outlets.

- **Criminal or other nonstate groups** also have the capability to compromise US election infrastructure. Gaining access to election-related systems could allow them to disrupt the voting process, steal sensitive data, or undermine confidence in the election results, but we do not know whether any of them have specific plans to do so. Some incidents have already occurred; in April, unidentified actors used ransomware to compromise the computers of a Virginia county administrator and vote registrar, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Other foreign actors have preferences for the outcome of the US presidential election, and in the runup to November 2020 they may express their views in statements to the press, in diplomatic channels, or privately. Most probably will make only oblique or tempered public comments to avoid the appearance of trying to shape the outcome of the election. For example:

- **German** Chancellor Merkel almost certainly would prefer that President Trump not win reelection because of personality conflicts

between the two leaders and her perception that the current administration's policies have complicated Germany's, the EU's, and NATO's geopolitical positions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In public remarks in July, she implicitly criticized the President's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in June she cited the 2020 election as a "risk factor" for the EU during a private video call with other European leaders.

- [REDACTED] In mid-2019, **Saudi** Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman expressed concern that Riyadh would lose US support for its priorities if the President were to lose the election in 2020, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] the President was the most Saudi-friendly of any US President, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]

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## Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape

This graphic describes efforts by selected countries to attempt to manipulate aspects of the US political landscape over at least the past four years. It is not intended as a comparison of the scope, scale, or level of effort of each country's influence

activity. For example, the scope and scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's, and Russia has leaked intelligence-acquired information more often than Iran.



Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic



Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent



Observed




### EFFORTS

|                                           |                                                                                                                         | RUSSIA                                                               | CHINA                                                             | IRAN                                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Public opinion ( <i>overt</i> )           | <i>Releasing press statements, state-run media content</i>                                                              | Observed                                                             | Observed                                                          | Observed                                                             |
| Public opinion ( <i>covert</i> )          | <i>Covertly messaging on social media</i>                                                                               | Observed                                                             | Observed                                                          | Observed                                                             |
| National leaders/policy                   | <i>Covertly influencing Executive Branch or Congressional leaders' thinking or policies</i>                             | Observed                                                             | Observed                                                          | Observed                                                             |
| State or local leaders/policy             | <i>Covertly influencing state or local government leaders' thinking or policies</i>                                     | Observed                                                             | Observed                                                          | Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic |
| Leaking intelligence-acquired information | <i>Publicizing information gathered through intelligence operations to damage a US political figure or organization</i> | Observed                                                             | Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent | Observed                                                             |
| Election processes                        | <i>Targeting, accessing, or manipulating election processes or election-related systems</i>                             | Observed                                                             | Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent | Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent    |
| Legal processes                           | <i>Influencing US law enforcement investigations, prosecutions, or other aspects of the US legal process</i>            | Observed                                                             | Preliminary or preparatory steps, with or without specific intent | Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic |
| Economic leverage                         | <i>Offering economic inducements to secure policy concessions</i>                                                       | Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic | Observed                                                          | Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic |
| Punitive measures                         | <i>Retaliating for US decisions or actions</i>                                                                          | Observed                                                             | Observed                                                          | Not observed, not aimed primarily at United States, or only symbolic |

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[REDACTED]



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## CIA NOTE

(U) Subject:

Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018 – 2020

.....

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## CIA NOTE

(U) Subject:

Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018 – 2020

██████████ The following contains portions of sensitive reporting that was disseminated between 2018 and 2020 related to the People's Republic of China (PRC). This is not a comprehensive synopsis or summary of all reporting disseminated during that time period:

- ██████████ In mid-2018, the Chinese Communist Party's policy was to leverage all domestic and foreign elements that were opposed to the U.S. President in an effort to reduce the U.S. President's votes and make him resign or prevent his re-election. ██████████
- ██████████ Also in mid-2018, China was working to influence the results of the U.S. mid-term elections, and later the results of the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. As part of this campaign, China was analyzing the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections and identifying U.S. states who voted for the U.S. President. The Chinese would then identify sectors within these states that voted to support the U.S. President's political party, and would attempt to make these sectors experience negative financial consequences by levying tariffs on exports to China from those sectors. The Chinese hoped that these measures would induce representatives from these sectors to lobby the U.S. President. ██████████
- ██████████ As of mid-2018, the PRC's ultimate goal with regard to the U.S. elections was for the U.S. President not to be re-elected. China found the uncertainty of the U.S. administration unsettling. ██████████
- ██████████ Separately, the Chinese Government used a number of means to exert influence over individuals it believed would speak on behalf of Chinese interests with senior U.S. officials. China regularly extended invitations to influential U.S. individuals to travel to China for speaking engagements for which they were paid significant speaking fees, along with first-class travel and accommodation. This was effective particularly with think tank officials, academics, and former U.S. government employees. The goal of these activities was to get either U.S. corporations or U.S. individuals "hooked on China." By doing so, the Chinese relied on hitting these entities in the wallet to force them to talk with the U.S. President about tariffs. ██████████
- ██████████ In mid-2019, China assessed that a means to gain advantage over U.S. policy was to direct additional, unspecified resources toward political swing states, as China assessed these states would play a crucial role for the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Along with this, it was also recommended that China apply pressure to

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## CIA NOTE

financial supporters of the U.S. President's re-election campaign. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Separately, in mid-2019, the Chinese Government's strategy against the United States was focused on undermining domestic confidence in the U.S. President. The strategy included efforts to use Chinese contracts with big U.S. companies to influence U.S. business leaders to turn against the U.S. President. The Chinese Government sought to identify U.S. journalists who had reported negatively on the U.S. President and pay them to write more negative articles about him. The Chinese Government wanted the U.S. President to lose the next election. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



President's Daily Brief

THURSDAY, 25 JUNE 2020

FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Beijing Escalating Efforts To Shape US Policies on China*

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] warn a White House official that Beijing had derogatory information on him in an effort to compel him to take a restrained approach to China, [REDACTED] China's attempt to use blackmail against a US administration official. [REDACTED] reveal the information through social media. We assess that this threat is credible. Lower level Chinese officials have recommended collecting and using "black materials" against perceived anti-China US officials since at least January 2019. This is the most detailed and authoritative recommendation that we have seen.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

☆☆☆

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

**PRC Analysis on U.S. Voter Registration Information from Multiple States, Conduct U.S. Identity Matching and Public Opinion Analysis; 2019**

**(U) DETAILS**

PRC analysis on U.S. voter registration data contained U.S. voter registration records from the Mid-term Elections. the data contained personal identifiable information (PII). it would be used for mining PII on U.S. citizens. Additionally, the data could be used to analyze, discover, the identities of U.S. citizens. the information would be used to conduct opinion analysis on the U.S. General Election. Furthermore, to continue state voter registration data.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




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


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[REDACTED]

|            |                                                                                                             |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]                                                                                                  |
| [REDACTED] | U.S. Consumer database [REDACTED]                                                                           |
| [REDACTED] | U.S. Voter Registration database [REDACTED]                                                                 |
| [REDACTED] | U.S. Voter Registration databases from [REDACTED] State Governments of [REDACTED] Georgia, Iowa [REDACTED]. |
| [REDACTED] | Registered U.S. Military Personnel Information database [REDACTED]                                          |

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] comprehensive PII baseline on [REDACTED] U.S.  
persons— [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

PRC [REDACTED] discuss targeting 2024 US elections: [REDACTED] 2023 information [REDACTED]

[illegible]

**(U) Correction**

[illegible]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## (U) Key points

[REDACTED] The essential element in this report is as follows:

- PRC [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] to target the 2024 US elections.

## (U) [REDACTED] Analysis

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is unknown if [REDACTED] were instructed to target unidentified 2024 US elections by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## (U) Details

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] shared [REDACTED] data with [REDACTED] PRC [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
The [REDACTED] data [REDACTED] shared [REDACTED] included [REDACTED], and voter registration information from Named US state entity 1 (US-1).

## (U) Election

[REDACTED] On [REDACTED] July, [REDACTED] wanted to [REDACTED] the election system as the following year was the US election. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *This is a reference to an unidentified 2024 election, almost certainly the 2024 US Congressional or Presidential elections.* [REDACTED] to join an effort to [REDACTED] an unidentified swing state to observe the voting situation ahead of time. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] requested [REDACTED] a list of swing states. *This is almost certainly a reference to US electoral swing states, suggesting their discussion is regarding the 2024 US Presidential election.*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

PRC

U.S. Presidential Election-related Intelligence in 2020;  
Publicly Available Information from U.S. Government Website

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PRC

increase of U.S. Presidential  
election-related intelligence, collected publicly available information from a U.S.

[REDACTED] learned from public

sources that information published on [REDACTED] on the U.S. [REDACTED] website [REDACTED] 2020 U.S. Presidential election infographics and products. [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] infographics and products, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the products consisted of [REDACTED] infographics and [REDACTED] maps, which would provide election officials, interested parties, and voters with information for mail-in voting, post-election, and election returns procedures, as these procedures differed according to state or administrative jurisdiction area, or both. [REDACTED] the products provided procedures to implement countermeasures for rumors, and to safeguard the 2020 U.S. Election. [REDACTED] U.S. Presidential election information products were:

- mail-in voting processing map, [REDACTED], and provided a visualization of each state's mail-in voting procedures;
- mail-in voting 2020 policy change map, [REDACTED] a map [REDACTED] state's changes stemming from the COVID-19 epidemic;
- mail-in voting election [REDACTED] safeguards infographic, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] a post-Presidential Election process timetable from [REDACTED] Election Day 2020 through [REDACTED] Inauguration Day; and
- election results reporting risks and mitigation measures [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

PRC

Shares 2020 U.S. Voter Registration  
Data for Cities within Seven U.S. States in 2023

A PRC provided with requested  
U.S. voter data from several cities within seven U.S. states on 2023.

and

if had any data on the U.S. states of Connecticut and Massachusetts on 2023.

responded that would ask

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated [REDACTED] had previously purchased 2020 voter data and provided [REDACTED] with a sample of U.S. voter data that contained data from cities within Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, Michigan, and North Carolina. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

|            |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

|            |            |
|------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY****Summary:**

Ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections, China had extensive plans to utilize potential [REDACTED] and cyber operations to sway public opinion against the Trump Administration and international opinion against the U.S. Government. The China plans were designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities, to influence U.S. and other audiences, and by extension U.S. government decision-making. The plans addressed several scenarios, including military conflict between the U.S. and China, as well as other potential crises.

The [REDACTED] operations themes covered a broad range of topics, to exploit what China perceived to be U.S. fissures and vulnerabilities (perceived or real), including:

- Economic recession:
  - Encouraging violent demonstrations and looting, to increase the appearance of social unrest;
  - Intensifying Americans' disapproval of the President of the United States, calling into question his ability to govern; and
  - Overall undermining the legitimacy and public support of the President of the United States.
- Ineffective USG COVID-19 response:
  - Increasing public dissatisfaction with the President of the United States by questioning his fitness to govern and undermining public support for his actions.

China had developed capabilities to project themes on these topics into social media (Tiktok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others), as well as mainstream media through a variety of overt and hidden influencers and media contributors. One of the options included gathering information on senior U.S. government officials to influence public opinion of those officials.

**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY****Summary:**

Ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections, China had extensive plans to utilize potential [REDACTED] and cyber operations to sway public opinion against the Trump Administration and international opinion against the U.S. Government. The China plans were designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities, to influence U.S. and other audiences, and by extension U.S. government decision-making. The plans addressed several scenarios, including military conflict between the U.S. and China, as well as other potential crises.

The [REDACTED] operations themes covered a broad range of topics, to exploit what China perceived to be U.S. fissures and vulnerabilities (perceived or real), including:

- Racial tensions:
  - Alleging that White people hate Black people;
  - Inciting demonstrations and marches as evidence of racial divides;
  - Increasing the level of conflict between police and anti-racism activists; and
  - Feeding any sense that U.S. law enforcement resents USG and people of color.
- USG tensions with the U.S. military;
- Political party disagreements;
- Congress-Trump Administration conflicts;
- Women's rights;
- U.S. South China Sea policies;
- Alleged U.S. war aspirations; and
- International propaganda.

China had developed capabilities to project themes on these topics into social media (Tiktok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others), as well as mainstream media through a variety of overt and hidden influencers and media contributors. One of the options included gathering information on senior U.S. government officials to influence public opinion of those officials.

**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY****Summary:**

Ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections, China had extensive plans to utilize potential [REDACTED] and cyber operations to sway public opinion against the Trump Administration and international opinion against the U.S. Government. The China plans were designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities, to influence U.S. and other audiences, and by extension U.S. government decision-making. The plans addressed several scenarios, including military conflict between the U.S. and China, as well as other potential crises.

The [REDACTED] operations themes covered a broad range of topics, to exploit what China perceived to be U.S. fissures and vulnerabilities (perceived or real), including:

- Gun proliferation; and
- Immigration policies;
  - Inciting migrant community dissatisfaction with the USG;
  - Instigating demonstrations against the USG's alleged human rights violations against immigrants;
  - Inflaming resentment between anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant communities; and
  - Instigating anti-immigration demonstrations.

China had developed capabilities to project themes on these topics into social media (Tiktok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others), as well as mainstream media through a variety of overt and hidden influencers and media contributors. One of the options included gathering information on senior U.S. government officials to influence public opinion of those officials.



**Tab 1**

- Electronic media reviewed
- People identified for an interview
- Relevant personnel link chart
- IIR dissemination flow chart (generic)
- IIR recall decision tree
- IPPG relevant sections

**Tab 2**

- FBI Albany IIR#1 dissemination flow chart
- FBI Albany IIR #1 recall flow chart
- Pertinent electronic communications on 09/25/2020
- Log of direct electronic communication between DAD Floris and DAD Ugoretz
- Recalled IIR

**Tab 3**

- Emails from Albany discussing the IIR and Director Wray's testimony

**Tab 4**

- FBI Albany IIR #2 flow chart
- Pertinent electronic communications from 09/26/2020 – 10/08/2020
- DAD Floris IM with OGA

**Tab 5**

- FITF lead to FBI Chicago flow chart

**Tab 6**

- IIR recall statistics from 2019-June 2025





## Inspection Division Intelligence Reporting Strategic Review 07/07/2025 - 07/20/2025

### FBINET

**21456**

Total FBINET Emails Reviewed

**24289**

Total Skype Messages Reviewed

**27**

Count of FBINET Accounts

**23**

Count of Skype Accounts

### UNET

**10351**

Total UNET Emails Reviewed

**692**

Total Text Messages Reviewed

**23**

Count of UNET Accounts

**16**

Count of Phones

### SCINET

**1432**

Total FBINET Emails Reviewed

**14**

Count of SCINET Accounts

### Totals

**58220**

Total Items Reviewed

**103**







Total Accounts Reviewed

**DRAFT**

| Name          | Contacted | Scheduled Date     | Reinterview Time   | Interview #1 | Interview #2 | Interview #3 | Interview #4 | Status            |
|---------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
|               | Yes       | July 10 at 3pm     | July 14 at 10:30am | Serialized   | Serialized   | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 15 at 9am     |                    | Serialized   | Serialized   | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 15 (phone)    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 9am     | July 14 (am)       | Serialized   | Serialized   | Serialized   | Serialized   | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 10 at 3:30 pm | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 1pm     | July 15 (am)       | Serialized   | Serialized   | Serialized   | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | TBD                |                    |              |              |              |              | Unable to contact |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 1pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | TBD                | July 15 (phone)    | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 11am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 11am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 10 am   | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
| Nikki Floris  | Yes       | TBD                |                    |              |              |              |              | Unable to contact |
| Tonya Ugoretz | Yes       | July 16 at 3 pm    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 14 at 10am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 10 at 2:30pm  | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 10am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 14 at 11am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 14 at 2pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 14 at 4pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 1 pm    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 4pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 12pm    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | TBD                |                    |              |              |              |              | Unable to contact |
|               | Yes       | July 10 at 4pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | No        | July 14 at 5:15pm  | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 10 at 11am    | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 11 at 1pm     | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |
|               | Yes       | July 14 at 1:45pm  | N/A                | IIC Reviewed | N/A          | N/A          | N/A          | Serialized        |

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




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## IIR Dissemination Flow Chart



### DRAIN Criteria – (Per RIRM, 2019)

**Detailed** – Each IIR must contain intelligence sufficiently detailed to be of operational, investigative, and/or analytic value

**Respects the Rights of USPERs** – IIRs must respect the rights of USPERs to participate in constitutionally protected activities, such as speech and assembly.

**Authoritative** – IIR authors, reviewers, and releasers must ensure that the source of the information in the IIR could credibly have had access to the information provided.

**Of Interest** – IIRs must address a valid intelligence requirement to be considered “of interest.”

**New** – IIRs should contain information that the USIC does not already have or cannot obtain through open sources.

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
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# (U//FOUO) DECISION TREE

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(U) Intelligence Program Policy Guide

(U//FOUO) BLG reports must be written by IAs. (For more information, see the [Bureau Control System BLUEGEM Policy Guide \[1012PG\]](#) [links to a SECRET//NOFORN policy document]).

**9.2. (U) Thresholds for Raw Intelligence Product Types**

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence product types must meet the "DRAIN" threshold to be suitable for release as FBI raw intelligence reports. Additional threshold requirements exist for each type of raw reporting as well.

**9.2.1. (U) DRAIN Threshold**

(U//FOUO) All four raw intelligence product types must meet the DRAIN threshold. DRAIN stands for:

1. (U) Detailed
2. (U) Respectful of the rights of USPERs
3. (U) Authoritative
4. (U) Of Interest
5. (U) New

(U) For additional guidance on meeting the DRAIN threshold, see the FBI [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

**9.2.1.1. (U//FOUO) Detailed**

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence reports must contain actionable intelligence and must be sufficiently detailed to be of operational, investigative, or analytical value to recipients.

**9.2.1.2. (U//FOUO) Respectful of the Rights of United States Persons**

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence reports must be respectful of the rights of USPERs to participate in constitutionally protected activities, such as freedom of speech and the right to assemble. A raw report cannot solely describe activities and the expression of thoughts that are protected by the U.S. Constitution. Raw reports may include USPER information only if (1) the USPER's identity is necessary to understand the report or to assess its importance, (2) dissemination is limited to entities that have the subject matter of the report as part of their authorized functions, and (3) the identification of the USPER does not compromise any operation or investigation. The IPM (or designee) must determine that these requirements have been met in order to identify an USPER. The authoring FBIHQ division or FO does not need to obtain legal review to name the USPER unless the raw report meets another legal review trigger, as articulated in [subsections 9.2.2.3.](#) and [9.4.4.](#) of this PG.

**9.2.1.3. (U//FOUO) Authoritative**

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence report authors, reviewers, and approvers must determine that the source of the information in the raw report could credibly have had access to the information provided. The credibility of the source's placement and access is specific to each report, the report author must make an assessment for each report based on the information provided by the source, as well as any information provided by subsources.



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(U) Intelligence Program Policy Guide

**9.6.3. (U) Public Corruption Information Report Documentation**

(U//FOUO) Disseminated PCIRs must be stored in Sentinel. PCIRs must be serialized to the INTELPRODS subfiles of the investigative Assessments or case files from which their information was derived. All PCIRs must be serialized to file 804B-HQ-C3043777 in Sentinel.

**9.6.4. (U) BLUEGEM Report Documentation**

(U) BLG reports must be documented according to the procedures outlined in subsection 4.6. of the [Bureau Control System BLUEGEM Policy Guide \(1012PG\)](#) [links to a SECRET//NOFORN document].

**9.7. (U) Dissemination, Revision, or Recall of Raw Intelligence Product Types**

**9.7.1. (U) Dissemination, Revision, or Recall Process for Intelligence Information Reports**

**9.7.1.1. (U) Limited Distribution of Intelligence Information Reports**

(U//FOUO) A limited-distribution IIR must be held to the same dissemination thresholds as a standard-dissemination IIR. Limited-distribution IIRs may only be used for circumstances in which the reported intelligence is exceptionally sensitive in nature. When drafting a limited-distribution IIR, the distribution list may not be so limited that the IIR is released to a single agency or solely within the FBI.

(U//FOUO) For more information and guidance on limited-distribution IIRs, see the [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

**9.7.1.2. (U) Intelligence Information Report Revisions and Recalls**

(U//FOUO) A revision is a correction resulting in the reissuance of an IIR with the same serial number. A recall uses the same serial number to announce the cancellation of an IIR. An IIR may be revised or recalled for either administrative or substantive reasons. If a report needs to be revised or recalled for both administrative and substantive reasons, the report must be labeled a substantive revision or a substantive recall.

(U//FOUO) ODNI guidelines do not allow for the modification of a subject line or the administrative page. If either change is necessary, the entire IIR must be recalled and reissued with a new serial number. Report authors must not cite the original report or the administrative recall in the reissued report.

(U//FOUO) For more guidance on recalling or revising IIRs, see the [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

**9.7.2. (U) Dissemination, Revision, and Recall Procedures for Situational Information Reports and Public Corruption Information Reports**

(U//FOUO) FBIHQ divisions/FOs authoring SIRs must ensure that the approved SIRs are disseminated to the appropriate state, local, and tribal LE partners. Revision and recall procedures for SIRs and PCIRs must follow the same processes mandated for IIRs in [subsection 9.7.1.](#) of this PG.

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# FBI Albany IIR #1 Dissemination Flow Chart



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# FBI Albany IIR #1 Recall Flow Chart

## Friday, 25 September 2020



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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

| Time<br>(approximate) | September 25, 2025                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7:23 a.m.             | FBI Albany disseminates IIR 4 212 7305 20.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 10:19 a.m.            | Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF)-China personnel receive IIR via email.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 10:27 a.m.            | FITF-China SIA [REDACTED] reaches out via Skype to FBI Albany SIA [REDACTED] regarding IIR.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 10:57 a.m.            | SIA [REDACTED] emails IIR to FITF SC Bradley Benavides (Benavides) and FITF ASC [REDACTED]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 11:59 a.m.            | SIA [REDACTED] emails FBI Albany team, "I spoke with [REDACTED] earlier in case he receives inquiries from operation components at HQ, but to make sure others involved in this IIR are also in the loop, I received a call from two SIAs at FBIHQ/CD who indicated this IIR was getting highlighted within CD and they had a few questions...."                                                                    |
| 12:34 p.m.            | CD DAD Nikki Floris receives IIR via email from SC Benavides.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 1:43 p.m.             | FBI Albany SA [REDACTED] emailed FBI Albany team, "...earlier today I had a conversation with FBIHQ IA about his IIR..."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 4:18 p.m.             | DAD Floris sends email to A/DAD CID Brian Cohen (Cohen), CID [REDACTED] cc'ing CyD DAD Tonya Ugoretz (Ugoretz), CyD ASC [REDACTED] and SC Benavides, "Hi team CID, Are you guys tracking this IIR? Given the topic, this is obviously going to get quite a bit of attention. Thoughts on CID adding in some additional analysts comments on this to put this reporting into context?"                               |
| 4:24 p.m.             | DAD Ugoretz replies to DAD Floris' email, "Thanks. This is fun."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 4:35 p.m.             | DI SC Kellie Hardiman (Hardiman) emails DI Raw Intelligence Coordination Unit (RICU) UC [REDACTED] "In addition to the IIR we discussed this morning, another election related IIR went out today that is creating a stir. DAD Floris wants us to work with the FITF to push out guidance...."                                                                                                                      |
| 4:52 p.m.             | SC Benavides emails SC Hardiman, "Thanks for helping us out...the NY and Albany FOs have pushed two IIRs in the past two days, neither of which should have gone out in my opinion...that said, I've asked the FITF to craft language that FOs can use directing them to coordinate with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence prior to its dissemination..." and forwards this email to DAD Floris at 5:08 p.m. |
| 4:53 p.m.             | ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris and states "[i]t's first contact with a source. They were trying to get in front of the source a second time. It never should have gone out and we recommend an admin recall."<br>DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.                                                                                                                                         |
| 4:55 p.m.             | DAD Floris responds "Awesome, thanks [REDACTED] So is AL going to recall this? Just FYI, I've hit up the DI about ALL election related IIRs having to come through HQ for review. More to follow on that!"                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 5:06 p.m.             | ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "An IIR AL sent out today is getting a lot of attention from all HQ divisions. We know that the source is first contact and hasn't been reinterviewed. Are you considering recalling the IIR until you can track the source down and re-interview? Everything election is getting scrutiny and we just want to be sure we have reliable sourcing."                             |
| 5:08 p.m.             | ASC [REDACTED] responds to DAD Floris, "I shot the SIA a message explaining the situation and asking them to recall, at least, until they re-interview the guy. Seems like everyone was caught off guard by it."<br>DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.                                                                                                                                        |

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



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|           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5:09 p.m. | DAD Floris responds, "Good deal, thanks again [REDACTED] Let us know if you need anything from us on this. Totally concur to pull this back til we get back in front of this guy. TGIF right 😊"                                      |
| 5:15 p.m. | SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "...We have no reason to recall at this point. [REDACTED] has been trying to recontact the CHS this afternoon."                                                                                 |
| 5:17 p.m. | ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "Hey, right after I got off the phone with you, I was contacted by Cyber DAD and CD DAD. They are directly requesting it be recalled until he is re-interviewed..."                             |
| 5:20 p.m. | ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris, "I talked to the SIA [REDACTED]. They aren't looking to recall it, they believe it meets DRAIN. I warned them this may get elevated and they said their SAC and ASAC are aware of the interest..." |
| 5:21 p.m. | ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris, "[t]his is moving fast. He just notified me they will recall it. Boom mic drop."                                                                                                                   |
| 5:22 p.m. | DAD Floris responds, "AAAAAAAH SNAPS!!!! Well done [REDACTED] THANK YOU for handling!!!"                                                                                                                                             |
| 5:24 p.m. | SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "Can who give me the names of the DADs so we can cite that?"                                                                                                                                    |
| 5:24 p.m. | DAD Floris responds to SC Benavides with others CC'd (including DAD Ugoretz) email regarding FOs coordination with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence, "FYI . . . we'll get this back in a box!"                               |
| 5:24 p.m. | DAD Floris separately responds to SC Benavides regarding FOs coordination with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence to only FITF SC, "TY! AL going to recall their IIR."                                                         |
| 5:25 p.m. | ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "Yup. Nikki Floris (CD) and Tonya Ugoretz (Cyber). They are over the Intel shops."                                                                                                              |
| 5:28 p.m. | SC Benavides responds via email to DAD Floris, "Fact or suggestion for them to recall?"                                                                                                                                              |
| 5:32 p.m. | DAD Floris responds to SC Benavides via email, "Fact. Boom."                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 6:14 p.m. | SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "The IIR has been submitted for recall..."                                                                                                                                                      |
| 6:31 p.m. | ASC [REDACTED] emails group including DAD Floris and DAD Ugoretz, "All, the IIR has been recalled. Crisis averted! We will stay engaged for when they track the source down again."                                                  |
| 6:35 p.m. | DAD Floris replies to ASC [REDACTED] group email, "Outstanding, thanks all!"<br>DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.                                                                                             |

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

[REDACTED]  
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

**STRATEGIC REVIEW**  
**ALBANY IIR**  
**07/08/2025 – 07/20/2025**



**DAD Nikki Floris and DAD Tonya Ugoretz**  
**9/25/2020 Conversations**

| Time:<br>(Skype -4hr UTC)     | Account: | From:   | To:                                                                              | Summary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------------------------|----------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12:32 Local<br>16:32:00 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | another fucking IIR went out re election security                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 12:34 Local<br>16:34:09 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | 4 212 7305 20                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 16:06 Local<br>20:06:26 (UTC) | Skype    | Ugoretz | Floris                                                                           | oh crap                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 16:06 Local<br>20:07:31(UTC)  | Skype    | Ugoretz | Floris                                                                           | how's the sourcing on the new IIR?                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 16:18 Local<br>20:18 (UTC)    | FBINET   | Floris  | COHEN, BRIAN<br>[REDACTED]<br>UGORETZ, TONYA<br>[REDACTED]<br>BENAVIDES, BRADLEY | Hi team CID, Are you guys tracking this IIR? Given the topic, this is obviously going to get quite a bit of attention. Thoughts on CID adding in some additional analysts comments on this to put this reporting into context? Thanks! Nikki |
| 16:24 Local<br>20:24 (UTC)    | FBINET   | Ugoretz | Floris                                                                           | Thanks. This is fun.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 16:27 Local<br>20:27:48 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | i don't even know what to say anymore                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 17:22 Local<br>21:22:21 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | you all have the montly fitf stuff on yellow                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 17:21 Local<br>21:22:27 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | let's rally up monday and make sure we're all good                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 17:22 Local<br>21:22:33 (UTC) | Skype    | Floris  | Ugoretz                                                                          | im out of energy and brain power at this poitin                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 17:48 Local<br>21:48:18 (UTC) | Skype    | Ugoretz | Floris                                                                           | It's a plan(d)                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |

[REDACTED]  
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT



IIR (Rev. 01-25-13)

DTG: 2009252204Z

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/ROUTINE

INFO 24AF LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/

543 ISR GP LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/

AMEMBASSY BEIJING/ROUTINE/

CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE/ROUTINE/

CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/ROUTINE/

CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2///ROUTINE/

CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI/ROUTINE/

CDR USPACOM JECG HONOLULU HI/ROUTINE/

CDR USPACOM LO WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

CDR USSTRATCOM ABNCP OFFUTT AFB NE/ROUTINE/

CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE/ROUTINE/

CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE//J2/ROUTINE/

CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL/ROUTINE/

CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL/ROUTINE/

CDR USTRANSCOM TCJ2 SCOTT AFB IL/ROUTINE/

CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA /ROUTINE/

CDRNGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA/ROUTINE/

CIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DCIS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC//INTEL///ROUTINE/

DIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/

DIRMSIC REDSTONE ARSENAL AL/ROUTINE/

DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/

DNI WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

DTRA OPSCENTER WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

[REDACTED]

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 00 AUG 2020

SUMMARY: (U) None.

SOURCE: (U) A collaborative source with indirect access, none of whose reporting has been corroborated for less than one year.

CONTEXT: (U//FOUO) The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.

WARNING: (U) SUBSTANTIVE RECALL: This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence. It is being shared for informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated, integrated with other information, interpreted or analyzed. Receiving agencies are requested not to take action based on this raw reporting without prior coordination with the FBI. Unless a conviction in a criminal proceeding occurs, a presumption of innocence exists for any person being reported on in this IIR.

TEXT:

(U//FOUO) NOTICE: This is a SUBSTANTIVE RECALL of an intelligence information report which was originally issued as FBI IIR 4 212 7305 20, original DTG 2009251123Z. Reason for SUBSTANTIVE RECALL: This report was recalled in order to re-interview the source. Recipients should destroy all copies of the original report and remove the original report from all computer holdings. Recipients should also ensure that any citation of the information in finished intelligence products draws on the SUBSTANTIVE RECALL of this report rather than the previous version.

TOPIC: (U//FOUO) FINT

FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC2637

REQUIREMENT: (U//FOUO) CHN2019A.I.B.7.3; CHN2019A.I.A.3.1;  
CHN2019A.I.A.3.2; RUS-ANARCHIST\_EXT-CD-SR-0978-20.I.C.4;  
RUS-ANARCHIST\_EXT-CD-SR-0978-20.I.C.2;

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BT

-----  
SENSITIVE - FOR OFFICIAL FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY  
-----

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES: (U) Please remove the Administrative (Tickler) Page of this communication when sharing the contents of this Intelligence Information Report with any non-FBI employees as the Administrative (Tickler) Page may contain sensitive information regarding Intelligence sources and methods, FBI investigative activity, and or US Person Information.

(U//FOUO) A determination has been made by the Intelligence Program Manager that the identification of USPER(s) in this IIR is reasonably believed to be necessary to understand the IIR, convey intelligence information (e.g., imminent threat), or assess its importance. The Intelligence Program Manager further certifies that the PLA of this IIR has been narrowly tailored to include only those agencies reasonably believed to need this information in the performance of their authorized functions.

(U//FOUO) The counterintelligence and foreign intelligence PLAs with LEGAT/AMEMBASSY Beijing was utilized for this report.

(U//FOUO) DRAIN was conducted by EIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

late August 2020

ORIGINATING OFFICE: (U) ALBANY  
SOURCE DOCUMENT SQUAD: (U) AL-3 CI

COUNTRY: (U) People's Republic of China; United States of America

----- SOURCE INFORMATION - PROTECT IDENTITY -----  
(U//FOUO) This section contains sensitive source information that cannot be released in whole or in part to FBI personnel without a need-to-know or persons or agencies outside the FBI.

SOURCE: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

1. MOTIVATION: (U//FOUO) The source was motivated by a sense of indebtedness towards the United States after being granted asylum, and did not approve of the manner with which the PRC was governed.
2. ACCESS TO SOURCE INFORMATION: [REDACTED] The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source in China who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials.
3. TIMELINESS TO SOURCE OF INFORMATION: (U//FOUO) The source obtained the information on an unspecified date prior to or on 23 August 2020. The FBI acquired the information on 24 August 2020. The date of information was masked for source protection.
4. CORROBORATION OF INFORMATION: (U) None.
5. HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH FBI: (U//FOUO) The FBI opened the source on 14 August 2020.

THREAT: (U) No.

OPERATIONAL AGENT: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

COLLECTING AGENT/TFO: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

GROUP: (U) None.

SERIAL NUMBER: (U) IIR 4 212 7305 20

LIAISON: FIELD: (U) None.

DRAFTED BY: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

PHONE NUMBER: [REDACTED]

RECEIVED BY: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

PHONE NUMBER: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Please conduct legal review for naming a USPER in this report. Thanks. (Requested review from D9-NSLB-IIR (UC))

[REDACTED]

2020-09-23T15:39:19.299-04:00

(U) For NSCLB review and approval. (Forwarded request for review to [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

2020-09-24T08:17:01.676-04:00

(U//FOUO) NSCLB reviewed and has no objections/comments. Thanks.

FILE UPLOAD:

(U) 802I-AL-49205-INTELPRODS Serial 207 and 800A-HQ-C1591622 Serial 175047

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

(6)

**From:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 10:20 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Subject:** IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. Personally, I am highly skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
  - How trustworthy is source?
  - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
  - Does the Source believe this?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

2

Newman, Katherine

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:00 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - Thanks for the info. I would like to send to SSA [REDACTED] the below. Let me know what you think, and I'll send it to SSA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Thanks.

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- o How was source found?
- o What is Source's Access and Placement?
- o Source's Reliability:
  - o How trustworthy is source?
  - o How competent/knowledgeable?
- o Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- o Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
  - o Does the Source believe this?
  - o Was the Coronavirus reporting received from the same identified subsource, or was it from multiple subsources?

Regarding the Subsource:

- o What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- o What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- o What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)
- o The first IIR had a source context statement that contained - The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.
  - o Does the subsource have access to PRC government officials? Or was the intelligence from one official?

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 10:20 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Subject: IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
TRANSITORY RECORD

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. Personally, I am highly skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
  - How trustworthy is source?
  - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
  - Does the Source believe this?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]



9

**From:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:29 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
  - How trustworthy is source?
  - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
  - Does the Source believe this?
  - Was the Coronavirus reporting received from the same identified subsource, or was it from multiple subsources?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)
- The first IIR had a source context statement that contained - The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.
  - Does the subsource have access to PRC government officials? Or was the intelligence from one official?

SSA [REDACTED] - Can you also please send us the V file information that you and SIA [REDACTED] discussed earlier.

Thank.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

=====  
Classification: [REDACTED]

11

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:56 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED] - A new 1023 will be needed, that will have updated date of acquisition and contact, with an updated source context statement. AND it will have to run the gamut at HQ for review/approval.

Again, the reporting will contradict Director Wray's testimony.

Thanks.

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:37 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

No re-issue of the same IIR either? If not, what is our reason for not releasing it again?

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:24 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Gummersheimer, Molly Megan (SU) (FBI)

**From:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, October 2, 2020 8:28 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
Thanks for your feedback [REDACTED]. In speaking with [REDACTED] yesterday, we are planning to release the IIR once we receive a new 1023, assuming our current understanding of all the info remains the same. We are now required to coordinate the new IIR with FBIHQ, so that's non-negotiable. The reason for the new 1023 is to show we attempted to obtain new information from the CHS after recalling the original version. If we sent out a new IIR, from the same original 1023 that was the source document for a recalled IIR, it would appear to the consumer and FBIHQ that we didn't attempt to gain new information, and to FBIHQ we might look pretty foolish because they have all the background now. A new 1023 will also give us a new date of info, but that's a very minor detail and not the primary reason we're requesting a new 1023. [REDACTED] comment about the Director's testimony was not to suggest we refrain from disseminating the IIR, rather to ensure everyone is aware of the attention this is likely to receive.

[REDACTED]  
**From:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 01, 2020 2:16 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====  
(U) Good Afternoon Everyone,

(U) I'm not trying to be a pain on this, but after taking some time thinking this over I just want to voice my opinion and concerns on this issue and make it clear I do not agree with the reasoning for not putting this out.

[REDACTED] Regarding the below, I'm not satisfied with the reasoning of needing a new 1023 and HQ review as these things are everyday operational and administrative requirements. Most concerning to me, is stating the reporting would contradict Director Wray's testimony. I found this troubling because it implied to me that one of the reasons we aren't putting this out is for a political reason, which goes directly against our organizations mission to remain apolitical and simply state what we know. Likewise, at the field operational level, I do not feel it is our job to assess whether or not our



intelligence aligns with the Director, rather we provide intelligence for people way above our paygrade (like the director) to make the call of what the FBI is seeing as a whole.

[REDACTED] I do agree that we have an obligation to not put out reckless information where we know something to be false or will cause undue harm. However, we are also not in a sole position to determine a reporting's validity, as we only make up one USIC agency, and an incredibly small fraction of all USIC, and other FBI Sources that could report on this matter. While it's entirely possible that our CHS's sub-source did not get this information from a PRC government source, it's also entirely possible that he did- (as just like in our own government) it is plausible that a journalist would have a source within the government.

[REDACTED] Recognizing the unidentified PRCG officials and plausibility of the information and that recipients would not have access to the MATCH section, I elected to include the following context statement:

"[REDACTED] The acquisition of the source's information passed through a sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials, leaving the veracity of information questionable but is being reported due to the nature of the threat being discussed."

(U//FOUO) Per the IIR PIG, "The dissemination threshold is lower for threat reporting. Concerns regarding the source's reliability should be articulated in the source byline, source context statement, and motivation, access, timeliness, corroboration, and history (MATCH) questions. This allows each recipient to independently determine whether to take action on a given threat. Sample context statements include the following:

'(U//FOUO) The veracity of this source's information is seriously doubted but is being reported here because of the nature of the threat discussed.'

(U//FOUO) I believe this allowed us to release the potentially important intelligence, while also highlighting our lower confidence in the information. However this statement was requested to be reworded prior to release, to "The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials."

(U//FOUO) Overall, if we want to have a disagreement about meeting the elements of DRAIN, I'm completely okay with that. My concern is that I think it gets dangerous if we cite potential political implications as reasons for not putting out our information. Further, I think we are starting to drift too far into being the sole decider for the USIC regarding when information we gather is, or is not valid, or of interest to the intelligence community because it takes away the crucial opportunity from the rest of the USIC to potentially corroborate or discredit our intelligence. I think that we should at least draft and submit the IIR to FBIHQ to review, and if they decide that they want to cancel it, let that be their burden.

(U) Again, I obviously don't make the decisions, and I'm not sure if FBIHQ has provided you all with additional reasoning of why they told us to recall the IIR, but I just wanted to express my concerns. Happy to talk about this anytime.

V/r,

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:56 AM

To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]


Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FBI Albany IIR #2 Flow Chart



UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT



| Date/Time (approximate) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 09/26/2020 12:43 p.m.   | FBI Albany SIA [REDACTED] sends CID ASC [REDACTED] an email, "I've been talking with our IPM throughout the IIR process. Our current plan is to release an IIR again if the SA confirms the info from the CHS..."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 9/28/2020 11:46 a.m.    | SIA [REDACTED] emails Albany team, "...got a call from an SIA and UC at CD. Not surprisingly, all raw reporting concerning the election will now require HQ coordination, which was not required as of last week."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 9/28/2020 11:49 a.m.    | SIA [REDACTED] Skype messages FBI Albany CRO [REDACTED] regarding IIR, "Regarding the election IIR - if it comes through again and we look to re-release the info, do we have any concern about the authoritative nature of the reporting....figuring this is going to get even more scrutiny if we try to release the info again"                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 9/28/2020 11:52 a.m.    | CRO [REDACTED] Skype message replies to SIA [REDACTED] "yes it will get A LOT more scrutiny, but the source doc has China Government....not the fraudulent licenses."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 9/28/2020 11:53 a.m.    | SIA [REDACTED] Skype message replies to CRO [REDACTED] "right but wondering if that info, from the same sub-source, calls into question the authoritative nature of the reporting. Trying to get ahead of the scrutiny."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 9/28/2020 12:13 p.m.    | FBI Albany IA [REDACTED] emails Albany team about CHS reporting, "Given the lack of specifics we received in the initial reporting, my first opinion was that the CHS wants to help and is probably supplementing his reporting via open sources which is what [REDACTED] and I were working to get through follow on RFCs and meets."                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 9/28/2020 3:58 p.m.     | FBI Albany SA [REDACTED] emails Albany team about CHS reporting, "...advised that her/his most recent reporting-specifically regarding the fraudulent use of drivers' licenses-was obtained from an individual in China. I asked if s/he had read about the aforementioned fraudulent use of drivers' licenses in a newspaper and [REDACTED] said no."                                                                                                                                                  |
| 9/28/2020 4:06 p.m.     | Raw Intelligence Coordination Unit (RICU) sends email to CROs and CRAs providing RICU guidance to threats to U.S. Elections IIR reporting. "CROs, handing agents, and EIAs <b>should coordinate</b> with the appropriate HQ Division, notably FITF, Cyber, and/or CID's election teams, using the following email addresses, <b>prior to disseminating IIRs</b> on any information related to the 2020 elections."                                                                                      |
| 9/28/2020 6:13 p.m.     | Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) issues lead to FBI Chicago, "In order to determine if any of the fraudulent driver's licenses seized by CBP were used to register to vote, the Foreign Influence Task Force-China (FITF-C) respectfully requests the local field office coordinate with CBP regarding the seizure of fraudulent driver's licenses."                                                                                                                                                 |
| 9/29/2020 10:20 a.m.    | A/CRO [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] "Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories." |
| 9/29/2020 11:07 a.m.    | FITF issues second lead to FBI Chicago, informing of FBI Albany IIR recall and asking for FBI Chicago to reach out to CBP, "The Foreign Influence Task Force-China (FITF-C) is providing an update to the Chicago Field Office to the lead set on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |



|                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      | 09/28/2020 in 200I-HQ-3164550 Serial 5 where 802I-AL-5645455-INTELPRODS serial 30(IIR 4 212 7305 20) was referenced. For Chicago's awareness, the aforementioned IIR was recalled late 09/28/2020; however, the intelligence gaps outlined by FITF-C still stand regarding the seized licenses."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 9/29/2020 11:29 a.m. | CRO [REDACTED] uses A/CRO [REDACTED]'s email and copies into an email to FBI Albany SSA [REDACTED], ccing SIA [REDACTED] stating, "Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President...." And asks additional question regarding CHS.                                                                                                                                           |
| 9/29/2020 11:57 a.m. | SSA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and A/CRO [REDACTED] additional information regarding CHS including new CHS reporting serialized 9/29/2020 with sub-source information.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 9/30/2020 11:24 a.m. | CRO [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "SIA [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED] and I just spoke and agree with DMC [REDACTED] that there's nothing new to report regarding the threat to election. We will await SA [REDACTED]'s subsequent contact with the CHS."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 9/30/2020 11:37 a.m. | SIA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "No re-issue of the same IIR either? If not, what is our reason for not releasing it again?"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 9/30/2020 11:56 a.m. | CRO [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "SIA [REDACTED] - A new 1023 will be needed, that will have updated date of acquisition and contact, with an updated source context statement. AND it will have to run the gamut at HQ for review/approval. Again, the reporting will contradict Director Wray's testimony."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 9/30/2020 1:14 p.m.  | DI Communication sends email to all FBI Intel leaders (IPM, IPC, SSAs) providing same guidance from September 28 email regarding election-related raw intelligence reporting. "'CROs, handing agents, and EIAs <b>should coordinate</b> with the appropriate HQ Division, notably FITF, Cyber, and/or CID's election teams, using the following email addresses, <b>prior to disseminating IIRs</b> on any information related to the 2020 elections....This same guidance regarding IIRs was provided....on September 28."                                                                                                                                                     |
| 10/01/2020 2:16 p.m. | IA [REDACTED] sends email to FBI Albany team regarding concerns, "Regarding the below....Most concerning to me, is stating the reporting would contradict Director Wray's testimony. I found this troubling because it implied to me that one of the reasons we aren't putting this out is for a political reason, which goes directly against our organizations mission to remain apolitical and simply state what we know...."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 10/02/2020 8:28 a.m. | SIA [REDACTED] replies to IA [REDACTED] email, "...we are planning to release the IIR once we receive a new 1023, assuming our current understanding of all the info remains the same....The reason for the new 1023 is to show we attempted to obtain new information from the CHS after recalling the original version. If we sent out a new IIR, from the same original 1023 that was the source document for a recalled IIR, it would appear to the consumer and FBIHQ that we didn't attempt to gain new information, and to FBIHQ we might look pretty foolish because they have all the background now...." [REDACTED] comment about the Director's testimony was not to |



[REDACTED]

|                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                       | suggest we refrain from disseminating the IIR, rather to ensure everyone is aware of the attention it is likely to receive."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 10/02/2020 1:56 p.m.  | SSA [REDACTED] Skype messages CD Special Assistant [REDACTED] "Hey [REDACTED] Long time no talk. I hope all is well! Do you have a free moment today to chat on lync? It's regarding a recalled IIR"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 10/02/2020 2:19 p.m.  | SSA [REDACTED] Skype messages FBI Albany ASAC [REDACTED] "I have an additional piece of intel"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| 10/05/2020 10:53 a.m. | IA [REDACTED] sends email regarding IIR #2 sent to SSA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] for coordination.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 10/05/2020 11:00 a.m. | SSA [REDACTED] sends email to IA [REDACTED] "Done. Thank you. [REDACTED] will be singing on in the next hour or two to complete it."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 10/05/2020 1:11 p.m.  | FBI Chicago covers FITF Leads by coordinating with CPB noting, "Unfortunately, we (CBP) do not maintain a list of names and addresses that are found on these counterfeit licenses. Our office must take a risk-based approach to the research based on sheer volume alone. The overwhelmingly majority of these documents are procured by teens between the ages of 18 and 20 who then modify their DOB, to presumably try and circumvent alcohol laws." |
| 10/05/2020 4:01 p.m.  | A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages FITF IA [REDACTED] "essentially i'm getting pressure to reissue it, but thanks to the first time, we need to coordinate with FITF, so I may make you guys the bad guys, because I probably wouldn't have put it out to begin with"                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 10/05/2020 4:04 p.m.  | SIA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] "You may have seen the IIR ....is back in the queue... [REDACTED] might have to conduct that coordination and send it out as the A/CRO if the coordination goes smoothly. However, [REDACTED] does not feel the info is authoritative and would not send it out if acting as to CRO."                                                                                                                                |
| 10/05/2020 4:19 p.m.  | IA [REDACTED] emails UC [REDACTED] "I just wanted to let you know, IA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in Albany just hit me up over this IIR....He mentioned some drama over a week and half ago and he's getting pressure to reissue it?? He's looking for somebody to coordinate with in the FITF..."                                                                                                                                                             |
| 10/06/2020 3:39 p.m.  | A/CRO [REDACTED] sends email "Draft Election IIR for Coordination" to CD FITF-China and CYD - Election WG. Email contained new context statement for source.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 10/06/2020 4:40 p.m.  | UC [REDACTED] acknowledges A/CRO email and sets up meeting for 10/07/2020.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 10/07/2020 (unknown)  | Skype meeting between FBI Albany and FITF-China personnel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 10/07/2020 2:53 p.m.  | A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages IA [REDACTED] "the thing is, I dont want to put it out but am getting pressure from the supervisors and ASAC."<br>A/CRO [REDACTED] continues Skype conversation with IA [REDACTED] "I personally wouldnt have put it out, but my CRO did and now no one wants to show up in an IG report"                                                                                                                                 |
| 10/07/2020 2:54 p.m.  | A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages FITF SIA [REDACTED] "Hey, I want to apologize, I didnt know I was unmuted."<br>SIA [REDACTED] responds, "Thanks for the clarity and for the apology. I totally get your perspective of wanting top cover..."<br>A/CRO [REDACTED] responds, "between us, I wouldn't' have put it out, but my CRO did, and now I think everyone is afraid of being viewed as partisan."                                                     |

[REDACTED]

|                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      | SIA [REDACTED] responds, "its nothing to do with partisanship...its legit the information and we'd be trying to drill down regardless" "but again I get it."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 10/07/2020 3:30 p.m. | SIA [REDACTED] continues Skype message with A/CRO [REDACTED] "[REDACTED] another thought for you" "it could also come across as partisan putting the report out with such a strong title and no sourcing to back it up..."                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 10/07/2020 3:41 p.m. | A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages SIA [REDACTED] "it sounds like your SSAs got [REDACTED] onboard towards not putting it out, so hopefully he can convince my ASAC"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 10/08/2020 2:36 p.m. | UC [REDACTED] sends email to SSA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and A/CRO [REDACTED] "Just following up, as I know you talked to some of our team yesterday - wanted to reiterate that we have not approved a reissue, specifically because of our concerns that the reporting is not authoritative. Please let us know if you'd like to continue to pursue a reissue and we can discuss next steps for continuing the discussion..." |
| 10/08/2020 3:41 p.m. | SSA [REDACTED] emails FBI Albany SAC Thomas Relford, "The FITF China group does not want us to reissue the IIR that was recalled two weeks ago. After speaking with the FITF China team yesterday I agree with their assessment. Please let me know if you would like any additional information."                                                                                                                               |
| 10/15/2020 (unknown) | IA [REDACTED] deletes draft IIR #2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |



9.28.25

DRAFT

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:48 AM:

good morning sunshine!

do you have any read aheads for your fitf update? I'll have to leave early to go to the nakasone prep should all be fun

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:48 AM:

yep, let me shoot you an email!

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:49 AM:

thanks!

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:57 AM:

unrelated

do you have a serial for that IIR you mentioned to me last week re: China/

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

it's recalled

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:58 AM:

OK

talkign to PDB briefer

that's why i'm asking

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

4 212 7305 20

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:58 AM:

she is also asking if there was a revision on the russia one

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

there should have been, yes

revision to the source statement

but i haven't seen it . . . my team's not in yet to confirm though

let me check sentinel

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:59 AM:

OK

i looked in our system but didn't see it

but the system i use to look at your IIRs is not friendly so it might be there somewhere :)

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:00 AM:

yeah, doesn't look like they've pushed out a revision yet

for fucks sake

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:00 AM:

OK

The Director has the original in his book this AM

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:00 AM:

great

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:00 AM:

#funneverends

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:01 AM:

seriously

we're pushing out a note today to all FOs that all election related IIRs must come through FITF/HQ

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:01 AM:

that's good

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:02 AM:

i'm basically running a shadow government across the FBI at this point

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:02 AM:

**DRAFT**

you do what you have to do

:)

hang in there

i told [REDACTED]

you just need to get thru dec

and there are a couple of weeks in nov/dec where it is a ghost town

**FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:03 AM:**

no joke, i want to take like a two week vacay in january

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:05 AM:**

my goal is to take a month off - July 2021

I am sked to finish here June 2021

then I plan to take july off

that's my goal

**FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:09 AM:**

don't leave :(

**FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:23 AM:**

since alan can't sit in on the PDB brief, can you let me know how the convo goes about the IIRs??

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:23 AM:**

yes

will le tyou know for sure

**FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:23 AM:**

grazie!

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:23 AM:**

if your bosses have an 0930, suspect the meeting will be short

we are only up to [REDACTED] and it is almost 0830 :)

**FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:24 AM:**

good lord

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:24 AM:**

yeah


i had a few things but i'll just pass

this always happens when i actually have a few things that might be useful to the group - lol



DRAFT

## FITF Lead to Chicago Flow Chart



(U//FOUO) According to Sentinel, the FBI has published approximately 1,130 Recalls from 01/01/2019 to the present.

| Calendar Year     | # of Substantive Recalls | # of Administrative Recalls | # of FISA-Compliance Recalls | Total # of Recalls/Year |
|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 2019              | 112                      | 97                          | N/A*                         | 209                     |
| 2020              | 64                       | 90                          | 0                            | 154                     |
| 2021              | 46                       | 120                         | 2                            | 168                     |
| 2022              | 116                      | 87                          | 1                            | 204                     |
| 2023              | 105                      | 66                          | 1                            | 172                     |
| 2024              | 57                       | 82                          | 1                            | 140                     |
| 2025<br>(to date) | 19                       | 51                          | 13                           | 83                      |
| <b>TOTAL</b>      | <b>519</b>               | <b>593</b>                  | <b>18</b>                    | <b>1,130</b>            |

\* (U//FOUO) The FISA-Compliance Recall was introduced in February 2020 as a separate product type for recalls related to FISA-compliance.

|                                           |           |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Albany Field Office 2020 IIR Total</b> | <b>86</b> |
| Albany Field Office 2020 Recall Total     | 1         |

**The only recall is:** 802I-AL-49205-INTELPRODS 207

**SUBSTANTIVE RECALL** - Chinese Government Production and Export of Fraudulent US Drivers Licenses to Chinese Sympathizers in the United States, in Order to Create Tens of Thousands of Fraudulent Mail-in Votes for US Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, in late August 2020



**SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY**

**SUBSTANTIVE REVISION: Network Defense Notice: Publicly Available U.S. Voter Registration Information for Six U.S. States Downloaded from Commercial Websites by PRC CNE Actor in January 2022; Same Actor Attempts to Download Ohio Voter Registration Application;**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This is a revised copy. The State of Oklahoma has been added. In addition, the websites hosting the voter registration records are commercial websites, and that fact has been clarified in the report. Please remove the original report from all manual and computer files.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Publicly available U.S. voter registration information for six states was downloaded by a PRC, [REDACTED], CNE actor on 14 January 2022. The CNE actor [REDACTED] Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island voter registration information from U.S. commercial websites and a U.S. IP address. In addition, an Ohio voter registration application was also of interest to the CNE actor, but failed to download.

[REDACTED] Voter registration information from at least 2013 through 2021 is publicly available for download from the commercial websites and it appears the PRC CNE actor downloaded the full repositories. This activity represents newly-identified interest by this PRC CNE actor in U.S. elections, and the PII information obtained - to include names, party affiliations, email addresses, physical addresses, and phone numbers - could, in theory, be leveraged to carry out anything from future CNE operations to election influence operations, although the actual motivations for collecting this information is unknown.

[REDACTED] The victim information was passed to the appropriate agencies for CND response actions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island States' historical U.S. voter registration information from 2013 to 2021 was downloaded by a PRC CNE actor on 14 January 2022 from U.S. commercial websites, and a U.S. IP address hosting, among other things, U.S. state voter registration information. (T1594) [REDACTED] On the same day, an Ohio voter registration application was also of interest to the PRC CNE actor, but failed to download from the U.S. State Government's website .

[REDACTED] While the PRC government has historically demonstrated interest in U.S. elections, this is a newly-identified interest for this individual actor. The U.S. voter registration information is available for public download, with 2021 voter registration information available for some states. The PRC actors could, in theory, leverage the PII information obtained - to include names, party affiliations, email addresses, physical

1. [REDACTED] CISA and the NCJTF CYWATCH have established a Victim Notification process that provides a systematic way to contact organizations during cyber incidents. Before anyone outside of the Federal Cybersecurity Centers contacts a U.S. victim, the notification should be deconflicted through CISA and NCJTF CYWATCH, using the contact information below:

2. [REDACTED] According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, T1594 describes how adversaries may search websites owned by potential victims for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info. These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.



addresses, and phone numbers - for anything from future CNE operations to election influence operations, although the actual motivations for collecting this information is unknown.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Election security organizations should be aware that U.S. State voter registration information may be hosted on websites outside the control of government agencies, and that APT actors may harvest voter registration information outside the monitoring of election security organizations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]





# GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY



July 13, 2026

In May 2026, President Trump created the Government Transparency Task Force within the White House Executive Office of the President for the purpose of advising him, through the Counsel to the President, on documents that should be declassified and/or released to the public to further his administration's priorities of transparency and accountability.

Today the Government Transparency Task Force announces the first disclosure of U.S. Intelligence Community records that were declassified last week under the direction of President Trump.

The declassified intelligence reveals that voter registration rolls from at least 18 states (not all identified by name) have been compromised by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Additional intelligence records reveal that more than 200 million voter records were also compromised by the PRC, without state-specific affiliations.

President Trump is alerting Congressional and state government leadership officials to the election infrastructure vulnerabilities in states identified by name in the declassified intelligence records.

- Alaska
- Arkansas
- Colorado
- Connecticut
- District of Columbia
- Florida
- Georgia
- Iowa
- Kansas
- Maryland
- Michigan
- New York
- North Carolina
- Ohio
- Oklahoma
- Rhode Island